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Abstract 
 
From the perspective of behavioral finance, this thesis utilizes the real estate data 
since China's market-oriented reform to investigate the influence of sentimental variables 
and expectations on real estate prices. 
As the first topic of the research, Chapter 2 of this thesis takes China’s state level 
Consumer Expectation Index as proxy variable of consumers’ aggregated sentiment, and 
adopts the method of time series to empirically research on the relationship between the 
sentiment and China’s real estate prices. The research result indicates that there is long-term 
cointegrating relationship between the consumers’ aggregated sentiment and real estate 
prices, and the influence of the sentiment on real estate prices is stronger than the 
fundamental indicators in the traditional analytical framework such as M2, GDP, etc. 
For the purpose of further distinguishing the influence of psychological factors on 
real estate prices, and investigating data at a more detailed level, Chapter 3 of the thesis 
adopts panel data model to research the influence of sentiment of the market opinion leaders 
(entrepreneurs) on house prices of different provinces. The estimation result of the overall 
panel data indicates that the sentiment of entrepreneurs significantly affects house prices. 
Then, the country is divided into three areas: eastern, central and western areas, of which the 
estimation results indicate that the degree of the sentimental influence on house prices is 
positively correlated with the degree of market maturity. The maturer the market is, the more 
likely it is to be affected by the psychological factors. The conclusion of endogenous test 
shows that the sentiment of entrepreneurs is independent of other economic fundamentals 
and directly affects the prices of housing property. 
Chapter 4 of the thesis examines the influence of the promotion expectations of 
Chinese local officials (governors) on house prices from the perspective of public 
administration. China adopts a unique promotion system of local officials similar to 
yardstick competition, which has had a broad and profound influence on China's real estate 
market. This chapter first illustrates the theoretical mechanism that triggers China’s land 
finance. And on this basis, it carries an empirical study on the influence of promotion 
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expectations of local officials on land prices and then the house prices. The test results 
indicate that the promotion expectations of China’s local officials have long-term and 
profound influence on house prices, which help us to better understand the unique 
mechanism of China's sustained rapid development. The public administrative policies 
outlined in Chapter 4 have important reference to other developing countries. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
 
1.1 Research background 
1.1.1 Behavior and rationality 
Understanding the law of asset price fluctuation is one of the world's most challenging 
problems. So far, there has been no convincing theory or method that can stand the test of time. 
Aggarwal (2014) pointed out that, in general, economic reasons for deviations from 
perfect markets fall into four broad categories. The first is that demand shocks brought about by 
macroeconomic development cannot cause enough immediate reaction. The second is transaction 
costs and arbitrage limits. Both of these phenomena are fundamentally derived from non-zero 
and risky transactions costs. According to transaction costs economics, transactions costs 
generally consist of search, negotiation, contracting, and enforcement costs of establishing a 
business relation-ship so that exchange of goods, services, and compensation can take place. 
Likewise, the effects of arbitrage on market efficiency are also limited by costs include the costs 
of overcoming the risks involved, any short-selling costs, costs of leverage, and constraints on 
margins and on equity capital (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). The third reason for market 
inefficiency is behavioral biases and other deviations from rationality (Statman, 2008). The 
fourth is that the Herding Effect and other positive feedback loops deviates the market from 
equilibrium prices. These forces opposing market efficiency can be regulated and reduced but 
cannot be eliminated. Therefore, while there are many self-correcting forces pushing markets 
toward efficiency, there are also many hurdles and costs. Therefore, in practice, an unregulated 
free market is an unreachable fantasy (Stiglitz, 1982). Behavior bias and positive feedback loops 
will be discussed below. 
(1) Behavior bias 
Traditionally, financial economists think that economic agents are completely rational, 
self-interested, and pursue the maximization of expected utility (the view of economic man). 
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However, more and more scholars point out that human beings are not completely rational and 
that our actions and decisions are influenced by psychological biases. Behavioral finance focuses 
on studying the impact of cognitive biases, heuristics, and conscious emotions. Starting with the 
groundbreaking work of Taversky and Kahneman (1974), literature on the behavioral effects of 
decision-making has been rapidly evolving in recent decades (e.g.: Daniel et al., 2002; Fudenberg, 
2006; Hirshleifer, 2001). Humans seem to value their own feelings when assessing risks (Lucey 
and Dowling, 2005). In studying the role of behavioral biases in financial decision-making, the 
economic and financial literature began to ponder on the effects of "animal spirits" (Keynes, 
1936). This effect is manifested by psychological biases and emotional effects in financial 
decision-making.  
First, there is psychological bias. Scholars generally agree with three psychological biases: 
biases, heuristics, and framing effects (e.g., Shefrin, 2007). Bias is a tendency to make wrong 
decisions. A heuristic is a psychological shortcut or rule of thumb that facilitates decision making. 
Framing means a person's decisions are influenced by the manner in which the setting for the 
decision is described. It is also convenient to place many other psychological phenomena into 
these categories. For example, overconfidence and over-optimism, as well as confirmation bias 
and illusion of control all fall into the category of biases; representativeness, availability, 
anchoring, and affect (or emotion) fall into the category of heuristics; loss aversion and prospect 
theory fall into the category of framing effects.  
Second, in addition to psychological bias, human decisions are also influenced by 
emotions (Lucey and Dowling, 2005). One way to assess the effect of emotion on financial 
decisions is to assume that the economic entity is rational, "but their utility consists of a payoff 
resulting from a particular decision or action (such as an effort level) plus utility from the 
resulting sentimental state." (Aggarwal, 2014, p182). Therefore, economic agents choose actions 
(and time-paths of emotions) in order to maximize both rational and emotional future discount 
returns (Elster, 1998). Scholars apply the theories of Freud and other psychologists to assess 
emotional returns. For example, Taffler and Tuckett (2008) and Eshraghi and Taffler (2009) 
assess the role of emotions in finance by analyzing the impact of unconscious and infantile 
emotions on investor decisions. In many cases, investors are significantly affected by the weather 
and mood (Baker and Wurgler, 2006; Hirshleifer and Shumway, 2003; Kamstra et al., 2003). 
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Animal spirits can be proved by modern neurology (Eadie, 2003). By recording the physiological 
changes in emotions in the decision-making process so as to demonstrate that the investor has a 
physiological positive feedback effect in winning and losing situations, neuroscientists show that 
market fluctuation is correlated with emotion (Coates, 2012). 
(2) Positive feedback loops 
There are positive feedback effects in commercial and macroeconomic variables (Arthur, 
1996; Aggarwal 1999b). There is clear evidence that traders usually show herding behavior when 
making transactions (Hirschleifer and Teoh, 2003). Herding behavior is the behavior of 
individuals in a group acting collectively without centralized direction. It is a human instinct 
reduces the danger to itself by moving as close as possible to the center of the fleeing group. 
Thus, the herd appears as a unit in moving together, but its function emerges from the 
uncoordinated behavior of self-serving individuals (Hamilton, 1971). The herding behavior leads 
to a positive feedback loop of prices, which means that price increase will further aggravate the 
price increase, and that price decrease also leads to spiraling price decrease (Cutler and Poterba 
1991; Shiller 2005). The positive feedback effect induced by the herding effect have a significant 
impact on asset prices, creating a "kinetic energy" that deviates asset prices from the long-term 
price trends over a longer period of time and causing dramatic market fluctuation (Shiller, 2005). 
The initial herding can start with any kind of shock or news message under the right conditions. 
Repeated loops of positive feedback create a price bubble, and only when the price deviation 
exceeds a certain threshold, the error correction mechanism of asset prices’ return to equilibrium 
will play a role and there will be a negative feedback loop of prices. As a result, the stock and 
real estate markets are always governed by bubbles and downturns of all sizes and durations. But 
the bubble can create far-reaching destructions when it grows big enough to attract attention. 
1.1.2 Expectations and sentiment indices 
(1) Expectations 
The impact of behavioral biases on expectations also led to long-standing arguments in 
academia. The rational expectation hypothesis, as a revision of the theory of adaptive 
expectations, has been challenged by economic experiments in recent years. 
The Rational Expectations Hypothesis (REH), first proposed by Muth (1961) and then 
systematized by Lucas Jr. and Prescott (1971), is the mainstream understanding of the 
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expectation theory. According to this hypothesis, the agent takes into account all available 
information when making expectation, and there is no systematic forecast error. However, it is 
noteworthy that there is also a dispute between individual rationality and collective rationality in 
the process of proposing the rational expectation hypothesis (Colasante et al., 2017). After his 
reference to Galton's (1907) early work, Muth pointed out that individual expectations can be 
wrong (overestimated or underestimated), but aggregated individual predictions can provide 
correct expectations. Lucas Jr. and Prescott (1971) considered individual predictions to be 
rational. According to simulation and experimental evidence, the hypothesis of rational 
expectation is often unrealistic. Individually, agents are unable to make rational forecast, and 
cannot show consistent behavior even in the case of given objective probability (Ellsberg, 1961; 
Branch, 2004; Evans and Honkapohja, 2001; Sargent, 1993). Collectively, although collective 
decisions (which can also be made in a decentralized and non-communicative manner) move near 
to optimal decisions, it is still impossible to reach the optimal state (Colasante et al., 2017). 
Another hypothesis is that agents form their expectations based on an adaptive rule, that is, 
expectations are a function of past expectations and past realizations. The academic mainstream 
does not accept the hypothesis of adaptive expectation because the hypothesis does not satisfy the 
necessary condition of that the errors' unconditional mean is equal to zero. This means that any 
forecast error in the series forecast by the agent will be a systematic forecast error, and the 
expected error cannot be corrected in the long run. However, more and more empirical evidence 
(Anufriev and Hommes, 2012; Hommes, 2011; Granziera and Kozicki, 2015) showed that 
although individuals often mistakenly forecast the price of future assets or commodities, different 
combinations of rules of adaptive expectation result in very good experimental results. 
It is noteworthy that Colasante et al. (2017) pointed out clearly in their experimental 
premises that in order to correct the theoretical flaw in adaptive expectation that the errors’ 
unconditional mean is not equal to zero, the expectant must predict the fluctuations of future 
economic variables. That is, in order to make the assumptions of adaptive expectations more 
perfect in theory, it is necessary to revise the assumption to be that the agent’s expectations 
should not only focuses on historical expectations and historical facts, but also integrate elements 
of rational expectations. 
Recent literature attempts to incorporate the above two expectations theories, considering 
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aggregated expectations as the fusion of rational expectations and irrational expectations, and 
irrational expectation as a subjective Knightian uncertainty (Drerup et al., 2017). This theory of 
expectation holds that different agents make decisions through two ways of decision-making or 
the integration of two ways of decision-making: one is rational decision making based on theory 
or complete information; the other is purely based on intuition (Kahneman, 2011; Binswanger 
and Salm, 2014; von Gaudecker, 2015) or rules of thumb (Ameriks and Zeldes, 2004). Irrational 
decision-making demonstrates the characteristics of being rudimentary, diffuse, and unstable, 
which cannot be eliminated by hedging and is independent of other economic variables (Drerup 
et al., 2017). 
(2) Sentimental variables 
For a long time, people thought that the sentimental variables contain the information 
about the future fluctuations of the real economic activities. The information is not only the 
disorder disturbance of the economic variables, but contains the independent influence (which 
comes from subjective expectations) on the economic variables (Barsky and Sim, 2012). 
From the existing literature, the measure of sentimental variables usually adopts two 
approaches, namely the market-based sentiment measure indicator and the publicly available 
sentiment (confidence) index. But no matter which approach is adopted, it is to measure such 
investment sentiment as optimism, pessimism or neutralism in the market. 
A market-based sentiment measure indicator (whether in stock markets or real estate 
markets) usually refers to the changes in market sentiment by constructing a combination of the 
relationship between trading volume and other variables. For example, Khcherem and Bouri 
(2009) and Dhaoui (2014) quantified the overconfidence in the market by correlating the current 
stock trading volume with the previous trading returns, believing that the return increase in the 
previous period will enhance the confidence of traders and increase the current trading volume; 
another example, Hui and Wang (2014) measure such investment sentiment as optimism or 
pessimism in the market by examining the deviation of the expected and actual trading volume of 
Hong Kong's real estate market; Hui et al. (2017) separately adopted the linear combination of 
the trading volumes of real estate and land markets with other macro variables to proxy the 
buy-seller sentiment and developer's sentiment in Shanghai’s real estate market. 
The publicly available sentimental (confidence) index usually refers to consumer 
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confidence (sentiment) indices and the investor confidence (sentiment) indices, and the 
entrepreneur confidence index used in this thesis also falls into this category. Such indices 
usually take the form of questionnaires, asking the interviewees to make optimistic, pessimistic 
or neutral subjective judgments on the status quo and the future economic conditions. Introducing 
sentimental (confidence) indices into empirical systems has significantly improved the model 
performance. For example, research by Matsusaka and Sbordone (1995) showed that consumer 
confidence adds important information to GDP projections; Batchelor and Dua (1998) pointed 
out that if forecasters take consumer confidence into account, the GDP forecasts for 1991 
recession can be improved; Christiansen et al. (2014) argued that sentiment indices (consumer 
sentiment and investor sentiment) are the best predictor of economic downturn, both in a single 
variable and in combination with other predictor variables. In addition, studies by Kauffman 
(1999), Lindsey and Pavur (2005), Banerjee and Marcellino (2006) and Lahiri and Monokroussos 
(2013) also showed that sentiment should be used as important variables in forecasting GDP and 
business cycles. As Koenig (2002) pointed out, using sentiment indices has two important 
advantages over alternative metrics: that they are real-time available and not affected by 
subsequent revisions. Lahiri and Monokroussos (2013) pointed out that there are not any 
economic variables of equal importance having the same timeliness. In contrast, macroeconomic 
variables are often postponed and often undergo substantial revisions after their initial release. 
It is worth pointing out that although scholars generally agree that sentiment (or 
confidence) can explain macroeconomics, there is still controversy over the source of this 
explanatory power. 
The mainstream view is that the explanatory power of the sentimental index comes from 
the "animal spirits" which was proposed by Keynes (1936) and then refined by Akerlof and 
Shiller (2009), that is, there are the impulsiveness of spontaneous action and the general 
optimism or pessimism that cannot be hedged in the market, and these psychological 
characteristics lead to the deviation of trading volume and price from equilibrium. Keynes argued 
that human behavior is influenced and guided by instincts, proclivities and emotions, and in most 
cases, people’s decision is uncertain and is not the result of rational calculation. Besides, human 
tends to make positive activities depend on spontaneous optimism. In this particular framework, 
Keynes defined the animal spirits as “a spontaneous urge to action rather than inaction”, which 
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can be measured in terms of, for instance, consumer confidence. Thereafter, based on the 
evidences from modern experimental psychology, Akerlof and Shiller (2009) extended the 
definition of animal spirits to include optimism and pessimism. They considered that economic 
failure, especially the financial market failure, is the result of the failure of investors to 
reasonably expect future earnings and stock returns. Therefore, they attribute the economic 
dysfunction to the animal spirits pointed out by Keynes and extend his theory. They held the 
necessity of incorporating animal spirits into macroeconomic theory for improving the 
framework. That is, they hope to introduce beliefs and emotional variables to the traditional 
economic analysis framework to explain economic operation. 
The view of animal spirits has been held in some studies. For example, Dhaoui (2014) 
constructed explanatory variables based on the assumption of rational expectations and animal 
spirits and studied data from five major stock markets, and he found out that the rational 
expectation hypothesis could not explain trader behavior, and that economic fluctuations were 
driven by behavioral biases, namely investor sentiment and confidence. Another example, Shiller 
(2007) pointed out that the positive feedback on asset prices mainly came from the investor 
confidence brought by the sustained growth of past prices, rather than abrupt changes. 
Another view is that the explanatory power of sentimental index comes from "confidence 
measures contain fundamental information about the current and future states of the economy" 
(Barsky and Sim, 2012, p1344), and these basic information will be perceived by people in the 
form of "news", and in the longer term, the confidence index shows a combination of expected 
productivity growth and noisy measures. 
Generally speaking, sentimental variables refer to the aggregated subjective expectation 
on the fluctuation trend of future economic variables produced by the combination of rational and 
irrational decision-making processes in the market. This variable has digested the news in the 
market and includes the influence that psychological factors exert on the decision making. 
 
1.2 Chinese real estate market 
The market reforms of China's real estate began in 1998, which was manifested in policy 
changes, that is, the introduction of a series of policies to stimulate real estate development. The 
first was to cancel the welfare housing distribution to solve the housing problem through the 
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market. This policy resulted in surging effective demand in a short period of time as well as 
drastic and rapid increase. The second was the abolition of price control, as the price of 
commodity housing was strictly controlled by Price Bureau back then. The third was that the 
People's Bank of China promulgated the Measures for the Administration of Individual Housing 
Loans to advocate purchasing an apartment on mortgage. The fourth was the establishment of 
housing provident fund system for urban workers. Since then, real estate has entered a period of 
rapid development and has become one of the pillar industries of the economy. Overall, China's 
real estate market is characterized by the following obvious features. 
(1) Sustained rapid price growth accompanied by improved living conditions 
House prices have soared in China’s major cities since the market reforms of real estate, 
bringing unprecedented wealth to both the Chinese government and residents. As shown in 
Figure 1.1, during the data period studied in this thesis, the actual average residential house 
prices in 35 cities increased rapidly from 2,426 yuan per square meter in 2003 to 5,937 yuan per 
square meter in 2011, registering a compound annual growth rate of 11.8% and surpassing the 
GDP growth rate of China in the same period (Wu et al., 2015). Even the financial crisis in 2008 
failed to curb house prices significantly. House prices in first-tier cities have seen higher growth 
rates, taking Beijing and Shanghai as an example, their house prices quadrupled in 2012 
compared to that of 2000 (Zhao et al., 2017). Such a soar in house prices has drawn great 
attention and controversy, sparking widespread debate over the existence of a bubble. 
 
 
Figure 1.1: Evolution of real residential house prices of 35 cities in China 2003-2011 (Wu 
et al., 2015) 
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High prices bring high investment. From 1999 to 2013, China's urban real estate market 
generally showed high investment growth (compound annual growth rate of 20%). By the time of 
2013, the dwelling demand is almost saturated and housing development moves towards quality 
improvement. In 1978, the average residential area per capita in urban China was only 6.7 square 
meters, but that figure increased to 33 square meters by the end of 2013, approximating that of 
most developed countries such as Britain (35.4 square meters), Japan (36.6 square meters) and 
South Korea (26 square meters) but lower than that of the United States (67 square meters). 
(2) Skyrocketing house prices causing continued regulation and its effects 
Within five years after the marketization of real estate industry in 1998, the government 
decided to drive real estate development to stimulate domestic demand, promulgating such 
incentives as tax rebates in major cities. These policies became the turning point for the 
improvement of market demand after the Asian financial crisis. The effect lasted 10 years and 
made the real estate industry one of the pillar industries of the Chinese economy. In 
correspondence with it, the real estate craze not only bred a large number of magnates in China, it 
also widened the poverty gap and became the main corruption quagmire of government officials. 
Continued price increases have also brought controversy over the existence of a bubble. Since 
2004, a number of regulatory measures to curb speculation and stabilize house prices have been 
put in place. 
The main feature in 2004 was to tighten the two channels of land and credit to regulate 
supply. The new State Eight of real estate regulations promulgated in 2005 introduced credit 
policies on the basis of the tax policy and raised the threshold of pre-sale of commodity housing. 
The State Six of real estate regulations promulgated in 2006 introduced the construction of 
low-rent housing and affordable housing on the basis of improving the intensity of the previous 
policies, and then released the detailed rules governing the foreign exchange of overseas buyers 
to purchase domestic commodity housing. The policy against overseas buyers was strengthened 
again in 2007. Regulatory policies were introduced less frequently from 2008 to 2010 for the 
sake of recovery after the financial crisis. After 2010, control measures staged a comeback, 
including land, finance, taxation and other means of regulations and controls, and there has been 
a control means in the form of administrative order: property-purchasing limitation. After 2016, 
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control means in the form of administrative order (including restrictions on purchases and 
transfer, and price controls) was further intensified due to a new upswing in house prices. 
Long-term and continuous increase in house prices in parallel with the macro-control 
shows that regulations merely focus on economic variables is not the ideal way out (Hui and 
Wang, 2014; Zhou, 2018). Burnside et al. (2016) predicts that when optimistic agents hold a 
firmer view than others, there will be a protracted housing boom until economic uncertainty is 
resolved. As far as the Chinese housing market is concerned, although previous tightening 
policies took aggressive measures, the housing prices in China is still rising too quickly relative 
to the growth of income (Wei et al., 2017). Zhou (2018) find that tightening policies cannot 
decrease sentiment and that high sentiment hurts the effectiveness of tightening policies. When a 
tightening policy meets with high sentiment, housing prices initially drop and then quickly 
rebound. The rebound is especially significant in the zones where housing prices are sensitive to 
increasing sentiment. When There is strong optimism in the market, many households with two 
or above houses that are prohibited from buying houses, conduct “fake divorce” to buy the third 
house. Such phenomenon indicates that the tightening policies convey very limited information 
for long-run fundamentals, at least in the optimists' view. It is noteworthy that, the most recent 
research indicates that, comparing with regulation measures such as tax, land auction and credit 
tightening, administrative imperative of home purchase restriction reflects more observable effect 
in curbing excessively house price rising (Li et al., 2017, Sun et al., 2017). However, the authors 
also admit that, without the reversal of market sentiment, lift the policy of purchase restriction 
could probably significantly cause the price rebound. 
It can be argued that the driving force behind the continuous increase of house prices is 
that home buyers expect continuous increase in property prices, thus the fundamental and 
upstanding way to control house prices is to manage expectations. more and more severe land, 
credit, tax policies and administrative measures tend to be counterproductive. More regulation 
and control will cause investors to expect future increase and enhance their confidence in 
speculation and thus form an investment sentiment of general optimism in society. 
The ineffectiveness of regulation and clearly observable herding behavior (Wei et al., 
2007) in China’s housing market prompts a rethink of the driving force behind the industry, and 
shifts the aim of regulation from the traditional economic fundamentals to include animal spirits, 
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namely, for instance, consumer confidence in chapter 2 and entrepreneurial confidence in chapter 
3. 
(3) Land Finance promotes growth 
The development of China's land market lags behind the real estate market, but the 
continuous growth of house prices has also brought about the prosperity of the land market. 
Under Chinese law, the ultimate ownership of all land belongs to the state. Any individual or 
organization cannot occupy the land without permission by the government. In practice, local 
government is the monopoly supplier of urban land. In a typical case of land use, the local 
government first compensates peasants to transform agricultural land on the outskirts of rural 
areas into urban land, and then sells the land use rights to developers for land transfer fees. 
Developers build commodity houses on the land and sell them to individual property buyers. 
During the lease term of 70 years, property buyers have the right to occupy, lease and resale their 
houses. 
Land use rights were not traded publicly until 2003. Developers gain access to land 
through private negotiation with the government or previous land owner, but the process is highly 
vulnerable to bribery and corruption and results in land prices far below market values. In April 
2001, the State Council announced the land market reform by emphasizing the importance of 
market forces in land allocation. In May 2002, the Ministry of Land and Resources requested all 
residential properties and commercial plots leases to be sold through public auctions after July 
2002. At present, all land transactions must be conducted through auction, listing or bidding. 
After the land market reform, land transfer fee has become the most important extra-budgetary 
income that the local government can freely dispose. Urban average land transfer fees accounted 
for 57% of government revenue between 2003 and 2011, even exceeding 70% in some years (Wu 
et al., 2014). This unique financial phenomenon is called Land Finance. 
As China adopts a selection model based on relative performance appraisal (Li and Zhou, 
2005) for local officials, as a consequence, local officials on the one hand are obliged to pay 
undue attention to the preferences of their superiors while neglecting the needs of the public. On 
the other hand, they focus only on the short-term benefits during their terms of service, ignoring 
the long-term development. In contrast to long-term economic development goals such as 
improvement of people's livelihood and sustainable development, local officials are more 
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concerned about the targets of enhancing the "image" of economic development in the short term, 
as these projects are better able to facilitate their promotions. Local governments continue to 
invest heavily in infrastructure due to Land Finance, raising the value of land and creating 
positive interactions with house prices. 
 
1.3 Research objectives 
1.3.1 Consumer expectations and real estate prices 
By adopting industry data from China, chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis are mainly aimed to 
prove the influence of market sentiment on house prices from different perspectives. 
The decision-making process of a market participant cannot be tied to an explicit 
maximizing objective because the future is not known, and, at best, it is a mixed judgment of 
probabilistic outcomes (Alchian, 1950). One of the major challenges facing human assessment of 
the future is to clearly separate uncertainty from risk. Keynes (1936) distinguished between the 
two with risk as a situation where the future outcomes can be enumerated and probabilities 
assigned to each outcome, versus uncertainty where no probabilities can be assigned to these 
future outcomes. The uncertainty comes from two aspects: imperfect foresight and human 
inability to solve complex problems with a host of variables. The irrational expectation 
mentioned above in this chapter is one indication of that (Drerup et al., 2017). Uncertainty and 
probabilistic outcomes make the maximization of any objective function difficult to achieve. 
Although we may study whether people are rational or is capable of making the best decision in 
theoretical research, in actual economic decision-making, we should pay more attention to 
identifiable criteria which is crucial to successful judgments (Alchian, 1950). From this 
perspective, although the debate about whether the explanatory power of the consumer sentiment 
(confidence) indices on macroeconomic and business cycle comes from the consumers’ wise 
expectations or animal spirits still exists, it seems more important to confirm the impacts of these 
indices on a particular industry. 
Current literature usually studies the impact of confidence index on GDP and economic 
cycles (e.g., Matsusaka and Sbordone, 1995; Batchelor and Dua, 1998; Christiansen et al., 2014) 
and rarely touched the real estate sector. And through the study of the American economy, the 
industry of real estate is often been regarded as a leading indicator of the economic cycle 
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(Leamer, 2015). In fact, the real estate prices have maintained a co-movement trend together with 
GDP, consumption, investment, working hours and real wage (Lambertini et al., 2017) in the 
United States in the past three decades. China's real estate prices and GDP also showed similar 
evolutionary trends. So, what is the relationship between real estate prices and Consumer 
Expectation Index (a sub-index of Consumer Confidence Index)? And whether or not the 
fluctuation of Consumer Expectation Index can be used to explain the trend of macro real estate 
prices? 
The empirical results of Chapter 2 show that the Chinese Consumer Expectation Index 
has a long-term and stable cointegration relationship with the real estate prices in China. Thus, 
the Chapter verifies the bidirectional-influence mechanism of aggregated mass sentiment and real 
estate prices by taking China's macroeconomic data as the example. In addition, the robustness 
check and additional analysis shows that the consumer expectations have a greater impact on the 
macro-real estate price than M2 and GDP and should be treated as a more important influential 
variable. 
1.3.2 Entrepreneurs' confidence and house prices 
Based on Chapter 2, Chapter 3 of this thesis verifies the influence of entrepreneurs’ 
confidence on the house prices at the provincial level in China. By referring the control variables 
(GDP per capita, housing construction costs, land prices, urbanization levels, the proportion of 
FDI, interest rates, and unmarried population proportion) that influence China's house prices 
from existing literature (e.g. Qiang Li et al., 2013; Zhi Wang et al., 2014), we use panel data of 
China's provincial level from 2003 to 2011 and introduce Entrepreneur Confidence Index as the 
new explanatory variable to empirically study it’s influence on house prices. First of all, we test 
the overall influence of Entrepreneur Confidence Index on house prices. On the basis of this, all 
provinces have been divided into three regions (the east, middle and west regions) according to 
their level of development and geographic location, with an aim to respectively examine the 
influences of entrepreneurs’ confidence on house prices. Empirical results show that the overall 
confidence indices of entrepreneurs have a significant impact on house prices. In sub-regional 
tests, the entrepreneurs’ confidence has a significant impact on house prices in the eastern and 
central regions, while the impact in the western region was not significant. The conclusions of 
this Chapter show that the entrepreneurs’ confidence has a significant impact on house prices, 
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and the degree of such impact is related to the degree of economic development, that is, the more 
developed the economy, the higher the degree of impact. 
The entrepreneurs’ confidence is similar to investors’ confidence, and the latter has a 
greater influence on the macroeconomic than consumers’ confidence (Christiansen et al. 2014). 
Entrepreneur’s confidence on the one hand affect the entrepreneur's own investment in housing 
or other properties; on the other hand and more importantly, it influences the price of housing by 
influencing the purchasing expectations of the general public, which embodies the expert effect 
and the herd behavior. Entrepreneurs are often identified as opinion leaders by the general public, 
influencing social investment psychology through their comments or taking the lead in buying or 
selling behavior (Chaudhry and Irshad, 2013). Shiller (2005) has summarized the effect of group 
psychology on market fluctuations and listed causes including the influence of authority (Asch, 
1952; Milgram, 1974), herd behavior, information cascade (Bikhchandani et al., 1992) and tale 
spreading surpasses theoretical. All these effects are reflected in the influences of entrepreneurs 
on the public. 
The "Circle Marketing" (resort to social organizations such as chamber of commerce for 
marketing) strategy, which is quite important in China's real estate marketing, is the typical 
embodiment of this effect. The empirical result points out that the impacts of entrepreneurs’ 
confidence on real estate prices are positively correlated with the degree of economic 
development. It also offers a possible explanation to address the fact, which is indicated by Qiang 
Li et al. (2013) and Zhi Wang et al. (2014), that the fundamental factors found in empirical 
studies had a decreasing impact on house prices in provinces or cites in China with a more 
developed economy: a more liberal market environment and a more developed economy may be 
accompanied by broader psychological effects. 
The additional contribution of Chapter 3 comes from changes in the measurement model. 
Due to the time-series cointegration analysis of macro data, it is difficult to simulate the impact 
of “news” (changes of fundamentals) on sentiment by setting control variables in Chapter 2. But 
based on the features of panel data model, we can set multiple control variables to better control 
for the impact of objective news on expectations. Therefore, if the influence of sentimental index 
is significant after the control variables are set, we may presume that the impact mainly comes 
from the psychological factors of the subjective expectation. 
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1.3.3 Local officials’ promotion expectations and house prices 
Zhuravskaya (2000) argued that China's high-speed economic growth in the 1980s and 
1990s stemmed from the strong incentives for promotion of local officials through fiscal 
decentralization. Chapter 4 of this thesis, through empirical analysis, mainly discusses the impact 
of local officials' promotion expectations on land prices and then on house prices under the fiscal 
decentralization mechanism from the perspective of behavioral science. 
According to behavioral science, performance-based promotion provides a powerful 
motivating force for individuals to exert efforts (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). Performance-based 
promotion exams create a tournament-style system in an organization, and the reward is to 
promote the winner. And, theoretically, the ex-ante probability of a promotion will induce effort, 
thus leading to improved performance (Demeré et al., 2015). Chapter 4 applies this theoretical 
judgment to the public administration of China. 
The fiscal decentralization of the Chinese government is an important part of the reform 
of the market-oriented mechanism, but it is quite different from the fiscal decentralization system 
in other countries: China's fiscal system is decentralized, but its administrative system is a 
top-down authorization system. Among the officials at or below the provincial level in China, 
there is the mode of promotion and selection of officials in the form of yardstick competition 
(Caldeira, 2012), that is, the Chinese central government, in an effort to achieve overall 
development, creates a yardstick competition system based on relative performance appraisal 
among local government officials by reward or punishment. The competition yardstick of local 
officials usually comes down to the rate of economic growth (Chen et al., 2005; Li and Zhou, 
2005; Chen, Qin and Wei, 2016) or the "image" of local economic growth, which is mainly 
reflected in urban infrastructure and amenity (Han and Kung, 2015; Ding, Niu and Lichtenberg, 
2014; Wu and Heerink, 2016). 
To launch the image project, local officials must focus on the source of funds. Under 
China's fiscal decentralization system, construction investment must be raised by local 
governments themselves. However, after the fiscal reform in 1994, the central government 
greatly increased its share of tax revenue and reduced the fiscal revenue of localities for 
consideration of centralization of state power. Land Finance emerges in this context (Han and 
Kung, 2015; Ding, Niu and Lichtenberg, 2014; Wu and Heerink, 2016). As the most important 
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extra-budgetary revenue that local governments can freely allocate, land transfer revenue is 
closely related to the promotion of local officials. Therefore, although politically local officials 
need to obey the central authorities' call for the stabilization of house prices, they have in essence 
become the promoters of high real estate prices. 
From the analysis of Chapter 4, we find that under the influence of the Chinese-style 
fiscal decentralization (both administrative concentration and fiscal decentralization) and 
yardstick competition, the higher (lower) promotion expected from local officials (the governor 
in this chapter) will result in a more radical (moderate) Land Finance policy during his term of 
office. This is a process in which the price of land keeps soaring, and the visible hands of the 
government help fueling the price of land. Radical Land Finance will raise land prices and forms 
a positive feedback loops with house prices. 
 
1.4 Thesis outline 
The thesis consists of five chapters. Chapter 1 is the main introduction chapter. Chapter 2, 
3 and 4 respectively study the influences of consumer expectations, entrepreneurs’ confidence 
and local officials’ promotion expectations on real estate prices. Chapter 5 summarizes the 
findings and implications. 
Chapter 2, 3 and 4 follows the usual sequence of introduction, literature review, empirical 
parts and conclusions. Since similar literature context, empirical model and data are 
cross-referred to investigate different issues about the topic, the discussion of the thesis may have 
some overlaps. However attempts have been made to minimize the duplication. 
The empirical strategies of Chapter 2, 3 and 4 are as follows. By analyzing China's 
monthly macro data from 2001 to 2012, Chapter 2 of this thesis demonstrates the relationship 
between the time series by empirically examining the cointegration relationship between 
Consumer Expectation Index and the integrated real estate prices. First, it demonstrates the 
cointegration relationship between Consumer Expectation Index and real estate prices and the 
impact on mutual changes, and then introduces M2 and quarterly GDP as extended variable sets 
for robustness check. 
The empirical analysis in Chapter 3 first uses provincial panel data to analyze the overall 
impact of entrepreneurs’ confidence on house price; second, it constructs instrumental variables 
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of Entrepreneur Confidence Index to study the possible endogenous problems caused by possible 
missing variables and to test whether Entrepreneur Confidence Index affects house prices by 
influencing underlying variables and unobservable variables; then, it divides all provinces into 
eastern, central and western regions, and then estimates the impact of regional Entrepreneur 
Confidence Index on house prices; finally, it analyzes the impact of laggard Entrepreneur 
Confidence Index on house prices. 
The empirical analysis in Chapter 4 mainly include the following aspects: Firstly, revises 
variables based on the promotion expectation estimate of the private sector to estimates the 
promotion expectations of Chinese governors by the probit model; secondly,  estimate the 
relationship between promotion expectations, land prices and the prices of housing properties 
through panel data model; finally, carry out an endogenous test based on the possible existence of 
common factors affecting both the promotion expectations and land prices. 
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Chapter 2 
Consumer Expectations and Real Estate Prices 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
In the past several decades, the prosperity and depression of the stock market has 
triggered a heated debate in academia. In addition to the fundamental analysis, more and more 
scholars try to use the psychological and irrational behaviors of investors to explain the 
fluctuations in stock prices, that is, how investor sentiment affects the future of stock prices. As 
defined by Baker and Wurgler (2007), investor sentiment is a belief about future cash flows and 
investment risks that cannot be explained by existing market information. But this is a relatively 
new field, most of the literature is confined to the analysis of developed stock markets in Europe 
and America (Brown and Cliff, 2005; Lemmon and Portniaguina, 2006; Baker and Wurgler, 2006, 
2007; Baker et al.; 2012). Even though with a huge market value and often suffered from bubbles 
and drastic fluctuations, the real estate markets have not been given the same attention as the 
stock markets with regard to the investor sentiment and expectation impacts. 
This is most especially true for the research on the real estate market in China. Since the 
reform in 1998, China’s housing market has experienced a period of rapid development. Before 
the global financial crisis in 2008, house prices grew at an alarming rate. After that, house prices 
suffered from tremendous fluctuations under the influence of the regulatory policies and the 
financial crisis. In recent years, although China’s economy has experienced a decline in growth 
and stock market crash, while the government has also taken different policies and measures 
regulating the real estate market, especially the attempt to contain the rampant speculations in 
first-tier cities, major cities in China have still experienced a sustained fast rise in the house 
prices as a whole. 
In this context, majority of existing studies concerning China's real estate market  
reflected in the following aspects: first, by taking the city or provincial house prices as the 
dependent variable, from the views of supply and demand, the studies aim to investigate macro 
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and micro prices as well as the mutual relationship and influence between their conventional 
factors (e.g. per capita disposable income, population, land prices, construction prices, money 
supply, housing characteristics and regional differences) with the method of house price 
equilibrium equation which is generally used in the study of international housing markets (Wang 
et al., 2014; Zhang et al, 2013; Wen et al, 2013; Li et al, 2013; Wu et al, 2012）; second, the 
studies are conducted on the price rationality (whether a price bubble exists or not) from the 
perspective of return on assets (Shen, 2012; Ren et al, 2012; Jin et al., 2014; Shih et al., 2014). 
Recent literature findings show that the market fundamentals cannot fully explain the 
changes in the house price, and the real estate market often suffers from bubbles (Wong et al., 
2005; Jin et al., 2014; Shih et al., 2014).In other words, there is independent influence factors in 
addition to the fundamentals in the real estate market, and these factors are either considered as 
psychologically based animal spirits (Keynes, 1936; Akerlof and Shiller, 2009) or agents 
rationally and intelligently processing current or future fundamental news (Barsky and Sims, 
2012).  
Akerlof and Shiller (2009) attributed economic dysfunction to human psychology and 
took “animal spirits” as one of the factors that affect the economy and the market. To define 
“animal spirits”, the author magnifies the definition given by Keynes (1936) in his summary, and 
introduces confidence, fairness, corruption and association behavior, money illusion, and stories 
as items of animal spirits. For Keynes (1936), animal spirits was defined as “a spontaneous urge 
to action rather than inaction”. In addition, Shiller (2000, 2005) described the impact of social 
sentiment on the investment market in his famous book Irrational Exuberance, indicating that it 
is difficult to calculate the real value of the market and investors rely on many psychological 
factors to assess asset valuations. In other words, irrational exuberance makes the asset price 
higher than the basic value. 
However, no matter from the psychologically based angle or news angle, all information 
is interpreted and processed by agents subjectively, and these studies lay the foundation for 
investor (consumer) sentiment (confidence) research, which is one of the most important factors 
leading to stock market fluctuations, and one of the factors that lead to the anti-equilibrium of 
real estate assets pricing. 
From the perspective of the behavioral economics, this chapter introduces China's 
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Consumer Expectation Index—a sub-index of Consumer Confidence Index as the proxy variable 
of subjective expectations for macro-economy, and studies the relationship between them and 
China's real estate prices, thereby clarifying the interaction between such expectations and macro 
real estate prices fluctuations. The real estate prices referenced in this chapter are the 
comprehensive national urban real estate prices involving China’s residential and commercial 
real estates, and Consumer Expectation Index are also the nationwide subjective expectations on 
the economic development in the future. Therefore, the data collection is characterized by the 
relevance and consistency.  
According to the conclusion of this chapter, a long-term cointegration relationship is 
found between China’s Consumer Expectation Index and real estate prices, namely, there is a 
long-term common trend between China’s consumer expectations and real estate prices, and they 
are also mutually corrected in the process of change. Thereby, this chapter verifies the correctness 
of bidirectional-influence mechanism of aggregated mass sentiment and real estate prices by 
taking China's macroeconomic data as the example. 
The result of this chapter is of significance on the aspect of macroeconomic policy. While 
developing macro-control policies for the real estate market, we are usually more concerned 
about the impact of some traditional macroeconomic factors on the real estate prices, such as land 
supply, population and monetary policy. In addition, during the policy development, we also 
focus to adjust the real estate market prices by adjusting these factors. However, two issues are 
often overlooked. One is that these market factors usually affect people’s investment expectations 
and then the decision of buy or sell a property by affecting their subjective psychological feelings. 
The other is, due to the impact of people’s irrational behaviors, people's real estate investment 
expectations are also influenced by media and other subjective information acquisition channels 
in addition to objective economic factors. Shiller (2005, 2008) has pointed at "animal spirits" as a 
factor that drives the stock markets and the real estate markets, and Akerlof and Shiller (2009) 
have argued that over-optimism played an important role in generating and amplifying the most 
recent international financial crisis. In other words, the government should take managing the 
investors’ subjective expectations as the appropriate way while developing real estate control 
policies, rather than the traditional economic transmission mechanism.  
To our knowledge, this chapter is amongst the first studies on the relationship between the 
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aggregated sentiment and real estate prices in the current literature. The most recent study with 
similar focus is from Abildgren et al. (2018). By using both aggregated data from Danish 
consumer confidence survey as well as the household-level microdata, the research indicated that 
house prices are partly driven by sentiment decoupled from economic fundamentals. However, 
although alike study objective employed (real estate price and Consumer Confidence Index), 
Abildgren et al.’s study failed to distinguish Consumer Confidence Index from its two 
sub-indices – Consumer Satisfaction Index and Consumer Expectation Index, and roughly 
proxied sentiment with consumer confidence in the econometric analysis. In this chapter, the 
influence of Consumer Confidence Index, Consumer Satisfaction Index and Consumer 
Expectation Index on real estate price has been distinguished, and the results clearly point out 
that there is only one cointegration relationship between Consumer Expectation Index and real 
estate prices, which is more in line with the theoretical expectation. 
The result of this chapter adds new evidence from the strand of behavioral perspective. 
The conclusion in this chapter can provide useful reference and helpful insights for further 
research. 
 
2.2 Literature review 
2.2.1 Animal spirits and psychological influences 
In recent decades, financial and economic literature argues that investors’ trade is rational, 
even if they are engaged in trade irrationally (such as random trade). The deviation from 
equilibrium caused by the irrational trades can be offset by other irrational trades from other 
irrational investors. Hereby, it can be presumed that the market is effective, and all isolated rare 
events cannot significantly affect the price-making process, which may naturally reduce market 
return and trade volatility. The Efficient Markets Hypothesis has achieved a success in academia 
since the mid-1960s with impressive theory and been deemed as academic orthodoxy (Jensen, 
1978). However, the Efficient Markets Hypothesis has been seriously challenged and criticized 
by the behavioral economics in the recent three decades. 
The Effective Market Hypothesis argues that asset prices generally reflect all relevant 
basic information and provide appropriate resource allocation signals, but some researchers try to 
test if the actual mode of operation of the economy is affected by human psychology. Keynes 
33 
 
realized the problem in 1936 for the first time and made a clear statement. He held that all 
investor decisions are deviated from rational assumptions and he attributed economic failure to 
psychological factors and irrational behaviors - animal spirits. Based on experiments, Tversky 
and Kahneman (1986) posed direct challenge on rationality assumptions of human behaviors, in 
which experimental subjects’ preferences were affected predictably by the framing of decision 
problems, or by the procedure used to elicit performance. That is to say, human sensitivity of 
framing violates the basic assumptions about the rationality of human behavior. Later, Keynes’s 
viewpoint was inherited and developed by Akerlof and Shiller (2009). Akerlof and Shiller (2009) 
replaced the rational hypothesis with investor’s behavior bias to explain the fluctuations in stock 
returns and trading volume. They argued that the concrete framework of behavioral economic 
explanation should inclusive of changing confidence, temptations, envy, resentment, and 
illusions, and all those sentiment had been witnessed in the financial crisis of 2008. 
Animal spirits phenomenon can be understood as the investor-driven irrational behavior. 
Keynes (1936) held that for most cases, the full consequences of people’s decision is uncertain 
and is not the outcome of cool-headed calculation, which can only be deemed as the results of 
animal spirits. In this particular framework, Keynes defined the animal spirits as “a spontaneous 
urge to action rather than inaction”. However, Akerlof and Shiller (2009) extended this definition 
to include optimism and pessimism. Therefore, Animal Spirits include spontaneous behavior as 
well as optimistic and pessimistic beliefs. 
Previous literature (De Bondt and Thaler, 1987; Barberis et al., 1998; Daniel et al., 2001) 
linked stock price volatility and price anomalies with underreaction and overreaction. 
Underreaction and overreaction are driven by the investors’ pessimism, optimism and 
overconfidence. On this line, early studies such as Ciccone (2003) show that investor sentiment 
and behavior plays a decisive role in the stock market. Investors’ optimism and pessimism are 
particularly reflected in the stock price. Haruvy et al. (1999) argued that optimistic investors are 
those who incline to choose the potential investment strategy with highest payoff. These authors 
define optimistic investors as “those who are motivated by worst-cases scenarios and hence tend 
to choose a secure action.” Wenstein (1980, 1986, 1989) and Otten (1989) argued that optimistic 
investors consider that positive events have greater probability of happening on them while 
negative events are unlikely to occur as compared to other investors. On the contrary, pessimistic 
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investors hold that they are more likely to be exposed to negative events while are unlikely to 
have positive events. These beliefs have led to an increase in the trading of optimistic investors, 
while a decrease in the trading of pessimistic investors. In terms of trading strategy, Chen (2013) 
deemed that optimistic agents will be more positive in trading while pessimistic agents will be 
relatively conservative in trading. 
King (2009) agreed with Akerlof and Shiller (2009) and discussed the key role of 
investors’ irrational behavior, such as optimism or pessimism, or more specifically, what they 
call animal spirits. His conclusion is that behavioral bias can explain the main part of the 
economic fluctuations. Optimistic and overconfident investors are more inclined to risky 
investment. They are engaged in the trades irrationally, and their irrational reaction will lead to 
abnormal fluctuations in trading volume, and then will affect the stock returns. Empirical studies 
show that irrational investor behavior not only exists in the international stock market, but also 
has a significant impact on price fluctuations (Chuang, 2010). 
Another important psychological factor affecting the stock market is overconfidence. 
Overconfident investors will overemphasize the accuracy of the information they own, while 
ignoring public information (Daniel, et al., 1998). They also overestimate their ability of 
judgment while underestimating the ability of others. As a result, they have overreacted to private 
information and underreacted to public information (Odean, 1998). The asymmetric reaction of 
overconfident investors leads them to underestimate the risks and take positive actions to increase 
the trading volume (De Long et al., 1990; Kyle and Wang, 1997; Benos, 1998; Odean, 1998; 
Wang, 1998,2001; Daniel et al., 1998; Hirshleifer and Luo, 2001), and De Bondt and Thaler(1985) 
argued that overconfidence is a key behavior factor in unlocking the mystery of market 
transactions. In particular, Gervais and Odean (2001) have developed a model, which is used to 
predict that overconfident investors attribute market returns to the accuracy of their private 
information, their ability of judgment and their ability to choose the stock; and sustained wealth 
accumulation also leads them to overreact in the market. 
2.2.2 Consumer confidence (sentiment) and its influences on economy 
Scholars have deemed that sentiment (or confidence) variables contain information about 
future fluctuations in real economic activity for a long time. The former chairman of the United 
States Federal Reserve Ben S. Bernanke once revealed in a speech in 2008 that “as in all crises, at 
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the root of the problem is a loss of confidence by investors and the public in the strength of key 
financial institutions and markets”1. In addition, “our measures of consumer confidence are not 
merely noise, nor are they simply reflections of information contained in other variables with 
which they are correlated” (Barsky and Sim, 2012, P1344). The research of Matsusaka and 
Sbordone (1995) showed that consumer confidence adds important information to GDP forecast. 
Batchelor and Dua (1998) pointed out that if the predictors take into account the consumer 
confidence, GDP forecast of the recession in 1991 can be improved. Christiansen et al. (2014) 
argued that whether the single variable or combination with other forecast variables, the 
sentiment index (consumer sentiment and investor sentiment) are the best forecast variables of 
economic recession. Carroll et al. (1994), Bram and Ludvigson (1998) and Howrey (2001) 
showed that measurement of consumer confidence contain the information about consumer 
spending. Howrey (2001) took into account the relationship between consumer confidence and 
business cycle. Similarly, Dasgupta and Lahiri (1993) demonstrated the positive significance of 
Purchase Management Index (PMI) for GDP forecast. In addition, Kauffman (1999), Lindsey and 
Pavur (2005), Banerjee and Marcellino (2006), Lahiri and Monokroussos (2013) showed that 
sentiment shall be considered as an important variable in predicting GDP and business cycle. As 
Koenig (2002) pointed out, there are two important advantages to use the sentiment index as 
compared to the alternative leading index, that is, they are available in real time and subject to no 
subsequent revisions. Lahiri and Monokroussos (2013) pointed out that no economic variables of 
equal importance have the same timeliness. In contrast, macroeconomic variables are often 
delayed in release and are often subject to considerable revisions after initial release. 
It is worth pointing out that although scholars generally agree that sentiment (or 
confidence) has explanatory power for GDP or consumption forecasts, there is little insight into 
the source of the explanatory power. One viewpoint holds that the explanatory power of the 
sentiment indices comes from the animal spirits mentioned above, that is, the urge of spontaneous 
action can be found on the market as well as the general optimism or pessimism that cannot be 
hedged, and these psychological characteristics lead to the deviation of trading volume and price 
from equilibrium. For example, Ghaoui (2014) constructed the explanatory variables from 
assumptions of rational expectations and animal spirits and found from the study of the data of 
                                                        
1 Quotation from speech by Bernanke (2008) 
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five major stock markets that the rational expectation assumption cannot explain the behavior of 
traders, and the economic fluctuation is driven by behavioral bias, that is, investor sentiment and 
believes. For another example, Shiller (2005, 2007) pointed out that the positive feedback on 
asset prices mainly comes from the investor confidence due to sustained price growth in the past, 
rather than a sudden change. Another viewpoint considers that the explanatory power of the 
sentiment indices comes from “confidence measures contain fundamental information about the 
current and future states of the economy” (Barsky and Sim, 2012, P1344), and these basic 
information will be perceived by people in the form of “news”, and confidence index is 
expressed as the combination of the expected productivity growth and noisy measures from a 
relatively long term. 
It is believed that the animal spirits view holds more compelling reasons because of the 
following possible causes. First, all current or future fundamental information (or news) must be 
interpreted and accepted before it can be used to guide economic behavior. As the basic economic 
information—news (including the spot and long-term) cannot be accurately obtained, and will be 
affected by Framing and other psychological mechanisms in the perception process, deviation 
can be found in people feedback of news, leading to economic fluctuations. Second, Barsky and 
Sim (2012) presumed that animal spirits may cause “transitory changes” and “that attenuate over 
time” only. But if we agree with Shiller (2005, 2007) on his positive feedback theory of asset 
prices, that is, asset prices mainly come from the growth in investor confidence due to the 
sustained growth in price in the past, and people will produce adaptive expectations of future 
fluctuations from intuitive changes in price or trading volume, while sentiment impact may not 
certainly confined to a short term (bubble or depression with a longer period is not uncommon in 
history).Coupled with other influence factors of exogenous sentiment in specific history period, 
optimistic or pessimistic social convergence behavior will be produced, amplifying the 
fluctuations in asset prices and trading volume. From this point of view, news angle does not 
exclude animal spirits, while the view of animal spirits is more explanatory to the fluctuation. In 
the long run, the trend is determined by the increase in productivity brought about by technology 
growth. 
A growing strand of microeconometric literature investigating behavioral implications of 
household expectations also echo the theory of animal spirits. A recent contribution is the study 
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by Hyytinen and Putkuri (2017). They find that households making large optimistic forecast 
errors tend to carry greater levels of debt than other households. Abildgren et al. (2018) argue that 
overoptimistic households were more likely to purchase real estate compared to other households, 
and they leveraged more when purchasing real estate. Previous studies along the same line 
include Brown and Taylor (2006), Puri and Robinson (2007) and Souleles (2004). 
In the research on the impact of sentiment (or confidence), the real estate market is given 
less attention. As Baker and Wurgler (2006) pointed out, assets with limit arbitrage were more 
susceptible to sentiment, less liquidity and higher transactions costs make the real estate market 
more vulnerable to the impact of the bubble and its burst, and in fact, the policy control over 
China’s real estate market has long been aimed to avoid such impact. Lambertini et al. (2017) 
found that there is expectation-driven economic cycle through research on the housing market in 
the United States, while the expectation is affected by “news shocks”. Especially when the 
expectation is found inconsistent with monetary policy or inflation, people’s investment or 
consumer sentiment will be impacted, and the turning point of the economic cycle will appear. 
Hui and Wang (2014), Wang and Hui (2016), Hui et al. (2017) constructed the sentiment index 
mainly through the trading volume to research different real estate markets, and the results show 
that sentiment index has an impact on the real estate market as a whole, and has a predictive 
effect on price, trading volume and returns. 
2.2.3 Hypothesis and empirical strategy 
Leamer (2015) pointed out that when it comes to 11 economic recessions since 1985 from 
the perspective of the economic fluctuations in the United States, 9 housing investments begun to 
decline 3-4 quarters before the recession, and the development of the housing industry is a key 
leading index of the economic cycle. In fact, the real estate prices has maintained a co-movement 
trend together with GDP, consumption, investment, working hours and real wage (Lambertini et 
al., 2017) as a whole from the perspective of the economic development in the United States in 
the past three decades. On the one hand, the real estate cycle is correlated with the basic 
economic indices. On the other hand, the said literature also shows that the real estate prices are 
affected by psychological factors with animal spirits as the internal driving force. So, what is the 
relationship between real estate prices and Consumer Confidence Index? And whether or not the 
fluctuation of Consumer Confidence Index can be used to explain the trend of macro real estate 
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prices? 
This chapter demonstrates the relationship between the time series by empirically 
examining the cointegration relationship between Consumer Confidence Index and its two 
sub-indices—Consumer Expectation Index and Consumer Satisfaction Index and the integrated 
real estate prices. First, it demonstrates the cointegration relationship between Consumer 
Expectation Index and real estate prices and the impact on mutual changes, and then introduces 
M2 and quarterly GDP as extended variable sets for robustness check. 
 
2.3 Data of Consumer Expectation Index and real estate prices 
2.3.1 Mechanism between consumer behavior and real estate prices 
This Chapter analyzes the factors influencing real estate prices from the perspective of 
consumer behavior. The indicators measuring consumer behavior are Consumer Confidence 
Index and its two constituent indices, i.e. Consumer Satisfaction Index and Consumer 
Expectation Index. 
The above literature review shows that the real estate prices are closely related to the 
expectations, so we may seek the empirical relationship between the two. According to the 
definitions of Consumer Confidence Index, Expectation Index and Satisfaction Index mentioned 
above, Consumer Satisfaction Index refers to a social individual’s evaluation on the current 
situation, Consumer Expectation Index is the subjective expectation on individual's economic 
situation in the future, and Consumer Confidence Index is the weighted average of Consumer 
Expectation Index and Consumer Satisfaction Index, representing the comprehensive evaluation 
of social individual on the current economic situation and the future expectation. Although these 
three indices are not set up specifically for the real estate market, they stand for all social 
individuals’ comprehensive subjective feelings about the overall macroeconomic situation, and 
can be used to proxy the aggregate sentimental changes in the real estate market in the case that 
China is in lack of the data from relevant industries. Meanwhile, according to Shiller’s (2005) 
theory, the public psychological expectations on the house price movements is the result of a 
world view, more similar to a Zeitgeist that is encouraged by stories and theories whose 
contagions as ideas are amplified by the excitement surrounding the price increases, and not just 
limited to the public understanding on the real estate industry. From this point of view, Consumer 
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Confidence Index and its two sub-indices are of representative significance.  
In addition, this chapter adopts more comprehensive real estate prices (including 
commercial and residential real estates) to replace the residential real estate prices applied in 
traditional studies, which is of more macro significance, and more relevant to the three indices 
mentioned above. 
2.3.2 Consumer Confidence Index and its two sub-indices 
The calculation method of Consumer Confidence Index (CCI) varies in different countries. 
In United States, it is monthly issued by the Conference Board, an independent economic 
research organization, based on surveys on 5000 households. The Conference Board defines 
Consumer Confidence Index as a monthly report detailing consumer attitudes and buying 
intentions, with data availability by age, income and region. 
In China, Consumer Confidence Index is an indicator showing the strength of consumer 
confidence, comprehensively reflecting and quantifying consumers’ evaluation on the current 
economic situation and subjective feelings on the economic outlook, income level, income 
expectations and consumer psychological state; and refers to a view and expectation obtained by 
consumers after performing a comprehensive judgment on the employment, income, prices, 
interest rates, etc. according to the economic development situation of a country or region. 
China's Consumer Confidence Index is issued monthly. Consumer Confidence Index issued by 
the China Economic Monitoring Center of National Bureau of Statistics is compiled mainly 
based on the random sample questionnaires from 20 major cities nationwide. The consumer 
confidence (or emotion) survey aimed at households, belonging to an urban and rural resident 
survey. The questions in the questionnaire mainly involved five aspects: the respondents’ 
judgment on the current economic situation, views on family income, the judgment on the current 
timing of purchasing goods, the judgment on the overall future economy and the judgment on 
their own incomes. There are three options for every question in the questionnaire: optimistic, 
so-so and pessimistic, and respondents can only choose one of them. The index is calculated 
based on a weighted average, and reflects consumers’ attitude differences by comparing the ratios 
between the consumers who hold an optimistic view and a pessimistic view. The value range of 
Consumer Confidence Index is between 0 and 200, with 100 as the threshold. When the index is 
greater than 100, it indicates that the consumer confidence is positive and optimistic. The closer 
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the value is to 200, and the higher the degree of optimism will be; and when the index is less than 
100, it indicates that the consumer confidence is negative and pessimistic. The closer the value is 
to 0, the deeper the degree of pessimism will be. 
In general, Consumer Confidence Index of a country is composed of the national 
Consumer Satisfaction Index and Consumer Expectation Index depending on the different 
weights. Consumer Satisfaction Index refers to consumers’ evaluation on the current economic 
life. Consumer Expectation Index refers to consumers' expectation for the change of the 
economic status in the future. Specifically, Consumer Expectation Index is ordinary consumers' 
expectation on the income, quality of life, macro economy, consumption expenditures, 
employment status, purchase of durable consumer items and savings in the coming year and the 
expectations on the purchase of decoration of a house the next two years as well as the purchase 
of a car and the stock market change in the next six months.  
2.3.3 Data 
The research data of this chapter comes from the statistics database of China Economic 
Information Network (CEInet). It is an organization specialized in economic data resources 
development and service, established by the State Information Center, and it is responsible for 
business data collection, providing data support and data integration to the government and 
government research institutions, as the only window to provide the economic information and 
data service to the society on behalf of the China Economic Information Network of the State 
Information Center. The database covers all areas like macro-economy, industrial economy, 
regional economy and world economy, and is a basic information database providing users from 
all sectors of the community with comprehensive, authoritative, timely and accurate statistical 
data regarding economy, including the China Economic Statistics Database Series and the World 
Economic Statistics Database Series. The China Economic Statistics Database Series is 
composed of the following five sub-databases, namely the Macro Monthly Database, the Industry 
Monthly Database, the Consumer Monthly Database, the Comprehensive Yearly Database and 
the Urban Yearly Database. The data used in this chapter is from the Macro Monthly Database 
which covers more than 2000 indicators under 14 special subjects, including national accounting, 
finance, trade, investment real estate, industrial transportation, wages and prices, etc. 
The dependent variable in this chapter is the real estate prices. For the measurement of the 
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macro-level real estate prices, there are two representative methods: one is based on the real 
estate sales price indices of 70 nationwide large and medium-sized cities monthly issued by the 
National Bureau of Statistics starting from July 2005, which include the newly-built house sales 
price indices and the second-hand house sales price indices in 70 nationwide large and 
medium-sized cities, of which the newly-built houses include new affordable houses and 
commercial houses. However, the issue of such indices stopped as of January 2011 (Xu et al., 
2012); the other is the method proposed by Liang et al (2006), namely, measuring the real estate 
prices (including residential and commercial buildings) via the commodity house sales prices. 
The commodity house sales prices are proposed according to the ratio between the commodity 
house sales and the sold area of buildings which are also monthly issued by the National Bureau 
of Statistics. The correlation coefficient between the unit prices of commodity houses calculated 
with this method and the house sales price indices monthly issued by the National Bureau of 
Statistics is 0.68.  And then, deflating will be done according to the Consumer Price Index (CPI), 
uniformly converted to that value in 2001.  
In this chapter, the core explanatory variables are Consumer Expectation Index, 
Consumer Confidence Index and Consumer Satisfaction Index which is monthly issued by the 
China Economic Monitoring Center of National Bureau of Statistics. In the robustness test, we 
also further consider other variable as M2 (after CPI deflation) affecting the real estate prices. 
Since this chapter applies cointegration as the method of analysis, and cointegration requires the 
non-stationary time series in terms of the selection of explanatory variables, in this case, some 
variables with stationary time series are not within the range of analysis, such as disposable 
income per capita of urban households, interbank offered rate, foreign direct investment and land 
acquisition2. In addition, the influence from some other variables, such as M2 and quarterly GDP 
were considered in the section of robustness check. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
2 Refer to Section 2.3.5 of Chapter 2 for the stationary test of variables. 
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Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics of variables 
Variable Definition Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
price Real estate sale price 3323.94 761.07 1748.44 5046.60 
ln_price Real estate sale price logarithm 8.0820 0.2350 7.4665 8.5265 
confidence Consumer Confidence Index 97.52 5.2432 85.7 108.5 
expectation Consumer Expectation Index 99.12 5.8014 83.7 111.8 
satisfaction Customer Satisfaction Index 96.33 4.8499 88.6 107.8 
m2 Currency and basic currency M2  439689.5 239903.1 147809.7 944832.4 
first difference 
price_fd  16.6780  235.0885  -1053.431  1306.834  
ln_price_fd  0.0052  0.0808  -0.4716  0.5581  
confidence_fd  0.0626  2.2259  -8.9000  12.8000  
expectation_fd  0.0890  2.3633  -10.400  10.4000  
satisfaction_fd  0.0187  2.3476  -7.0000  16.3000  
m2_fd  6479.86  7265.97  -7897.23  31541.48  
Note: monthly data from June 2001 to November 2012 except every January is included. sample size is 
124. 
 
2.3.4 Descriptive statistics analysis 
(1) Evolution trend of real estate prices 
As shown in Figure 2.1, China's real estate prices (average price per square meter) 
showed a steady increase trend from 2001 to 2012, rising from the averaged ￥2300/m2 in 2001 
to the averaged￥4400/m2 in 2012. Within 12 years, China's real estate prices were nearly 
doubled. The real estate prices constantly fluctuated in the increase process. The lowest point of 
in real estate prices appeared in August 2005, i.e. ￥1748/m2, and the highest point was appeared 
in February 2011, i.e. ￥5242/m2. The averaged real estate prices was ￥3324/m2, and the 
standard deviation was 761.07, indicating a large fluctuation in China's real estate prices. 
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Figure 2.1：Evolution trend of real estate prices 
 
(2) Evolution trend of consumer indices 
Figure 2.2 shows the evolution trend of Consumer Confidence Index, Consumer 
Expectation Index and Consumer Satisfaction Index. In general, the change of Consumer 
Confidence Index is between Consumer Expectation Index and Consumer Satisfaction Index. 
According to the fluctuation features (Std. Dev), the standard deviation of Consumer Expectation 
Index is the largest, followed by that of Consumer Confidence Index, and the smallest one is that 
of Consumer Satisfaction Index. The evolution of Consumer Confidence Index, Consumer 
Expectation Index and Consumer Satisfaction Index from 2001 to 2012 can be divided into four 
stages. The first stage was from June 2001 to March 2003, the three indices varied within a small 
range, with an average value of about 97; the second stage was from April 2003 to November 
2008, during which the evolution showed a trend of declining - rising - declining- rising, with a 
low overall level; the third stage was from December 2008 to May 2011, during which the 
consumer indices were higher than that in the previous stages. In addition, the gap between 
Consumer Confidence Index, Consumer Expectation Index and Consumer Satisfaction Index was 
decreasing; and the fourth stage was from June 2011 to November 2012, during which the main 
feature of the evolution was that the gap between the three was increasing, and the overall change 
was dramatic. 
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Figure 2.2：Evolution trend of consumer indices 
 
(3) Consumer indices and real estate prices 
We firstly analyzed the evolution trend between Consumer Confidence Index and real 
estate prices. As shown in Figure 2.3, the two showed no similar trend of evolving over time. 
From 2002 to 2004, Consumer Confidence Index fluctuated significantly, but the change in real 
estate prices during this period was relatively stable; while in 2005, the real estate prices declined, 
but Consumer Confidence Index was relatively stable. Therefore, from the view of the evolution 
trend of Consumer Confidence Index and the real estate prices, we cannot determine whether 
there is a long-term cointegration relationship between the two or not. Secondly, we will analyze 
the evolution trend of Consumer Expectation Index and the real estate prices. As shown in Figure 
2.4, there is a common evolution trend between Consumer Expectation Index and the real estate 
prices. However, as for whether there is a cointegration relationship between the two or not, it 
requires to be verified with the analysis method of time series.  
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Figure 2.3: Consumer Confidence Index and real estate prices 
 
Figure 2.4 Consumer Expectation Index and real estate prices 
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Figure 2.5 Consumer Satisfaction Index and real estate prices 
 
2.3.5 Non-stationary time series and unit root test 
If a time series is not a stationary process, then we call it a non-stationary series. A 
non-stationary series may occur in any of following circumstances:  
a. Deterministic trend: If a time series has a deterministic trend, then it is a non-stationary 
series. This type of non-stationary series may become a stationary series as long as the time trend 
is removed. Therefore, it is called a trending stationary series.  
b. Structural change: if a series has structural changes, then it is a non-stationary series, 
which may be tested through the Chow test.  
c. Stochastic trend: for example, the Random Walk Model: 
1+t t ty y −= , wherein t｛ ｝is 
the white noise. As for the random walk, a stationary series may be obtained as long as the first 
order difference is performed on it. Therefore, it is also called the difference stationary series. 
We call the stationary time series as the integrated of order zero, denoted as I (0). If the 
first order difference of the time series is a stationary process, it will be called the "integrated of 
order one”, denoted as I (1), also known as the "unit root process". More generally, if the d-order 
difference of the time series is a stationary process, then it will be called the "integrated of order 
d”, denoted as I (d). The I (0) series is stationary, so it has the trend to return to its expectations 
from a long-term point of view, and this property is called the "mean-reverting”. However, the 
non-stationary I (1) series without such property will wander widely. In addition, the I (0) series 
only has limited memory for its past behavior, which means the impact of the past disturbance 
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item on the future will decay with time; the I (1) series has infinite memory for past behavior, 
namely, any past disturbance will permanently change the whole series in the future. 
We used Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) method and Phillips-Person (PP) unit root test 
method respectively. And the original hypothesis of the both is H0: a unit root exists. 
a. ADF unit root test  
ADF unit root test (Dickey and Fuller, 1981) is an extension of the Dickey-Fuller (DF) 
test method developed by Dickey and Fuller in (1979). In the DF Test, the first-order 
auto-regression is used to test the unit root, requiring the disturbance item to be the independent 
white noise, so there is no autocorrelation in the disturbance item. If the disturbance has the 
autocorrelation, a higher order lagged item may be introduced to control the disturbance item to 
be without autocorrelation. The critical value of the ADF test may be obtained through the Monte 
Carlo simulation, and the test is the left single-side test. 
b. PP unit root test 
In the PP test (Phillips and Perron, 1988, hereinafter referred to as PP), the first-order 
auto-regression is used, but the heteroskedasticity–autocorrelation robust standard deviation is 
used for the correction of statistics. The asymptotic distribution of the corrected PP statistics is 
the same as the statistic distribution in DF test, so the critical values are the same as well, which 
means the PP test is also left single-side test. In a sense, the PP test is equivalent to the 
heteroskedasticity-robust ADF test. Another advantage of the PP test is that specifying lag phases 
is not necessary.   
The specific results of unit root test are shown in Table 2.2. The interest rate, foreign 
direct investment (FDI), land acquisition area and per capita disposable income of urban 
households are stationary time series; the real estate prices, Consumer Confidence Index, 
Consumer Expectation Index, currency and basic currency M2 are non- stationary time series. In 
the above stationarity tests, we considered the unit root tests excluding the trend term. If the trend 
term is considered, both the real estate prices and Consumer Expectation Index are stationary. On 
the significance level of 1%, the first order differences of all non-stationary time series are 
stationary, so each of the non-stationary variables is I (1), i.e. integrated of order one. 
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Table 2.2: Stationarity tests 
Variable Test Type ADF Statistics P-value PP Statistics P-value Conclusion 
price constant -1.994 0.289 -1.380 0.592 Non-stationary 
 constant and trend -7.667*** 0.000 -7.946*** 0.000 Stationary 
 1st order difference -18.098*** 0.000 -21.977*** 0.000 Stationary 
confidence constant -2.161 0.221 -1.980 0.296 Non-stationary 
 constant and trend -3.363* 0.057 -3.283* 0.0691 Non-stationary 
 1st order difference -11.861*** 0.000 -12.055*** 0.000 Stationary 
expectation constant -1.881 0.341 -1.699 0.4319 Non-stationary 
 constant and trend -4.168 0.005 -4.144 0.0054 Stationary 
 1st order difference -10.795*** 0.000 -10.927*** 0.000 Stationary 
m2 constant -0.434 0.904 -0.420 0.907 Non-stationary 
 constant and trend -2.166 0.509 -2.506 0.3248 Non-stationary 
 1st order difference -9.574*** 0.000 -9.551*** 0.000 Stationary 
disposable 
income per 
capita 
constant -3.852** 0.014 -3.178**  0.0213 Stationary 
interbank 
offered rate 
constant -3.501*** 0.008 -3.323** 0.014 Stationary 
FDI constant -6.151*** 0.000 -6.123*** 0.000 Stationary 
land 
acquisition 
constant -7.068*** 0.000 -6.983*** 0.000 
Stationary 
Note: “constant” means that there is only constant term in the unit root test, and “constant and trend” 
indicates that both constant and trend items are included in the unit root test. All variables are logarithm based. *, 
**, and ***, respectively indicate significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%. The sample of disposable income per 
capita of urban households is 59. 
 
2.4 Analysis on the cointegration relationship of consumer expectations and real estate 
prices 
2.4.1 Cointegration and Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) 
(1) Cointegration 
For the variables of unit root, the traditional processing method is to obtain stationary 
time series by performing the first order difference. However, the economic implication of 
variables after the first order difference is different from that of the original time series, while 
sometimes we still hope to use the original time series for regression. If there is a relationship of 
long-run equilibrium between multiple unit root variables due to some economic power, then the 
cointegration relationship may exist as well. The basic idea of the cointegration relationship is: if 
multiple unit root series have a "common stochastic trend", the stochastic trend may be 
eliminated through the linear combination of these variables. 
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Suppose the real estate prices {𝑦𝑡}and Consumer Expectation Index {𝑥𝑡} is the I (1) 
process, and they are respectively expressed as: 
{
𝑦𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑤𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡
𝑥𝑡 = 𝛾 + 𝛿𝑤𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡
                                                   （2.1） 
In which, 𝑤𝑡 is the random walk, 𝑤𝑡 = 𝑤𝑡−1 + 𝑣𝑡; while 𝜀𝑡, 𝑢𝑡, and 𝑣𝑡 are all white 
noise. As {𝑦𝑡} and {𝑥𝑡} have a common stochastic trend, the linear combination of the two 
below is a stationary process: 
𝛿𝑦𝑡 − 𝛽𝑥𝑡 = (𝛼𝛿 − 𝛽𝛾) + (𝛿𝜀𝑡 − 𝛽𝑢𝑡)                                   （2.2） 
Under such circumstance, we call the real estate prices {𝑦𝑡} and Consumer Expectation 
Index {𝑥𝑡} as being in cointegration, and the vector (𝛿, −𝛽) as the cointegration vector or the 
cointegration coefficient. Obviously, we can standardize the cointegration vector into(1, −𝛽/𝛿). 
Besides, for the two variables in the I (1) process, only one cointegration relationship is possible; 
while for N variables in the I (1) process, the N-1 cointegration relationships are possible at most. 
The number of cointegration relationships among a group of I (1) process variables is the 
cointegration rank, i.e. the number of linearly-independent cointegration vectors.   
(2) Maximum likelihood estimate (MLE) 
We estimate VECM model based on MLE method of Johansen (1988): 
△ 𝑦𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛤0𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝛤1 △ 𝑦𝑡−1 + ⋯ + 𝛤𝑝 △ 𝑦𝑡−𝑝+1 + 𝜀𝑡                    （2.3） 
Wherein 𝛤0 ≡ −𝛷(1) = −𝐵𝐴′. In order to facilitate derivation, we assume that there is 
no time trend item. Suppose the number of samples is T+p, i.e. the observed data is 
{𝑦−𝑝+1, 𝑦−𝑝+2, 𝐿, 𝑦0, 𝑦1, 𝐿, 𝑦𝑇}. Obviously, only when there is cointegration relationship for {𝑦𝑡}, 
the VECM model can be established; otherwise, the left side of the above equation is stationary, 
and the right side is a non-stationary process. Suppose the cointegration rank is h, then the 
coefficient matrix 𝛤0 must satisfy the constraint condition of "rank (𝛤0) = h". Johansen’s method 
is, in the case of meeting the said constraint condition and the given {𝑦−𝑝+1, 𝑦−𝑝+2, 𝐿, 𝑦0}, to 
maximize the log-likelihood function of {𝑦1, 𝐿, 𝑦𝑇}. 
2.4.2 Estimation of cointegration and VECM 
(1) Cointegration estimation 
Firstly, we roughly estimate the long-term equilibrium relationship between the real estate 
prices and consumer indices through Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression. It is worth 
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pointing out that the estimate results could be spurious at this stage as we do not know yet we 
have cointegration among the series or not. However, the sign of coefficients and significance of 
the estimated results can assist us in judging the selection of cointegration variables in 
subsequent analysis. 
As shown in Table 2.3, Consumer Expectation Index and the real estate prices are 
significant on the 1% level, and the estimate coefficient sign is consistent with the expectation, 
while the respective estimate coefficients between Consumer Confidence Index, Consumer 
Satisfaction Index and the real estate prices are negative and not significant.  
 
Table 2.3: OLS estimation results of real estate prices and consumer indices 
price Coef. Std. Err. t-value P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
confidence -0.6258  0.8088  -0.77 0.441 -2.2273  0.9756  
expectation 3.7817  0.5801  6.52 0 2.6330  4.9303  
satisfaction -0.2485  0.4823  -0.52 0.607 -1.2034  0.7064  
constant -5.2909  1.3288  -3.98 0 -7.9219  -2.6599  
Note: the sample size is 124. All variables are logarithm based. 
 
The conclusion of Table 2.3 generally conforms to the theoretical expectation. According 
to the definitions of the three indices, Consumer Satisfaction Index is consumers' self-assessment 
of their current incomes and consumption. Consumer Expectation Index represents consumers' 
subjective expectation of future economic changes, and Consumer Confidence Index is the 
weighting of the above two indices. As the most important component of household wealth, the 
fluctuation of house prices has a significant impact on household non-housing consumption. In 
theory, the effect of house prices on consumption can be driven by two main mechanisms. First, 
according to the wealth effect, the increase of house prices improves the total wealth of 
households or the expected total wealth, which can in turn stimulate household consumption by 
relaxing the credit constraint (Ludwig and Sløk, 2002). Second, substitution effect means that the 
increase of house prices will increase the cost of buying and renting a house, thereby reducing the 
household's expenditure on other commodities for those families who want to buy a new house or 
upgrade a house (Chamon and Prasad, 2010; Li, Li, and Chen, 2014). Therefore, from the 
perspective of spot observation, these two effects illustrate the uncertainty of the impact of house 
price fluctuation on household consumption in different markets. The corresponding results 
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reflected in Table 2.3 are that neither Consumer Satisfaction Index nor Consumer Confidence 
Index is significantly correlated with real estate prices. 
The theoretical relationship between consumer expectations and house prices is 
completely different. Productivity explanation pointed out that the positive expectation of future 
income increases the demand for housing and household goods and leads to price increases 
(Attanasio, et al., 2009; Pagano, 1990). Besides, it is particularly noteworthy that China's 
Consumer Expectation Index contains useful information about pure expectation shocks, which 
are unrelated to economic fundamentals (Li, 2011). That is to say, consumers' subjective 
expectations have irrational composition and under the influence of animal spirits, which makes 
the study on the relationship between real estate prices and consumers' subjective expectations 
have the characteristics of behavioral finance. 
Based on above analysis, we will mainly analyze the cointegration relationship between 
Consumer Expectation Index and the real estate prices. However, one drawback of the Engle and 
Granger ADF (EG-ADF) method is that it cannot process the cases with multiple cointegration 
relationships. Furthermore, the EG-ADF method should be applied by two steps. The estimate 
error in the first step will be taken into the second step. So, it is not an efficient way. Therefore, 
we have to conduct the Johansen cointegration test on the real estate prices and Consumer 
Expectation Index. 
As shown in Table 2.4, the Johansen cointegration test shows that there is only one 
linearly-independent cointegration vector (* in the table) between the real estate prices and 
Consumer Expectation Index. The maximum eigenvalue test also shows that the original 
hypothesis of “cointegration rank is zero” is refused at the 5% significance level, but the original 
hypothesis of “cointegration rank is 1” cannot be refused at the same level. In other words, there 
is a cointegration relationship between the real estate prices and Consumer Expectation Index. 
According to Final Prediction Error (FPE) criteria, Hannan-Quinn Information Criterion (HDIC) 
and Schwarz's Bayesian Information Criterion (SBIC), it is determined that the lag order of the 
system is 2. 
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Table 2.4: Test on the cointegration relationship between real estate prices and Consumer 
Expectation Index 
Original hypothesis H0 
trace test max test 
Statistic 5% critical value statistic 5% critical value 
0 cointegration relationship 21.3869* 15.41 20.4018* 14.07 
At least 1 cointegration relationship 0.9850 3.76 0.9850 3.76 
Note: * means significant on the result of “at least 1 cointegration relationship”. 
 
(2) VECM estimation 
This chapter defines the lag order as 2 and rank as 1 to estimate the cointegration formula 
as: 
𝑙𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 = 4.346 × 𝑙𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛                                       （2.4） 
Consumer Expectation Index positively correlates with the real estate prices at a 1% 
significance level, the standard deviation of estimate coefficient is 0.5877, and such coefficient 
indicates that: the real estate prices will rise by 4.346% for 1% Consumer Expectation Index 
increases. The estimate coefficients of the error correction terms of real estate prices and 
Consumer Expectation Index are -0.0683 and 0.0565 respectively, which means that, ceteris 
paribus, the changes of real estate prices and Consumer Expectation Index can eliminate 6.83% 
and 24.52% of the unequal error of last period respectively. 
Next, we will verify the stationarity of the cointegration relationship between Consumer 
Expectation Index and the real estate prices. As shown in Figure 2.6, except for the unit roots that 
the VECM assumed itself, all featured roots of the companion matrix fall within the unit circle, 
therefore, the cointegration system between Consumer Expectation Index and the real estate 
prices is stationary. 
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Figure 2.6: Stationarity test 
 
2.5 Robustness check and additional analysis 
In robustness check, we separately add money supply M2 and the quarterly GDP into the 
cointegration system for analysis. 
2.5.1 Cointegration relationship between real estate prices, Consumer Expectation Index 
and M2 
First, we have described the evolution trend of consumer expectations and money supply 
M2, as shown in Figure 2.7. The money supply M2 increased from 14.78 trillion at the beginning 
of the period to 94.48 trillion at the end of the period during 2001~2012, and increased for nearly 
6 times during the sample period. The overall upward trend of money supply M2 is basically the 
same as the evolution trend of the real estate prices. 
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Figure 2.7: Evolution trend of consumer expectations and M2 
 
The Johansen cointegration test shows that there is only one linearly independent 
cointegration vector between the real estate prices, Consumer Expectation Index and M2, and the 
maximum eigenvalue test also shows that the original hypothesis of “cointegration rank is 0” is 
rejected at a significance level of 5%, but the original hypothesis of “cointegration rank is 1” 
cannot be rejected, that is, there is a cointegration relationship between real estate prices and 
consumer expectations. In addition, the lag order is determined to be 2 according to AIC, HQIO, 
SBIC statistics which are -12.957, -12.843 and -12.678, respectively. 
 
Table 2.5 Cointegration regression test on real estate prices, consumer expectations and 
M2 
Original hypothesis H0 
trace test max test 
Statistic 5% critical value statistic 5% critical value 
0 cointegration relationship 36.767* 34.55 32.386* 23.78 
At least 1 cointegration relationship 14.381 18.17 16.443 16.87 
At least 2 cointegration relationships 1.939 3.74 1.939 3.74 
Note: * means that the original hypothesis is rejected at the significance level of 5%. 
 
The cointegration equation between real estate prices and Consumer Expectation Index 
and M2 is shown below: 
𝑙𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 = 0.875 × 𝑙𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑝 + 0.276 × 𝑙𝑛𝑚2
                                
（2.5） 
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error correction model is 0.332 and 0.029, respectively, which is positively correlated with the 
real estate prices at the significance level of 1%.The above equation shows that the increase in 
Consumer Expectation Index by one percent will increase the real estate prices by 0.88%, money 
supply M2 by 1% and real estate prices by 0.28%, while the consumer expectations are estimated 
to be decreased as compared to Equation (2.4) after the addition of M2. In addition, the addition 
of money supply M2 does not affect the significance of consumer expectations for real estate 
prices, it has also proved the robustness of the cointegration relationship between Consumer 
Expectation Index and real estate prices. 
2.5.2 Cointegration relationship between real estate prices, Consumer Expectation Index 
and GDP 
Here we use quarterly GDP data as an additional variable to verify the robustness of the 
conclusion in this chapter. Since there is only quarterly data available GDP, real estate prices and 
consumer expectations are averaged at the quarterly level to fit the analysis. The Johansen 
cointegration test shows that there is only one linearly independent cointegration vector between 
the real estate prices, Consumer Expectation Index and quarterly GDP, and the maximum 
eigenvalue test statistics is 13.659, as a result of which the original hypothesis of “cointegration 
rank is 0” is rejected at a significance level of 5%, but the original hypothesis of “cointegration 
rank is1” cannot be rejected. 
 
Table 2.6 Stationarity test of quarterly GDP 
Variable Test type ADF statistics P-value PP statistics P-value Conclusion 
lnqgdp constant -1.298 0.630 -2.512 0.113 Non-stationary 
 constant and trend -6.332*** 0.000 -6.334*** 0.000 Stationary 
 1st order difference -6.585*** 0.000 -6.585*** 0.000 Stationary 
Note: “constant” means that there is no trend term in the unit root test, and “constant and trend” indicates 
that trend items are included in the unit root test. All variables are logarithm based. *, **, and ***, respectively 
indicate significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%. 
 
The cointegration equation between real estate prices and Consumer Expectation Index 
and GDP is shown below: 
𝑙𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 = 0.675 × 𝑙𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑝 + 0.489 × 𝑙𝑛𝑞𝑔𝑑𝑝
                              
（2.6） 
56 
 
The standard deviation of consumer expectations and the estimation coefficient of GDP in 
the error correction model is 0.282 and 0.037, respectively, which is positively correlated with 
the real estate prices at the significance level of 5% and 1%, respectively. In addition, the above 
equation shows the robustness in the cointegration relationship between consumer expectations 
and real estate prices after addition of the variable of quarterly GDP. 
It is worth pointing out that the estimation coefficient of consumer expectations with the 
addition of M2 and quarterly GDP (2.5) and (2.6) is significantly decreased as compared to 
Model (2.4) of the single variable, which is because there is a high correlation between consumer 
expectations and M2 and the quarterly GDP, and the correlation coefficient of the two reaches 
0.82 and 0.71, respectively. That is, the impact of M2 and GDP on real estate prices has been 
included in consumer expectations, and M2 and GDP have been the important factors affecting 
the consumer expectations. However, the high correlation coefficient between M2, GDP and 
expectations cannot be used to judge the impact degree of subjective psychology on expectations. 
 
2.6 Conclusions 
Participants in the financial market usually pay more attention to the monthly 
announcements of consumer and investor sentiment, especially during the economic crisis, 
mainly because: first, the confidence (or sentiment) index is neither just the noisy of the 
macroeconomic variable, nor the simple feedback of the information contained in these related 
economic variables, but has an impact on the economic system as independent exogenous 
variable (Barsky and Sim, 2012); second, the confidence (or sentiment) has a certain predictive 
effect on consumption and GDP, and its ability to predict the economic recession far surpasses 
the classic recession forecast indices and other fundamental macroeconomic variables. In 
addition, the best way to forecast the future economic recession is to combine sentiment variables 
with classic recession forecast factors or fundamental economic variables (Christiansen et al., 
2014). 
Further research is still needed to understand why consumer confidence can well predict 
economic fluctuation. At present, the predictive power of confidence is usually attributed to 
animal spirits (Keynes, 1936; Akerlof and Shiller, 2009) or agents rationally and intelligently 
processing fundamental news (Barsky and Sims, 2012). The author believes that the animal 
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spirits view has more explanatory power. On the one hand, all current or future fundamental 
information (or news) must be interpreted and accepted before it can be used to guide economic 
behavior, that is, confidence is subjective; on the other hand, the impact of sentiment may not be 
confined to a short term. News angle does not exclude animal spirits, and news is only one of the 
sources of animal spirits. 
Although Consumer Confidence Index is deemed as a regular index which is published 
immediately, it has an important advantage of being available in real time subject to no 
subsequent revisions as compared to other leading indices (Koenig, 2002), while it has rarely 
been introduced to the real estate market to test the relationship between variables and to explain 
the prices. This chapter analyzes the impact mechanism of real estate prices, portrays market 
expectations on economic situation with Consumer Confidence Index, and analyzes the 
long-term equilibrium relationship between consumer expectations and real estate prices through 
cointegration. The empirical results show that: Consumer Expectation Index has positive 
correlation with real estate prices at the 1% significance level. If Consumer Expectation Index 
increases by one percentage point, the real estate prices will increase 4.346%. Afterwards, M2 
and quarterly GDP are separately added into the test, and it can be seen from the test results that 
the cointegration relationship is robust between consumer expectations and real estate prices. 
Moreover, it can be seen from the conclusions of the three-variable cointegration test separately 
with the addition of M2 and quarterly GDP that although there is a higher correlation coefficient 
between M2, quarterly GDP and the real estate prices, there is only one cointegration relationship 
between the consumer expectations and real estate prices in the test system, which also partially 
proves the viewpoint that news is only one of the sources of confidence. 
Conclusion is of an obvious significance for the policy. For the purposes of regulatory 
policies, take China for example, although the regulatory policies for the purpose of curbing 
excessive increase of house prices (including means of administrative orders that prohibited 
housing purchase) accompanied the whole process of excessive increase of house prices, the 
effect is not ideal (Hui and Wang, 2014), because the land supply, interest rates, taxes and other 
means have not been able to change the expectations that house prices will continue to grow, and 
the expectations come from the historical long-term increase of real estate prices. And apparently, 
the expectations about sustainable increase of real estate prices have not been reversed by 
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objective factors such as rent prices ratio as low as 1 percent or ratio of house price to per capita 
annual income as high as 40, just because people believe the existence of such “superstar city” 
and sustained high economic increase expectations. In order to manage the market investment 
expectations, it is necessary to introduce a new channel and method to affect the public 
psychology besides traditional economic variables. What channel and method to be introduced is 
worth studying. 
Because this study focuses on macro level, it points out the correlation between real estate 
prices and expectations at macro-level. On one hand, one can further analyze the correlation 
between the sentimental factors at the provincial level in the follow-up study. As the 
provincial-level data are richer, there are more choices of price variables and expectations proxy 
variables, and one may verify the correlation between the two from more aspects; on the other 
hand, one can study the relationship between home tenure rate and social psychological change at 
the urban level, and study the psychosocial determinant of home tenure rate by way of qualitative 
and quantitative study.
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Chapter 3 
Entrepreneurs’ Confidence and House prices 
  
  
3.1 Introduction 
China's house prices, especially those in large cities, have experienced a sharp rise in the 
last ten years. The data from China Statistical Yearbook shows that China's overall average house 
price rose by 160% from 1998 to 2012, with an average annual rise of 7%. The house prices in 
big cities rose faster. Wu et al. (2012) estimated the house prices in Chengdu, Hangzhou, 
Shanghai and Shenzhen rose at least 10% per year from 2003 to 2010, while the house prices in 
Beijing rose by nearly 20% annually in the same period. The sharp rise of the house prices has 
not only led to enormous social pressures and conflicts, but also aroused extensive discussions on 
the ups and downs of house prices. Worrying about the serious harm to the macro-economy 
caused by the burst of potential house price bubble, and the intense social conflicts caused by the 
speculation induced income disparity, the Chinese government has taken a number of policy 
measures with the attempt to stabilize house prices, including tax policies, financial regulations 
and controversial purchase and resale restrictions. 
The development of China's housing market is a gradual process, and is still in the 
process of change. Since the reform and opening-up in 1979, China's housing market has 
experienced a change process from the welfare housing distribution system to the double track 
system of planned economy and market economy, and then to the market-oriented system (Ye et 
al., 2006). An important milestone is the 23rd Decree promulgated by the State Council in 1998. 
The document regulates that enterprises are prohibited to build new houses for their employees, 
thus making the house consumption subject to market-oriented demand. And then, the 
government changed the original inter-enterprise agreement based transfer system of state-owned 
land use right into the Bid, Auction and Listing system on the basis that the government is the 
only transferor of land use rights, and divided all the land into the residential land, commercial 
land and other land, having standardized the land transfer process, greatly enhanced the 
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transparency of governmental financial resources and the market, and laid a common foundation 
for the residential housing market, the commercial property market, and other property right 
based real estate market. Then, after 15 years' general rapid rise, China's house prices has been 
showing a trend of differentiation since 2013, along with the slowdown in China's overall 
economic growth. The house prices in China's central cities such as Shanghai, Beijing and 
Guangzhou are growing continuously and steadily, while the same in medium and small cities are 
downward as the backlog of new housing appears. 
This chapter is the extension of Chapter 2. Chapter 2 adopted China's Consumer 
Expectation Index as the proxy variables of subjective expectations for macro-economy, and 
studies the relationship between it and China's house prices, thereby clarifying the interaction 
between such expectation and overall house prices, from the perspective of the behavioral 
economics. According to the conclusion described above, a long-term cointegration relationship 
is found between China’s consumer expectations and real estate prices, namely, there is a 
long-term trend of common changes between China’s Consumer Expectation Index and real 
estate prices, and they are also mutually corrected in the process of changes. Thus, the study 
verifies the correctness of bidirectional-influence mechanism of aggregated mass sentiment and 
real estate prices by taking China's macroeconomic data as the example. 
By controlling the news-forged influences (Barsky and Sims, 2012) based on the 
literatures，this chapter taking Entrepreneur Confidence Index as an explanatory variable by using 
the provincial-level panel data, presents the empirical study about the variable's influence on 
house prices. First, it tested the overall influence of Entrepreneur Confidence Index on the house 
prices, and then tested the influence by dividing China's provinces into east, middle and west 
regions according to the level of development and geographical location. The empirical study 
results show that Entrepreneur Confidence Index has a significant influence on the house prices. 
According to the tests, the influence of Entrepreneur Confidence Index is of significance in the 
eastern and middle regions, but not in the western region. 
Akerlof and Shiller (2009) extended Keynes’ “animal spirits” (1936) to include 
spontaneous behavior as well as optimistic and pessimistic beliefs. And by the definition, 
Entrepreneur Confidence Index is the entrepreneurs' views (i.e. optimistic, so-so and pessimistic) 
on the prosperity situation of their own enterprises in the current and next periods. The data is 
61 
 
closely related to theory. 
In addition, the entrepreneurs’ confidence has a broad and far-reaching impact on the 
psychology of public investment. Shiller (2005) has summarized the effect of group psychology 
on market fluctuations and listed causes including the influence of authority, herd behavior, 
information cascade and tale spreading surpasses theoretical analysis. Entrepreneurs tend to be 
recognized as opinion leaders by the public, so their comments or buying-or selling-leading 
behaviors have exact influences on the social need psychology. The circle marketing (marketing 
by virtue of chamber of commerce and other social organizations) strategy which is more 
important in China’s housing sales and marketing, is a typical embodiment of this effect.  
The result of this chapter indicates that Entrepreneur Confidence Index has a significant 
influence on the house prices, and the degree of such influence is related to the degree of 
economic development. The higher the level of economic development is, the more influence 
will be. On the one hand, the confidence of entrepreneurs influences their own investment 
behavior on housing; on the other hand, what is more important is that influences the house 
prices by shaping the mass purchase expectations.  
The positive correlation between the influence of Entrepreneur Confidence Index on the 
house prices and the degree of economic development provides the possible way to explain why 
the explanatory capability of fundamental factors on China's provincial (or city) house prices 
drops along with the rise of economic development level (Li and Chand, 2013; Wang et al., 2014), 
namely: freer market environment and more developed economy may be accompanied by a 
broader sentiment impact. 
To our knowledge, this is one of the first attempts to study the relationship between the 
entrepreneurs’ confidence and house prices in the current academic field. The conclusion in this 
chapter can provide reference and help for further research. 
 
3.2 Literature review 
3.2.1 Market fundamentals 
In the extant literature, there are several variables applied to proxy economic 
fundamentals in modeling house prices. The most widely used factors include construction costs, 
population and income (Jud and Winkler, 2002; Potepan, 1996; Poterba. 1991; Shen and Liu, 
62 
 
2004; Meen, 2012). Construction cost and income are commonly found to be the most important 
determinants of house prices in these studies. The role of population is ambiguous. For example, 
Levin et al. (2009) concluded that population decline and aging put downward pressure on house 
prices, and the prices rose in the past wouldn’t continue into the future. However, some studies 
have also found insignificant or negative effects of population growth on house prices (e.g., Hort, 
1998 for Sweden, and Engelhardt and Poterba, 1991 for Canada). Other factors such as interest 
rates (Abranham and Hendershott, 1994; Englund and Ioannide, 1997; Jud and Winkler, 2002; 
Giulindori 2005; Adam and Fuss, 2010), land prices (Du et al., 2011; Yu, 2010) are also deemed 
as determinants in some studies, but the effects vary between regions and on the context.  
In his wrap-up work, Meen (2012) sorted the determinants of house prices into cyclical 
and trend factors. Hereinto, cyclical determinants include income, interest rates (real and 
nominal), credit availability, wealth, expected capital gains, construction costs and 
employment/unemployment; trend factors are population size and structure, headship rates, 
migration, housing stock, planning regulations and housing taxation. However, Meen (2012) 
admits that, despite of considerable agreement on the theoretical framework, controversial 
empirical findings had been made regarding different markets. The differences mainly due to the 
different empirical tools and economic variables they employed in explaining the prices. 
For China, Yu (2010) use panel data to reach the conclusion that the increase of land 
supply, area of housing sold and vacancy levels each has a negative impact on house prices while 
the decrease of mortgage rate has a positive effect. Liang and Gao (2007) conclude that the price 
of housing in eastern and western regions of urban china is mainly affected by the credit policy 
and income. But the independent factors were limited to the demand side such as GDP and 
housing sales areas, the factors from supply side were ignored. Both Deng et al. (2009) and Du et 
al. (2011) highlight the role of land prices in determining house price. Wang and Zhang (2014) 
adopt Hukou population, wage income, urban land supply and construction in explaining the 
rising house price in major Chinese cities between 2002 and 2008. The result indicates, for most 
cities, changes in fundamentals account for major proportion of price appreciation. However, for 
some coastal cities, explanatory ability of fundamentals seems non-significant. Li and Chand 
(2013) use annual provincial data to test the housing market fundamentals such as income, 
construction cost, land price, user cost and impending marriage. The finding shows that the house 
63 
 
price in more developed regions are determined by supply factors including construction cost and 
land price, while prices in other provinces are determined by both demand and supply. 
In this chapter, the modeling of determinants of house prices in China takes into account 
the contribution of most major variables noted in these studies. 
3.2.2 Psychological influences on real estate market 
As the author pointed out in the literature review of Chapter 2, the subjective psychology 
of social mass had a broad and profound impact on the economy. For example, Christiansen et al. 
(2014) found that the predicting ability of sentiment variables on the US recession was far 
beyond that of classic recession predictors and macro variables by applying monthly data from 
consumer and business surveys, and the combination of the data with classical recession 
predictors or macro variables. After examined both the predictive power of consumer and 
business confidence, the paper highlighted that the latter is a substantially stronger recession 
predictor than the former. 
For the real estate market, Shiller (2005) argued that the US asset price surge after 1992 
was a speculative bubble based on psychological factors, which was the “Ponzi process” from 
enlarging investments due to the feedback loop. The basic way was price-price feedback: The rise 
or fall in price triggered investor enthusiasm or indifference, which in turn leaded to the further 
rise or fall of future price. This market feedback process was a natural phenomenon, and indirect 
evidence came from the high autocorrelation of house price (Case and Shiller, 1990; Abraham 
and Hendershott, 1994; Englund and Ioannides, 1997; Tu, 2004). 
Behavioral evidence could also be observed in traditional economics, proving that the 
volatility of the house price cycle was caused by the supply stickiness of housing products and 
the unreasonable expectations on market rents. For example, short-sighted expectations might 
lead to overestimation of asset prices. By computing a Good-time-to-buy (GTTB) index to 
measure households’ expectations, Huang (2014) found those households' expectations and house 
price shifted synchronously with the housing boom-bust cycle. 
By studying the deviation of the market price from the intrinsic value, some special 
psychological effects on the price were revealed. For example, Edelstein and Paul (2000) pointed 
out that because of the continued success of the Japanese economy in the 1980s, people were too 
confident in their business management before the real estate bubble burst, which was considered 
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arrogance effect. This effect influenced many decision-making processes during that time, and 
these decisions appear to be very stupid today. For another example, Capozza and Seguin (1996) 
provided evidence of euphoria in the market: housing market participants seemed to have 
overreactions to income growth; similarly, Anundsen and Jansen (2013) pointed out that 
investors' expectations on their future revenue growth and economic growth had a significant 
impact on the development of house prices; by testing data of 18 OECD countries, Engsted and 
Pedersen (2015) found money illusion in the housing market, namely the rent-price forecast 
pattern was highly dependent on the return of the house and the rent was measured in nominal or 
real rent; and Lambertini et al. (2013) proved the importance of the news impacts and the 
consumer confidence to house prices. Shocks to news and expectations accounted for more than 
50% of the forecast error variance of house prices. 
As for China, Wei et al. (2007) argued that there was a sheep-flock effect in China's 
housing market. When the sheep-flock effect existed, the relationship between macroeconomic 
fundamentals and house prices was distorted, and the house price elasticity increased, leading to 
the real estate bubble. 
3.2.3 Sentiment and market fundamentals on asset pricing 
The early behavioral finance literature showed that the erroneous pricing of assets is the 
trade result of sentimental, irrational traders and non-sentimental rational arbitrageurs (De Long 
et al., 1990). However, as the arbitrage of irrational investors was both expensive and risky 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997), the behavior of rational arbitrage could not return the erroneous 
pricing of assets to the intrinsic value. Both for the securities market and the real estate market, 
investor sentiment was the result of the combined effects of various market psychological factors, 
but since it was difficult to measure psychological factors (Shiller, 2005; Baker et al., 2012), 
empirical research on investor sentiment was still in the process of development and 
improvement. 
In his classic paper, Baker and Wurgler (2006) constructed the investor sentiment index 
based on six related agency variables of US stock market, and based on this index, investigated 
the impact of investor sentiment on the forecasted stock returns. Their findings suggested that the 
stock market returns also fell as investors rallied. Baker and Wurgler (2007) investigated the type 
of stock most affected by investor sentiment in subsequent studies. With the "top-down" (or 
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macroeconomic) method, they found that the stocks, which were speculative and difficult to 
arbitrage, were more likely to be affected by investor sentiment. Later, Baker et al. (2012) studied 
6 major stock markets and the study results showed that the global and local market sentiment 
was negatively correlated with country-level returns, and global sentiment was formed by the 
spread of investment sentiment around the local markets through private capital flows. 
In the field of behavioral finance, the real estate market did not receive as much academic 
attention as the capital market. In contrast, there were few studies that focused on the real estate 
market or the securitized real estate market. In the case of the real estate market, the literature 
found that the market fundamentals could not explain the change in house prices 
comprehensively (Case, Quigley and Shiller, 2003; Wong et al., 2005; Jin et al., 2014). The 
unexplained change in house prices was driven by a "noise trader" activity (Barkham and Ward, 
2009), which had nothing to do with market fundamentals or rational factors. 
Unlike the stock market, the real estate market is with less liquidity and higher transaction 
costs, and the house prices cannot respond quickly to changes in information as stock prices do. 
As pointed out by Baker and Wurgler (2006), assets with limit arbitrage were more susceptible to 
sentiment. Some studies tried to build an index to measure the impact of investor sentiment on 
the real estate market. Clayton et al. (2009) used a direct survey and established a sentiment 
index to explore the impact of market fundamentals and investor sentiment on the valuation of 
commercial real estate in the US market. By using error correction models, they concluded that 
investors’ sentiment would affect pricing even after controlling long-term equilibrium of other 
variables (expected rent growth, stock risk premium, bond yield and lagging adjustment). Lin et 
al. (2009) examined the impact of investor sentiment on the return of REIT, which was 
considered to be a direct proxy variable for the US real estate asset. They found that investor 
sentiment had a positive impact on REIT monthly returns. Using the data of the real estate market 
in Hong Kong, Hui and Wang (2014) designed a sentiment index to elucidate the overall trading 
behavior of investors based on the expected waiting time (delay effect) from “buy” to “sell” in 
the transaction record, and found that the housing market investors were likely to be affected by 
the mood. In addition, the conclusion also showed that the sentiment index was an effective 
estimate indicator of price level, return rate and trading volume. In subsequent essays, Wang and 
Hui (2016) found that sentiment was not only related to short-term rents and house prices, but 
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also had long-term effects on house prices. Later, Lam and Hui (2018) confirmed that sentiment 
is negatively related to future returns of Hong Kong residential properties, with a lagged effect 
from 3 to 12 months, and has stronger effects on “hard to value” assets. 
In the case of China, the researchers found that house prices were too high to be proved 
based on market fundamentals. For example, Hui and Yue (2006) investigated the relationship 
between house prices and economic factors based on data from Beijing, Shanghai and Hong 
Kong. They concluded that there was an anomalous interaction between house prices and market 
fundamentals, which was defined as the real estate bubble. Gao et al. (2014) used data from 30 
Chinese metropolitans to estimate the extent of house prices deviating from market fundamentals. 
They found that most cities experienced a period of the real estate bubble. The real estate bubbles 
in eastern cities were bigger than those of western and central cities. The studies directly aimed to 
investigate the influence of sentiment in housing market is limited in mainland China. A recent 
study is, maybe due to the difficulty to obtain data, Hui et al. (2017) constructed buyer-seller 
index and developer index based on real estate transaction volume and land transaction volume in 
Shanghai to proxy market sentiment, and studied their effects on returns. Although the conclusion 
showed that there was an impact, the overall impact was not obvious. 
3.2.4 Hypothesis and empirical strategy 
Existing literature attributes the influence of consumer confidence on macroeconomy to 
either "nonfundamental-based sentiments" or "news" (Abildgren et al., 2018). The 
"nonfundamental-based sentiments" strand of view holds the understanding that consumption 
shock at least to some extent was caused by psychologically based animal spirits (Blanchard, 
1993). In contrast, "news" view deems that the predictive power of consumer confidents origins 
from agents rationally and intelligently processing current or future fundamental news (Barsky 
and Sims, 2012). 
This chapter attempts to achieve two possible contributions regarding sentiment through 
investigating the influence of entrepreneur confidence on house prices. First, since Akerlof and 
Shiller (2009) extended the definition of animal spirits to include spontaneous behavior as well as 
optimistic and pessimistic beliefs, and Entrepreneur Confidence Index is defined as the 
entrepreneurs' views (i.e. optimistic, so-so and pessimistic) on the prosperity situation of their 
own enterprises in the current and next periods, the Entrepreneur Confidence Index can be 
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adopted as an excellent proxy for sentiment to probe the impact of sentiment on house prices. 
second, since the cointegration analysis based on time series data was selected in Chapter 2, it 
became difficult to set control variables to simulate the influence of news on sentiment, when 
investigating the impact by consumer expectations on house prices. Yet, given the attributes of 
panel data model selected for the research in this chapter, diverse control variables can be set to 
better control for the influences by objective information (news) on expectations. Therefore, if 
control variables are set, the sentimental index is still able to generate significant influence, and 
thus the view is held that influence primarily derive from the psychological factors in subjective 
expectations. 
Entrepreneurs' confidence has broad and far-reaching influence on the investment 
psychology of the public. By referring to the research classics, Shiller (2005) summarized the 
effects of group psychology on market fluctuations into the influence of authority, herd behavior, 
information cascade and tale spreading surpassed theoretical analysis, etc. Although “Sentiment 
is intrinsically difficult to measure precisely” (Baker et al., 2012, P272), above-mentioned 
psychological factors could be reflected in Entrepreneur Confidence Index in China's real estate 
market. For example, as investment specialists (whether in the real estate or other areas of 
investment), entrepreneurs’ buying advices and market analysis could reflect the influence of 
authority, and their buying behaviors would bring the sheep-flock effect and produce herding; 
Because of the information cascade, the entrepreneurs' buying advices or their own buying and 
selling real estate behaviors would first affect real estate investment behaviors of their relatives 
and friends, and then affect other investors; finally, entrepreneurs or other real estate investment 
cases (especially the successful investment cases) would have a wide impact on the real estate 
investment sentiment of the whole society through the tale spreading. Circle marketing 
(marketing by virtue of chamber of commerce and other social organizations), which is prevalent 
in China's real estate developers and intermediaries, is a typical case of taking advantage of 
entrepreneurial influence. Therefore, this chapter attempts to study the impact of market 
sentiment on the real estate market by analyzing the impact of China's provincial level 
Entrepreneur Confidence Index on house prices and provide new evidence for behavioral finance. 
The empirical analysis of this chapter includes the following process: First, the provincial 
panel data model is used to analyze the overall impact of entrepreneurs’ confidence on house 
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prices. Secondly, the instrumental variable of Entrepreneur Confidence Index is constructed to 
examine the endogenous problems caused by missing variables and test whether the 
entrepreneurs’ confidence affects the house prices by influencing the potential and unobservable 
variables; then, all provinces are divided into the eastern, middle and western regions, and the 
impact of the regional Entrepreneur Confidence Index on house prices is estimated; finally, the 
impact of the lagged Entrepreneur Confidence Index on house prices is analyzed. 
 
3.3 Data and statistical analysis 
3.3.1 Entrepreneur Confidence Index 
Entrepreneur Confidence Index is an indicator comprehensively reflecting entrepreneurs' 
optimistic level on the current macroeconomic situation and the development trend according to 
their judgment on the industrial situation in the enterprise prosperity survey. Entrepreneur 
Confidence Index is a prosperity index determined based on the entrepreneurs' views (i.e. 
optimistic, so-so and pessimistic) on the prosperity situation of their own enterprises in the 
current and next periods. The value range of Entrepreneur Confidence Index is between 0 and 
200, with 100 as the threshold. When the index is greater than 100, it indicates that the 
entrepreneurs' confidence is positive and optimistic. The closer the value is to 200, and the higher 
the degree of optimism will be; and when the index is less than 100, it indicates that the 
entrepreneurs' confidence is negative and pessimistic. The closer the value is to 0, the deeper the 
degree of pessimism will be (Li, 2002; Gao, 2010). 
The enterprise prosperity survey was carried out in the form of questionnaire, and the 
prosperity index was obtained by measuring and processing the entrepreneurs' judgment on 
current macroeconomic environment and micro operation situation, to reflect the development of 
macroeconomic status, the enterprises' production and operation prosperity as well as the future 
development trend. The enterprise prosperity survey is a systematized quarterly survey. The 
survey involved industry, construction, transportation, storage and posts, wholesale and retail 
trade, housing, social services, information transmission, computer services and software, 
accommodation and catering industries. The survey was conducted via focus survey and 
sampling survey methods, and a total of nearly 20,000 sample enterprises in different industries, 
with different sizes and registration types were taken. The survey objects were the legal 
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enterprises and the enterprise principals who are in charge of industrial business corresponding to 
such enterprises. Entrepreneur Confidence Index typically includes Spot Confidence Index and 
Expected Confidence Index. Specific description is as follows: 
Entrepreneur Confidence Index = 0.4 × Spot Confidence Index + 0.6 × Expected Confidence Index    (3.1) 
Where, Spot Confidence Index = the proportion of the enterprise principals' optimistic 
answers on the current general operation status of the industry which their enterprises belong to
－the proportion of pessimistic answers,+100; Expected Confidence Index = the proportion of 
the enterprise principals' optimistic answers on the next quarterly general operation status of the 
industry which their enterprises belong to－the proportion of pessimistic answers,+100. This 
chapter adopts the provincial and municipal Entrepreneur Confidence Index between 2003 and 
2011, and the data is from DataStream3. 
3.3.2 Measurement of provincial house prices 
Since no statistical indicators readily available on house prices of China's provinces, this 
chapter calculated the house prices of provinces according to the relevant statistical indicators in 
China Statistical Yearbook (2003-2011). Specifically speaking, for each year and every province, 
unit price of residential commodity houses is calculated by the total sales of residential 
commodity houses divided by the sales area. The residential commodity houses refer to those 
exclusively for residence, including villas, apartments, family dormitories and common 
dormitories of employees (including bachelor employees and student dormitories), etc. But, the 
basement for people's air defense and non-residential basement are excluded. The houses can be 
divided into ordinary residential houses, affordable houses and villas, luxury apartments 
according to the purpose; and the houses with the area of below 90m2 and the houses with the 
area of more than 140m2 according to the house type. 
The sale area of residential commodity houses refers to the total area of the sold 
residential commodity houses in the reporting period (i.e. the construction area indicated in the 
contract between the buyer and the seller), consisting of the area of sold existing houses and the 
area of sold forward houses.  First, the area of sold existing homes refer to the construction area 
of the residential houses that have been completed and meet the entry conditions, and for which 
the contract has been signed, including the construction area of existing houses that are sold in 
                                                        
3 sourced from the enterprise prosperity survey by China's National Bureau of Statistics. 
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the form of one-time payment and installment. Second, the area of sold forward houses refer to 
the construction area of the residential houses that are still under construction and not delivered 
for residence, and for which the contract has been signed, including the construction area of 
existing houses that are sold in the form of one-time payment and installment. The construction 
area of sold forward houses will not be carried over the construction area of sold existing house. 
From the above calculation method, it is known that the price used in this chapter is the 
average price, instead of hedonic house price, which may result in the difference in price 
structure and quality of the houses cannot be captured. Considering that the high-price houses 
and affordable houses only account for a low proportion in China's house prices structure in the 
sample period, the deviation caused by the price structure may be ignored (Li and Chand, 2013). 
For example, in 2009, the high-price houses accounted for 5% of total sales, affordable houses 
accounted for 4%, and the remaining 91% were sold at conventional prices. In view of that the 
housing sales involve new houses, the difference in quality of sample houses may result in 
overestimation of the overall house prices. 
3.3.3 Control variables data sources 
The data of control variable sets in this chapter is mainly from China Statistical Yearbook 
(hereinafter referred to as the Yearbook), which is co-edited by the National Bureau of Statistics 
and the China Index Research Institute. China Index Research Institute is a research institution 
fully serving China's commercial economy, and integrating China's Housing Index System and 
China Housing TOP 10 Research Groups, etc., co-founded by dozens of domestic and foreign 
experts and several academic institutions, having five branches, i.e. North China, East China, 
Central China, South China and Southwest institutes, and it is the largest industrial institute. The 
China Housing Index System (referred to as CREIS), is an indicator system and analysis method 
reflecting the status of main cities' housing markets across China via the price index. As a house 
price index system with the largest coverage and most cities involved, China Housing Index 
System publishes a series of indices, like price indices (residential houses), office building 
indices, retail building indices, villa indices, second-hand housing sales and rental price indices 
of 100 cities on a monthly basis. 
3.3.4 Statistical analysis 
Based on China Housing Statistical Yearbook (2003~2011) data, this chapter estimates the 
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unit price of residential commodity houses in 30 provinces (excluding Tibet) of China, in order to 
measure the house prices of all the provinces of China, as shown in figure 3.14. Between 2003 
and 2011, the distribution of average house prices of China's provinces showed the trend of 
differentiation between the coastal region and the inland region. The average house price in the 
former was 4,646 yuan/m2, while that of the inland region was 2,000 yuan/m2. In the coastal 
region, the areas with the highest average price was Beijing, where it was10,065 yuan/m2, 
followed by 7,115 yuan/m2 of Shanghai; more than 4,800yuan/m2 in Tianjin, Guangdong and 
Zhejiang; more than 3,000 yuan/m2 in Liaoning, Jiangsu, Fujia and Hainan. In the west provinces, 
the house prices are basically lower than 2,000 yuan/m2. The areas with the lowest house prices 
are Gansu and Guizhou, 1600 yuan/ m2. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Distribution of provincial house prices of 2003~2011 
 
                                                        
4 This house price was adjusted according to the Consumer Price Index (CPI) of all areas by taking 2003 as the basic year. 
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Figure 3.2: Fluctuation of provincial house prices of 2003~2011(standard deviation) 
 
Secondly, in view of the evolution trend of provincial house prices, the average price of 
residential commodity houses in Beijing was 4,456yuan/m2 in 2003 and 13,087yuan/m2 in 2011. 
Since 2007, the house price of Beijing has exceeded 10,000yuan/m2; following Beijing, the house 
price of Shanghai, was 4,989 yuan / m2 in 2003 and 11,010 yuan / m2 in 2011. And since 2009, 
the house price of Shanghai has exceeded 10,000yuan/ m2. According to the fluctuation of the 
house prices (as shown in Figure 3.2), the value of Beijing, Shanghai and Zhejiang was the 
maximum, while that of Yunnan, Qinghai and Henan was the minimum5. 
Finally, let's analyze the evolution trend of the house prices and Entrepreneur Confidence 
Index (as shown in Figure 3.3). The left vertical axis represents the provincial average house 
price (expressed in the median of the annual house prices of all provinces), and the right vertical 
axis represents the average value of Entrepreneur Confidence Index. From the evolution trend of 
the house prices of all provinces, the house prices of all provinces were 1,470 yuan / m2 in 2003, 
and 3,178 yuan / m2 in 2011. Since 2007, the national house price has exceeded 2,000 yuan/m2 
and from 2008, the house price began to rise sharply. Entrepreneur Confidence Index experienced 
the rise - drop- rise trend. It started to rise from 2003 and reached the peak of 138 in 2007. Due to 
                                                        
5 In this chapter, the standard deviation of the house price among different provinces is adopted to measure the fluctuations in house 
price. 
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the impact of the financial crisis, Entrepreneur Confidence Index bottomed out to 116 in 2009. 
 
 
Figure 3.3: Evolution trend of Entrepreneur Confidence Index and house prices 
 
3.4 Model specification and empirical results 
3.4.1 Estimation of panel data model  
(1) Basic concept of panel data 
Panel data or longitudinal data refers to the data tracing the individuals of the same group 
within a period of time, which consists of N, i.e. the cross-section dimension (N individuals) and 
the time dimension (T stages). Generally, the panel data featuring smaller T and larger N is called 
short panel. If individuals in the samples of the panel data keep unchanged in different stages, the 
panel data is called balanced panel data. The provincial-level house price on which the paper is 
based is called the balanced panel data, including the data of the 30 provinces other than Tibet 
Autonomous Region during 2003 to 2011. Additionally, the major advantages of panel data are 
given as follows:  
On the one hand, the issue related to missing variable could be resolved. Missing of 
variables is a common problem during empirical analysis. Though it could be resolved by dint of 
instrumental variables, it is often hard to find out the effective ones. Generally, missing of 
variables is caused by unobservable difference or heterogeneity between individuals; if such an 
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individual difference doesn’t change with time, then, the estimation via panel data could be used 
to resolve the endogenous issue arising from missing variables (Wooldridge, 2009).  
On the other hand, information about more individuals’ dynamic behavior is provided. 
Thanks to its two dimensions i.e. cross section and time, the panel data sometimes is capable of 
resolving the issues that cannot be resolved by single cross section data or time series data. For 
example, when we consider how to distinguish the effect of scale economy upon enterprises’ 
productivity from that of technical progress, the cross-section data fails to observe the technical 
progress because it does not have the dimension of time while the time series data of single 
enterprise cannot figure out why the productivity has been enhanced, because of enlarged scale or 
technical progress. However, the panel data can resolve the foresaid problems.  
(2) Estimation method of panel data model 
The following panel data model is considered:  
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                              (3.2) 
Where, i denotes observed individual, t refers to time dimension, and it is assumed that 
the time dimension of each individual is T, that is to say, t=1，2,..., T; the number of individuals is 
K, that is to say, i=1，2,..., K. Therefore, the number of samples is N*K. A brief introduction of 
the estimation method for the fixed effect and random effect of panel data model will be made as 
follows. 
a. Fixed effect model 
For the XXth individual in the fixed effect model, the following equation is obtained after 
Equation (3.2) is averaged over the time zone on both sides:  
𝑦𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝑋𝑖𝛽 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖                                               (3.3) 
The interest margin of original model is obtained after Equation (3.2) minus Equation 
(3.3):  
𝑦𝑖𝑡 − 𝑦𝑖 = (𝑋𝑖𝑡 − 𝑋𝑖)𝛽 + (𝜀𝑖𝑡 − 𝜀𝑖)                                       (3.4) 
Define 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑦𝑖𝑡 − 𝑦𝑖,  𝑋𝑖𝑡 = 𝑋𝑖𝑡 − 𝑋𝑖, 𝜀𝑖𝑡 = 𝜀𝑖𝑡 − 𝜀𝑖, then there is  
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                      (3.5) 
𝛼𝑖 has been deleted from the above equation, so 𝛽, the consistent estimated parameter of 
OLS could be adopted as long as 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is not correlated with 𝜀𝑖𝑡, and the estimator is called fixed 
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effect estimator of panel data model 𝛽𝐹𝐸
^
. Since 𝛽𝐹𝐸
^
 has made use of the within groups 
dispersion of each individual, it is also called within estimator. Though individual characteristics 
are correlated with explanatory variable, a consistent estimation could be obtained as long as the 
within estimator is used. This is the advantage of panel data model. Additionally, in order to 
guarantee 𝑋𝑖𝑡 − 𝑋𝑖 is not correlated with 𝜀𝑖𝑡 − 𝜀𝑖, since 𝑋𝑖𝑡 contains the information of all 
𝑥𝑖1, 𝑥𝑖2, . . . , 𝑥𝑖𝑇, it is required that the i observed value meets the strict exogeneity assumption, i.e. 
𝐸[𝜀𝑖𝑡|𝑥𝑖1, 𝑥𝑖2, . . . , 𝑥𝑖𝑇] = 0. That is to say, the disturbance terms are not correlated with the 
explanatory variable of each stage.  
b. Random effect model 
It is assumed that in the random effect model individual effect is not correlated with 
explanatory variable, therefore the OLS estimation is consistent. However, the disturbance term 
is composed of 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 but not spherical disturbance, so OLS estimation is not among the most 
efficient ones. It is further assumed that the disturbance terms of different individuals don’t 
correlate with each other and the correlation among the disturbance terms of the same individual 
over different stages won’t change with time-space. Therefore, the estimated results of OLS or 
fixed effect are consistent but not the most effective. The common method is to estimate the 
residual error of random effect model through OLS and then to estimate the original model with 
FGLS so as to obtain 𝛽𝑅𝐸
^
, the random effect estimator of panel data model.  
c. Hausman test: FE vs. RE 
Which to select, fixed effect model or random effect model, when processing the panel 
data, is a fundamental problem. Therefore, it is required to test the original hypothesis “H0: 𝛼𝑖 is 
not correlated with 𝑋𝑖𝑡” (the random effect model is the correct one). Of course, no matter 
whether the original hypothesis is tenable or not, the fixed effect model is always consistent. If 
the original hypothesis is tenable, the random effect will be more effective than fixed effect; but 
if the original hypothesis is not tenable, the random effect will be inconsistent. Hausman (1978) 
has proposed the classical Hausman test estimator to test the fixed effect and random effect:  
(𝛽𝐹𝐸
^
− 𝛽𝑅𝐸
^
)
′
[𝑉𝑎𝑟( 𝛽𝐹𝐸
^
) − 𝑉𝑎𝑟( 𝛽𝑅𝐸
^
)] (𝛽𝐹𝐸
^
− 𝛽𝑅𝐸
^
) → 𝜒2(𝐾)               (3.6) 
The critical value for the distribution could be worked out based on 𝜒2(𝐾). If Hausman 
test estimator is higher than the critical value, the original hypothesis H0 will be refutable, that is 
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to say, the random effect mode is not correct. If Hausman test estimator is lower than the critical 
value, the original hypothesis H0 is acceptable, that is to say, 𝛽𝑅𝐸
^
, the random effect estimator is 
the most effective of all. However, if heteroscedasticity exists in disturbance terms, 𝛽𝑅𝐸
^
won’t be 
the most effective estimator. Therefore, the regression results of the article are mainly based on 
the fixed effect.  
In addition, there are two dimensions in a panel, N and T. This chapter and Chapter 4 
adopt the panel including the data of 30 provinces other than Tibet Autonomous Region during 
2003 to 2011 for econometric analysis. Where, N is 30, and T is 9. When T is greater than N, the 
heterogeneous regression model is adopted for the macro panel data, that is, one individual 
corresponds to one regression coefficient. Therefore, the fixed effect and random effect 
estimation of the panel data model are not suitable. Given the time series correlation in the 
explanatory variable, it is necessary to study the panel data model using the time series method. 
On the other hand, for the panel data model where N is greater than T, Baltagi (2005) held that 
there is no time series problem in variables, and the fixed effect of panel data can be used to 
obtain consistency of parameter estimation. Consistent with the measurement method of N 
greater than T, Li and Chand (2013) used the panel data of 29 provinces in China from 1998 to 
2009 to study the impact of market fundamentals on house prices, and directly estimated the 
fixed effect model and random effect model of panel data without studying characteristics of time 
series. This method is also adopted in the measurement of this chapter and Chapter 4. 
3.4.2 Model specification 
This chapter makes an empirical analysis of the effect of entrepreneurs’ confidence upon 
house prices by making use of the provincial-level panel data model and tries to prevent the 
endogenous issue arising from missing variables by bringing unobservable heterogeneity among 
the individuals of different provinces under control. The detailed measurement model is given as 
follows:  
𝑙𝑛𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟2008 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                  
(3.7) 
Where, the subscripts 𝑖 and 𝑡 denote province and year respectively and explained 
variable lnprice refers to the logarithm of provincial house price; lnindex denotes the logarithm 
of Entrepreneur Confidence Index of each province and it is also the core explanatory variable of 
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this chapter. Since Entrepreneur Confidence Index is released quarterly, the median of four 
quarters’ Entrepreneur Confidence Indices are used to measure the entrepreneurs’ confidence of 
the year. 𝑋 represents the control variable set. The papers of Li and Chand (2013) and Wang et 
al. (2014) about the fundamentals of China’s house price are main references for the setting. It 
includes GDP per capita, house construction cost, land price, urbanization level, FDI proportion, 
interest rate of more than five-year loan and proportion of unmarried population. The detailed 
definition of the variables is shown in Table 3.1. Year2008 refers to the dummy variable of the 
year. The years earlier than 2008 are set to 0 while the years later than 2008 are set to 1 with the 
aim to bring the effect of government bailout during the financial crisis of 2008 under control. 𝛼𝑖 
refers to the unobservable individual effect of province and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 denotes the disturbance term.  
3.4.3 Definition of variables  
This chapter selects house price as the explained variable and Entrepreneur Confidence 
Index as the explanatory variable. Section 3.3 of this chapter has explained the construction 
methods for the core explaining variables and the explained variables. In order to prevent the 
endogenous problem arising from missing variables, this chapter selects the following variables 
as the control variables. The detailed definition is given as follows:  
(1) Land price (land cost): Land acquisition cost refers to the expenses that housing 
development enterprises have to pay in order to obtain the use right of land by different means. 
The land acquisition cost falls into three types. Firstly, it is composed of the compensation for the 
land, the compensation for the attachments to or green crops on the land, settlement allowances, 
the management fee for land acquisition and many others that shall be paid if the land use right is 
obtained by way of land allocation; secondly, it is composed of the fees for assignment that are 
paid in case that the land use right is obtained through land transfer; thirdly, it consists of the 
funds that are paid in order to get the land use right through “land auction”. The funds paid in 
order to get the land use right by way of land allocation and land auction will be included into the 
newly increased fixed assets while the transfer fees that are paid in order to get the use right of 
land by way of land transfer won’t be included into the newly increased fixed assets. The land 
acquisition cost will be included into the investments on the basis of the actual amount of the 
period. In case of payment by installment, the land acquisition cost shall be included into the 
investments for housing development by stages. The land acquisition area of the year refers to the 
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land area of which the use right is obtained by different means (excluding land appropriation) in 
the current year. The variable will be adjusted according to Consumer Price Index (CPI) of 
different regions and converted into the value of the year 2003. (2) House construction cost 
(construct): The construction cost is measured by the construction cost of commercial building 
upon completion. The variable is also adjusted according to CPI of different regions and the year 
of 2003 is taken as the benchmark. (3) GDP per capita (gdp_pop): This chapter will use GDP 
per capital of each province to control the economic development level of the region. The GDP 
per capita will be deflated according to GNP index of each province and converted to the value of 
the year 2003. (4) Foreign investment proportion (fi): It refers to the proportion of the foreign 
investments in capital source of the housing enterprises in each province for the current year. The 
capital source of the year refers to the monetary funds that real estate enterprises (units) have 
actually invested for the purpose of housing development, including domestic loans, foreign 
investment, self-raised funds and other funds. Foreign investment refers to the offshore funds 
(including foreign countries and Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan regions) that are obtained 
within the reporting period for the purpose of housing development and operation, including 
foreign direct investment, foreign loans (loans from foreign government, loans from international 
financial organizations, export credit, commercial loans from foreign banks, bonds and shares 
issued to foreign countries) and other foreign investments (including foreign businessmen’s 
payment for equipment during compensation trade and processing assembly, international lease). 
It excludes the own foreign exchange funds (including state foreign exchange, local foreign 
exchange, retained foreign exchange, swap exchange, the foreign exchange loans issued by 
Chinese banks based on their own funds and many others) of China. (5) Loan rate (interest): The 
more-than five-year loan rate released by the People’s Bank of China will be adopted as the loan 
rate for the housing market in this chapter. (6) Urbanization level (urban): the urbanization level 
of a region is measured by the proportion of urban population in the total population of the region 
and this indicator could reflect the change of urban-rural dual economic structure (Gong, 2012). 
(7) Proportion of unmarried population (unmarried): It refers to Ratio of unmarried female to 
unmarried male. The definition of major variables is shown in Table 3.1.  
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Table 3.1: Definition of variables 
Variables denote Definition 
House price Price 
House price (Yuan per square meter) on the basis of the year 
2003 
Entrepreneur Confidence Index Index 
Entrepreneur Confidence Index (totaled up based on quarterly 
data)  
Land price land_cost 
Land acquisition cost of the year/Land acquisition area of the 
year (Yuan per square meter) 
House construction cost construct 
Construction cost of residential commodity house upon 
completion (Yuan per square meter) 
GDP per capita gdp_pop On the basis of the year 2003 (Yuan per capita)  
Foreign investment proportion Fi Proportion of foreign investment in housing funds (%)  
Loan rate interest More than five-year loan interest rate (%)  
Urbanization level Urban Proportion of urban population in total population (%) 
Proportion of unmarried 
population 
unmarried Ratio of unmarried female to unmarried male 
Note: the data of the article comes from “China Housing Statistics Yearbook 2003-2011”, “China Statistics 
Yearbook 2004-2012” and the website of the People’s Bank of China. The samples contain the data of 30 
provinces other than Tibet Autonomous Region during 2003 to 2011. 
 
The descriptive statistics of all variables are shown in Table 3.2.  
 
Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics of variables  
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
price 270 2970.70 2139.87 964.00 15274.68 
land_cost 270 1330.51 2107.39 163.58 21643.43 
construct 270 1441.54 515.41 740.10 3892.49 
index 270 129.84 8.80 103.65 156.90 
gdp_pop 270 13589.6 8494.75 3603 48429.95 
fi（%） 270 0.83 1.43 0.00 18.45 
interest（%） 270 6.14 0.62 5.40 7.26 
urban（%） 270 47.75 14.86 20.48 89.30 
unmarried 270 0.72 0.09 0.53 1.20 
first difference 
price_fd 240 298.51 504.27 -2187.25 3768.90 
land_cost_fd 240 198.16 1161.73 -9450.59 8237.23 
construct_fd 240 85.87 175.69 -845.34 882.41 
index_fd 240 0.67 9.99 -30.70 23.00 
gdp_pop_fd 240 406.76 914.50 -7968.95 6792.66 
fi_fd 240 -0.03 1.83 -17.95 17.20 
interest_fd 240 0.18 0.64 -1.32 0.90 
urban_fd 240 1.53 2.58 -15.80 16.85 
unmarried_fd 240 0.0036 0.09 -0.35 0.49 
Note: the data of the article comes from “China Housing Statistics Yearbook 2003-2011”, “China Statistics 
Yearbook 2004-2012” and the website of the People’s Bank of China. The samples contain the data of 30 
provinces other than Tibet Autonomous Region during 2003 to 2011. 
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3.4.4 Analysis of correlation among variables 
This chapter adopts Spearman correlation coefficient to identify the correlation among 
variables. The method has no special requirements on distribution of primitive variables and it is 
a non-parametric statistics method. Spearman rank correlation coefficient is also called rank 
correlation coefficient. The estimation coefficient is between -1 and 1. As shown in Table 3.3, the 
house price is positively correlated with Entrepreneur Confidence Index. Land price, construction 
cost, and urbanization level are also the major factors affecting house prices. Additionally, the 
coefficient of correlation between Entrepreneur Confidence Index and other control variables is 
lower than 0.3, indicating that no multicollinearity exists between Entrepreneur Confidence Index 
and other control variables. 
 
Table 3.3: Spearman correlation coefficient matrix of variables 
 lnprice lnland 
Lnconst-
ruct lnindex 
lngdp_ 
pop lnfi lninterest lnurban 
Lnun- 
married 
lnprice 1         
lnland_cost 0.8075* 1        
lnconstruct 0.8687* 0.7150* 1       
lnindex 0.1908* 0.1109 0.1855* 1      
lngdp_pop 0.7345* 0.5714* 0.6658* 0.2922* 1     
lnfi 0.1553* 0.0716 0.1091 0.0208 0.1760* 1    
lninterest 0.4093* 0.4241* 0.3385* 0.1710* 0.2163* 0.0898 1   
lnurban 0.7478* 0.5807* 0.6777* 0.2722* 0.8735* 0.1594* 0.2457* 1  
lnunmarried 0.3476* 0.2726* 0.3399* 0.1753* 0.6002* 0.0748 0.0847 0.5101* 1 
Note: (ln) refers to the logarithm of the variable, * means significance level is 5%;  
 
However, it may lead to multicollinearity due to the higher correlation coefficients among 
multiple variables in the Table 3.3. In section 3.4.5 of this chapter, the estimated results of the 
core explanatory variable are reported first. As shown in Columns (1) and (2) of Table 3.4, the 
main variables are significant at least at the level of 5%. Then, other control variables are added, 
as shown in Columns (3) and (4) of Table 3.4. In order to investigate the possible existence of 
multicollinearity, Table 3.4 further reports the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) of fixed effect 
estimation. VIF in Column (1) of Table 3.4 is 5.42, and that is 9.87 in Column (3) of Table 3.4. 
Usually, VIF less than 10 indicates that there is no multicollinearity in the measurement model. 
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3.4.5 General regression results 
Usually, in the Ordinary Least Squares regression (OLS), and 𝛼𝑖 are 𝜀𝑖𝑡  regarded as the 
disturbing terms of the model. We cannot control all the variables that influence Entrepreneur 
Confidence Index and the house price due to the limitation of data. However, there are 
differences in geographic features and institutional environment in various provinces of China, 
the missing variables that do not change with time may exist. Therefore, the regression results of 
OLS may be inconsistent. The measurement model using panel data can control individual 
heterogeneity of different provinces. In this way, the endogenous problems led by the missing 
variables can be solved. According to the relation between 𝛼𝑖 and explanatory variables, the 
fixed effect model (fixed effect, FE) and the random effect model (random effect, RE) can be 
used respectively. If 𝛼𝑖 is not related to the other explanatory variables in the model, the random 
effect model is more effective than the fixed effect model relatively; whether 𝛼𝑖 is related to the 
other explanatory variables in the model or not, the estimated result of the fixed effect model is 
always consistent. 
As shown in Table 3.4, we report the estimate results of the fixed and random effects of 
the panel data model respectively. The house prices are positively correlated with Entrepreneur 
Confidence Index, and when Entrepreneur Confidence Index is increased by one percentage point, 
the house prices are in the change range of 0.27% to 0.38%, indicating that the entrepreneur's 
current and expected confidence in the economic situation will affect the house prices.  The land 
acquisition prices and the housing construction costs are the major cost factors affecting the 
house prices, in accordance with the conclusion of Li and Chand (2013) and Wang et al. (2014), 
and their elasticity coefficients affecting the house prices are 0.12% and 0.46% respectively. The 
improvement of the urbanization also pushes up the house prices through increasing housing 
demands. When the proportion of the urban population increases by one percentage point, the 
house prices is correspondingly up 0.3%, which is in accordance with the conclusion of Chen et 
al. (2011). The influence of foreign investment and interest rate of five years is not significant on 
the demand of housing. The influence of the GDP per capita on the house price is significant 
when the control variables are fewer, and detailed analysis will be made in the follow-up by 
regions. Besides, adding the dummy variables in 2008 indicates that the house price was 
significantly raised after the financial crisis, which may be related to the investment of RMB 4 
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trillion Yuan from the government, and a large amount of money flowed into the housing market. 
It is notable that the unmarried population and estimated coefficient of house price are 
positive but not significant, and the conclusion is highly different from the conclusion of Li and 
Chand (2013). In the paper, Li and Chand takes impending marriage rate as the main variables to 
put in the panel data to estimate the influence on the house price, and the conclusion is significant. 
The differences of the conclusion of this chapter and the conclusion of Li and Chand are caused 
by the different parameters of the measurement impending marriage. In this chapter, the 
parameter is defined as the ratio of unmarried female to unmarried male, where Li and Chand 
define impending marriage as the population between 24 and 29 years old divided by total urban 
population, and with the situation that the average age at marriage all across the country is 25 
years old mentioned in the paper, the population between 24 and 29 years old must contain a 
large number of married persons. 
We report the test statistics of whether there is individual heterogeneity or not at the same 
time. The F test of the fixed effect model and the Breusch and Pagan LM test (Breusch and Pagan, 
1979) of the random effect model refutes the original assumption of inexistence of individual 
effect in the 1% significance level, which also indicates that the estimated results of OLS is 
inconsistent. The test result of Hausman is 17.73, which refutes the original assumption of “
i is 
not related to the other explanatory variables of the model” in the 5% significance level. As for 
the inaccurate of random effect model, the fixed effect model should be adopted. 
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Table 3.4: Entrepreneur Confidence Index and house prices (explained variable: lnprice ) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variables FE RE FE RE 
     
lnindex 0.3766** 0.2263 0.2684* 0.0484 
 (0.1809) (0.1682) (0.1589) (0.1508) 
lngdp_pop 0.3047** 0.4203*** -0.0283 0.1888*** 
 (0.1293) (0.0673) (0.1104) (0.0668) 
lnconstruct 0.7167*** 0.7352*** 0.4613*** 0.4779*** 
 (0.0827) (0.0763) (0.0710) (0.0663) 
lnland_cost   0.1243*** 0.1524*** 
   (0.0215) (0.0201) 
lnfi   -0.0054 -0.0042 
   (0.0068) (0.0069) 
lnurban   0.2954*** 0.3298*** 
   (0.0969) (0.0897) 
lnunmarried   0.1208 0.0791 
   (0.0884) (0.0885) 
lninterest   -0.0438 -0.0170 
   (0.0984) (0.1001) 
year2008 0.1876*** 0.1590*** 0.1171*** 0.0563** 
 (0.0323) (0.0270) (0.0304) (0.0261) 
constant -2.1106** -2.5838*** 0.8768 -0.3350 
 (1.0638) (0.8484) (0.9571) (0.7543) 
Province Fixed Effecy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-test 13.03***  14.08***  
Breusch and Pagan LM 
test 
 308.85***  285.27*** 
Observations 270 270 270 270 
R-squared 
Variance inflation factor 
0.7598 
5.42 
 0.8569 
9.87 
 
Note：*significance level is 10%; **significance level is 5%; ***significance level is 1%. FE: fixed effect 
panel data model; RE: random effect panel data model. 
 
3.5 Robustness check and additional analysis 
3.5.1 Endogenous test of missing variables 
In this chapter, the panel data model is used to avoid the endogenous problems caused by 
missing variables through controlling the individual heterogeneity of different provinces and the 
fixed effect of year. The panel data model cannot control some of the unobservable variables that 
change over time, and these variables may be related to Entrepreneur Confidence Index and also 
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affect the house prices. In view of this, we build the instrumental variable of Entrepreneur 
Confidence Index to test endogeneity. 
For panel data model, the lagged variable of the endogenous explanatory variable is often 
adopted as an instrumental variable. However, Entrepreneur Confidence Index is the prosperity 
index prepared based on entrepreneurs’ views (specifically divided into optimistic, pessimistic 
and so-so) on the current and future prosperity of the industry in which the enterprise is located. 
Given the differences in the samples of entrepreneurs in each interview or indexes compiled, it 
may not be appropriate to use the first lag of Entrepreneur Confidence Index as the instrumental 
variable. This paper uses Lewbel’s (1997) method for reference to construct the instrumental 
variable of Entrepreneur Confidence Index to test endogeneity. If no suitable IV can be found or 
the first lag of the explanatory variable is not suitable for IV, Lewbel (1997) provided a method to 
construct instrumental variable, which takes the third power of the differences between the 
sample observations and their mean values as the instrumental variable. Although such 
instrumental variable is not obvious in the economic sense, it has good adaptability to the 
endogenous test of the explanatory variable and the measurement errors that may exist in the 
explanatory variable. Besides, another advantage of this method is that it can build an effective 
tool variable without using external factors. The details are as follows: 
𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥_𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡 = (𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 − 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖)
3                                    (3.8) 
𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖 represents the average of i provincial Entrepreneur Confidence Index. 
The regression results for the instrumental variables of Entrepreneur Confidence Index 
are as shown in the table 3.5, and we report the estimate results of the first and second phases of 
the Two-stage Least Squares regression (2SLS) respectively. In the regression results of the first 
stage, the F statistic is 43.87. Determining the correlation between the instrumental variable and 
the endogenous variable can guarantee the reasonable progress of the two-stage least squares 
estimation. The statistical value should usually be greater than 10, indicating the selected 
instrumental variable is reasonable. In the regression results of the second phase, the 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test statistic is 0.9093, with a corresponding p-value of 0.3425, which 
could not reject the original hypothesis of exogenous explanatory variables. The estimated 2SLS 
results of the instrumental variable show that Entrepreneur Confidence Index is positively but not 
significantly correlated with the house prices, because although the 2SLS estimates are always 
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consistent, they are not the most effective, i.e. 2SLS estimates lead to significant horizontal 
distortions, that is, in the absence of endogenous explanatory variables, the fixed effect of the 
panel data model is most effective. The regression and endogeneity test results of Entrepreneur 
Confidence Index show that the impact of entrepreneurs’ confidence on the house prices does not 
have the endogeneity of missing variables, that is, Entrepreneur Confidence Index independently 
affects the house prices. 
 
Table 3.5: 2SLS estimation of instrumental variable of Entrepreneur Confidence Index 
 (1) (2) 
Variables 2SLS-1st 2SLS-2nd 
 Lnindex lnprice 
lnindex  0.2450 
  (0.5332) 
lnindex_iv 0.0070***  
 (0.0004)  
lnrgdp_pop -0.0067 -0.0017 
 (0.0165) (0.1411) 
lnconstruct 0.0091 0.5282*** 
 (0.0102) (0.0880) 
lnland_cost -0.0006 0.1268*** 
 (0.0030) (0.0261) 
lnfi 0.0011 -0.0154* 
 (0.0011) (0.0093) 
lnurban -0.0006 0.6349*** 
 (0.0136) (0.1168) 
lnunmarried -0.0065 0.2254** 
 (0.0132) (0.1146) 
lninterest 0.0502*** 0.3913*** 
 (0.0132) (0.1211) 
year2008 -0.0066 0.0549 
 (0.0041) (0.0364) 
constant 4.8410*** 0.6929 
 (0.1552) (2.6283) 
Province Fixed Effecy Yes Yes 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test    0.9093 
F test 43.87  
R-squared 0.9402 0.9513 
 Note: *significance level is 10%; **significance level is 5%; ***significance level is 1%.             
2SLS: two-stage least squares of instrumental variables regression, 2SLS-1st is to regress the endogenous 
variable of Entrepreneur Confidence Index, while 2SLS-2nd is to use the estimated Entrepreneur Confidence 
Index (with endogeneity having been removed) as an explanatory variable for regression with house prices. 
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3.5.2 Analysis by regions 
Liang and Gao (2007) have divided China’s 29 provinces into three regions by per capita 
GDP, among which the region with per capita GDP of more than RMB 20,000 is the eastern 
region, between RMB 12,000 to 20,000 is the middle region, and below RMB 12,000 is the 
western region. Based on this division method and geographic distribution, we made some slight 
adjustments of the regions that several provinces belong to. The dividing regions of each 
province are as follows (see map of China6 below). Eastern region contains 11 provinces and 
cities. They are Beijing, Fujian, Guangdong, Hebei, Hainan, Jiangsu, Liaoning, Shandong, 
Shanghai, Tianjin and Zhejiang. Western region includes 11 provinces which consist of Inner 
Mongolia, Guangxi, Chongqing, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia 
and Xinjiang. Anhui, Hubei, Heilongjiang, Henan, Hunan, Jilin, Jiangxi and Shanxi provinces 
constitute the middle region. Generally speaking, the house price distribution of Chinese 
provinces presents great differences: the eastern region’s is higher than the middle and western 
regions’. Therefore, this chapter will further analyze the influences that entrepreneurs’ confidence 
on house prices based on divided regions. 
                                                        
6 Sourced from www.59edu.com. 
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We make estimation with fixed effect model in the regression analysis of divided regions. 
As shown in Table 3.6, Entrepreneur Confidence Index significantly influences house prices in 
the eastern and middle regions, When Entrepreneur Confidence Index increases by one 
percentage point in both eastern and middle regions of China, the corresponding house price 
increases by 0.65 and 0.68 percentage points respectively, while the influence is not so significant 
in the western region. This indicates that influences of entrepreneurs’ confidence on house prices 
will be constrained by local economic development levels. Entrepreneurs’ confidence will have a 
more significant influence on house prices with a higher economic development level and faster 
market process. 
Besides, per capita GDP is the main factor that influences the house prices of the middle 
and western regions, but its impact on the eastern region is not remarkable, conforming to the 
conclusion of Li and Chand (2013). Li and Chand (2013) deemed the possible reason for this was 
that eastern region’s developed economy, large numbers of population migration and the 
relatively deficient land resources made supply factors like lands and construction costs play a 
more important role in the formation of house prices, whereas the influence of demand factors 
like per capita incomes was relatively weakened. This analysis is markedly different in 
comparison with the mentioned reason when Wang et al. (2014) explained why the explanatory 
ability of fundamentals for house prices is weaker in eastern cities, which (with a non-empirical 
analysis) held that inelastic urban housing supply would lead to the increase of the influence on 
housing premiums caused by the growth of population and income. This chapter holds that costs 
influence house prices significantly in the eastern region, and meanwhile, investment expectation 
also plays a part that cannot be neglected in developed regions. The high return expectation of 
asset investments will hasten more investment demands or produce more potential risks. For 
example, Wu et al. (2012) estimated that after experiencing the boom from 2007 to 2010, “even 
modest declines in expected appreciation would lead to large price decline of over 40% in market 
such as Beijing, absent offsetting rent increase or other countervailing factors” (p531). 
There are two channels may provide further evidence for the judgment that the more 
developed market may be accompanied by a more intensive psychological impact. One piece of 
evidence is from stock market. By studied six stock markets: Canada, France, Germany, Japan, 
the United Kingdom, and the United States, Baker et al. (2012) noted that United States’ total 
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sentiment index “receives the highest loading in the global index” because it is “widely 
considered the world’s bellwether market” (p278). Another piece of evidence comes from the 
volatility of China’s market house prices, which are important indicators of market sentiment. As 
shown in Figure 3.2, volatile degree is basically in accordance with the level of development, 
namely more developed province endured more severe fluctuation. There is only one exception 
province, Hainan, which is a relatively low developed eastern province but suffered number 4 
volatility in the Figure. That is because Hainan is a famous tourist destination, and there are lots 
of property purchases for investment purposes. Investments are more likely to be affected by 
sentiment. 
 
Table 3.6: Regression results of divided regions (explained variable: lnprice) 
 Eastern Western Middle 
Variables FE FE FE 
lnindex 0.6497** -0.0577 0.6834*** 
 (0.2918) (0.2408) (0.2164) 
lnrgdp_pop 0.2262 0.4464** 0.5002** 
 (0.2100) (0.1862) (0.1981) 
lnconstruct 0.3297*** 0.4243*** 0.6103*** 
 (0.1226) (0.1100) (0.1070) 
lnland_cost 0.1082*** 0.0524* 0.0513 
 (0.0380) (0.0294) (0.0501) 
lnfi -0.0326* 0.0028 -0.0066 
 (0.0182) (0.0082) (0.0083) 
lnurban -0.1777 0.6923*** 0.0022 
 (0.1641) (0.1661) (0.1688) 
lnunmarried 0.1478 0.1068 -0.0689 
 (0.1445) (0.1293) (0.1378) 
lninterest -0.1638 0.0007 -0.1499 
 (0.1853) (0.1435) (0.1217) 
year2008 0.2355*** -0.0224 0.0923** 
 (0.0575) (0.0450) (0.0389) 
constant -0.3811 -2.4994* -4.5945** 
 (2.1273) (1.4209) (1.7568) 
Province Fixed Effecy Yes Yes Yes 
F-test 11.80*** 8.78*** 6.41*** 
Observations 99 99 72 
R-squared 0.8822 0.8838 0.9426 
Note：*significance level is 10%; **significance level is 5%; ***significance level is 1%. FE: fixed effect 
panel data model. 
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The dummy variable of 2008 was also a factor that had significantly affected house prices 
of the eastern and middle regions, while the influence on the western region was not that striking, 
the reason for which might be that the eastern and middle regions were most affected by financial 
crisis and the government bailout was focused on the eastern and middle regions. 
 
3.5.3 The lagged effects of entrepreneurs’ confidence 
In this chapter, the impact of the lagged Entrepreneur Confidence Index on the house 
prices is considered in the empirical analysis. According to the definition of Entrepreneur 
Confidence Index, it is a prosperity index determined based on the entrepreneurs' views (i.e. 
optimistic, so-so and pessimistic) on the prosperity situation of their own enterprises and 
macro-economy in the current and next periods. The volatility of house prices or the rapid 
development of the real estate industry also affects Entrepreneur Confidence Index, that is, there 
may be a mutually-causal simultaneity bias, and the addition of the lagged item of entrepreneurs’ 
confidence can avoid the problem of inconsistencies in the estimation results caused by the 
simultaneity bias. In addition, the structure of Entrepreneur Confidence Index includes Spot 
Confidence Index and Expected Confidence Index. The addition of the lagged item can capture 
the impact of the entrepreneurs’ expectations on the house prices. 
We regard the lag phase of Entrepreneur Confidence Index as explanatory variable to add 
into regression model. The first lag means the effects of t-1th Entrepreneur Confidence Index on 
the tth house price of every province. The second lag means the effects of t-2th Entrepreneur 
Confidence Index on the tth house price of every province and by parity of reasoning. Table 3.7 
indicates the effects of lagged Entrepreneur Confidence Index on house prices, adopting 
estimating method of Fixed Effect. 
The first column of Table 3.7 means the effects of the first lag of Entrepreneur 
Confidence Index on house prices. Their regression coefficients are positive correlation at a 1% 
significance level, that is, if Entrepreneur Confidence Index of the first lag increases by 1%, 
current house price will increase by 0.51%, and the effect of Entrepreneur Confidence Index for 
the second lag on house price is 0.56%. From the estimation results, the confidence indices of the 
first and second lag have the greatest influence on the house prices in their respective explanatory 
variable setting. The effects of Entrepreneur Confidence Index of the third and fourth lag on 
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house price are not significant. Maybe entrepreneurs make future economy anticipation 
according to current economy situation, so their investment decision will alter with the change of 
economic situation and the entrepreneurs’ evaluation for future economic situation is not 
accurate.  
 
Table 3.7: the lagged effect of entrepreneurs’ confidence（explained variable：lnprice） 
 （1） （2） （3） （4） 
Variables The first lag The second lag The third lag The fourth lag 
L1.lnindex 0.5111***    
 (0.1639)    
L2.lnindex  0.5618***   
  (0.1600)   
L3.lnindex   -0.1814  
   (0.1890)  
L4.lnindex    0.0436 
    (0.2323) 
lnrgdp_pop -0.0351 -0.0871 0.0655 0.2431 
 (0.1200) (0.1741) (0.1891) (0.2155) 
lnconstruct 0.4604*** 0.4817*** 0.4524*** 0.3919*** 
 (0.0709) (0.0749) (0.0849) (0.0904) 
lnland_cost 0.1508*** 0.1301*** 0.1209*** 0.0543* 
 (0.0240) (0.0233) (0.0242) (0.0319) 
lnfi -0.0111* -0.0159** -0.0192*** -0.0129* 
 (0.0066) (0.0064) (0.0065) (0.0074) 
lnurban 0.1491 0.4798 0.9110*** 1.0211** 
 (0.1167) (0.2971) (0.3361) (0.3906) 
lnunmarried 0.0727 0.0094 -0.0169 0.0283 
 (0.0850) (0.0819) (0.0814) (0.0792) 
lninterest -0.0933 -0.0948 -0.1114 -0.2977*** 
 (0.0934) (0.0860) (0.0967) (0.1085) 
year2008 0.1273*** 0.1130*** 0.0277 -0.0093 
 (0.0312) (0.0308) (0.0232) (0.0240) 
constant 0.4407 -0.1837 0.8051 -1.3178 
 (0.9817) (1.0500) (1.3882) (1.2743) 
Province Fixed Effecy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 240 210 180 150 
R-squared 0.8484 0.8273 0.7973 0.7666 
Number of pid 30 30 30 30 
Note：*significance level is 10%; **significance level is 5%; ***significance level is 1%. FE: fixed effect 
panel data model. “Number of pid” refers number of provinces. 
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3.6 Conclusion 
This chapter analyzes the effects of sentiment on house price from entrepreneurs’ 
confidence, made use of house price data of every province in China during 2003-2011. It brings 
Entrepreneur Confidence Index as explanatory variable on the basis of controlling variable set, 
and makes an empirical analysis of their influencing mechanism. The ordinal house price of 
every province in China is that the eastern region is at the highest price, then the middle region 
and the western region at its lowest, which is consistent with economic development and 
marketization degree of every region, in which Beijing, Shanghai, Guangdong are the three cities 
at the highest increasing rate of house prices. Utilizing panel data fixed effect model of 30 
provinces in China, we find out that there is a remarkable positive correlation between 
Entrepreneur Confidence Index and provincial house prices. The regression results of regions 
indicate there is a positive correlation between Entrepreneur Confidence Index of the eastern and 
middle regions and house prices, but the effect of Entrepreneur Confidence Index on the western 
region is not remarkable. Additionally, Entrepreneur Confidence Index has lag effect on house 
prices. 
From the results of empirical estimation by adopting panel data, we find out the effects of 
the land price at the level of the whole nation, construction costs, and urbanization on house 
prices are significant in control variables. And the dummy variable in 2008 indicates the house 
price has a remarkable increase after financial crisis, which may be related to 4 trillion 
investment of the government, plenty of funds of which flow into the housing market, 
significantly increasing the prices of land and housing properties. At the level of regions, per 
capita GDP affects much on house price in the middle and western regions. But it is not 
remarkable in the eastern region. In general, empirical results of control variables are consistent 
with the conclusion of Li and Chand (2013) and Wang et al. (2014) on fundamentals concerning 
China house prices. 
After controlling the news-forged influences (Barsky and Sims, 2012) based on the 
literatures, we infer that the rest direct effect from Entrepreneur Confidence Index, by and large, 
is to influence house prices by influencing the psychology of social investments. Shiller (2005) 
has summarized the effect of group psychology on market fluctuations and listed causes 
including the influence of authority, herd behavior, information cascade and tale spreading 
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surpasses theoretical analysis, etc. As the social and economic elites, entrepreneurs are identified 
as the opinion leaders by the public in most cases. As a result, their comments or behaviors to 
purchase or undersell houses will make a great difference to the public’s demand psychology 
through the effects above. Circle marketing (marketing by using social organizations such as the 
chamber of commerce) which is the comparatively important strategy in Chinese marketing of 
housing is one of the typical embodiments of these effects. According to Akerlof and Shiller 
(2009), there are optimistic or pessimistic expectations in the public, and these psychological 
expectations lead to investor's behavior bias. The empirical results of this chapter show that the 
accuracy of prediction or regulation of house prices will undoubtedly improve if we give weighs 
to such sentiment (confidence) indices. 
In addition, Li and Chand (2013) indicate that “the level of house prices is likely to be 
associated with the local economic status… surprisingly, the positive relationship between local 
economic status and house price remains after we control for local GDP (income) in our model 
suggesting that there is a location premium over and above the simple income variation” (p152), 
similarly, Wang et al. (2014) also found “in several coastal cities, the actual increase in house 
prices deviates largely from what can be predicted from fundamental changes” (p53). But all of 
their interpretations are not convincing. The conclusion demonstrated according to different 
regions in this chapter may provide one feasible interpretation. Through the conclusion 
demonstrated according to different regions, a positive correlation is found between the influence 
of Entrepreneur Confidence Index on house prices and local economic status as well as 
marketization degree: a freer market environment and a more developed economy may 
accompany with more extensive psychological impacts. The possible reasons are: first, a freer 
market environment means less government control, thus investors and customers are able to 
make decisions more freely according to market information, and their decision-making process 
is thus easier to be affected by psychological factors; second, a more developed economy means 
that the motivation to make money by investment occupies a larger proportion in the purpose of 
market transaction, as a consequence, purchasing houses for making money is easier to be 
influenced by psychological factors than the rigid demand for purchasing houses; third, a more 
developed and freer market mean richer market information and more complicated trade products, 
the cognition mechanism of human to make the complicated simple and direct thereby make the 
93 
 
decision-making process (Shiller, 2005) more susceptible to psychological factors. 
The follow-up study of this chapter includes at least the following two directions. First, it 
is useful to extend the work by investigating the impact of entrepreneurs’ confidence on the 
housing market fluctuation as well as its price dynamics. Second, based on the study of this 
chapter, the relationship and mechanism between the degree of marketization and the degree of 
psychological impact should be further studied to build a more accurate housing market 
sentiment index, so as to provide a theoretical basis for the macroeconomic regulation and 
control policies for the real estate markets of different marketization degrees. 
94 
 
 
Chapter 4 
Impact of Promotion Expectations of Local Officials on Housing 
Market under Fiscal Decentralization 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Zhuravskaya (2000) considers that the rapid economic growth of China in 1980s and 
1990s comes from strong motivation generated from local fiscal decentralization on the 
promotion of local officials. This chapter discusses the impact of promotion expectations of local 
officials under the fiscal decentralization mechanism on the land price as well as house prices 
from the perspective of behavioral science by adopting empirical methods. 
China’s fiscal decentralization is an important constituent of the marketization mechanism 
reform; however, it is significantly different from the fiscal decentralization of other countries. 
Firstly, China’s fiscal system is decentralized, while China’s administrative system is top-down 
authorization system. It can be described as a multidivisional-form hierarchy structure in which 
the central government exerts great influence on the local administration (Maskin, Qian and Xu, 
2000). For example, the power of the provincial government is not based on election (although it 
is so in form), but based on the appointment of the central government. Secondly, the existence of 
the Hukou System (although the system is weakened in recent years) limits the movement of 
population between different provinces (in this case, the movement refers to the transfer of work 
and its related tax and social security relations). In fiscal federalism theory (Besley and Case, 
1995), decentralization is supposed to increase the efficiency of public spending by inducing 
competition between local officials, especially through a “vote for feet” or a “yardstick 
competition” created by voters. 
Notwithstanding the above differences, Caldeira (2012) considers that the traditional 
yardstick competition theory remains valid: Chinese central government has created yardstick 
competition system based on performance appraisal amongst local government officials through 
reward or punishment, similar to which the voters do in a democratic system, so to achieve the 
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objective of integral development. Such “top-down” yardstick competition may even alleviate the 
problems generated from traditional yardstick competition, such as market segmentation. 
Then, how does the central government reward and punish the local officials? What is the 
yardstick of competition? 
Just like politicians of other countries, China’s local officials, especially provincial 
governor-level officials in this study (officials of other levels are also similar), care about their 
political future very much. On the one hand, the desire for promotion comes from the great 
expansion of powers brought by the promotion as well as the changes associated with the prestige 
and welfare; on the other hand, there is “lock- in effect” existed among Chinese senior officials 
because of the control on senior officials by the Communist Party of China (CPC) and the central 
government; that is to say, unlike company managers or western politicians, it is virtually no 
chance for a Chinese provincial official to find an equivalent job in other places if such official 
breaks away from the bureaucratic system (Li and Zhou, 2005). The desire for promotion is 
greatly enhanced because of the superposition of these two factors. 
Performance-based promotion provides a powerful motivating force for individuals to 
exert efforts (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). Performance-based promotion assessment has built up 
a championship-type system in the organization and the reward for the winner is promotion. 
Moreover, it can be considered theoretically that the ex-ante probability of a promotion will 
induce effort, thereby leading to improved performance (Demeré et al., 2015). Therefore, the 
main contents of the first part of empirical tests in this chapter concerns application of promotion 
expectations theory to public sector which has already been used in private sector by an empirical 
study, which is intended to lay a solid foundation for the behavioral perspective of this chapter. 
As for the yardstick of competition amongst local officials, there are two kinds of 
viewpoints in the traditional academia. One viewpoint is that local officials take GDP as the main 
subject of the competition, and take the average GDP growth rate during the tenure as the main 
yardstick based on which the central government assesses and promotes the cadres (Chen et al., 
2005; Li and Zhou, 2005); or along with the adjustment of economic growth policies of the 
central government, energy productivity that can better reflect the intensive growth is taken as a 
basis for the assessment of local officials (Chen, Qin and Wei, 2016). Another viewpoint is that 
local officials competes surrounding the “image” of local economic growth, which is mainly 
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reflected as urban infrastructure and amenity (Han and Kung, 2015; Ding, Niu and Lichtenberg, 
2014; Wu and Heerink, 2016). That is to say, local officials care more about the subject that can 
improve economic development “image” in short term compared with improving people’s 
livelihood, sustainable development and other long-term economic development objectives, 
because such short-term projects can better accumulate capital for their promotion. 
Since officials want to start “image” projects, they must care about the sources of funding. 
Under China’s fiscal decentralization system, the investment fund in construction must be raised 
by the local government itself. After fiscal reform in 1994, the central government increased the 
revenue sharing ratio significantly in consideration of concentration of state power, thereby 
reducing the local fiscal revenue. Under such circumstance, Land Finance emerged at the right 
moment （Han and Kung, 2015; Ding, Niu and Lichtenberg, 2014;Wu and Heerink, 2016）。That 
is land can be leased out in the urban land market to the real estate sector and other tertiary-sector 
businesses for prices that far exceed those paid to farmers for expropriated land; this so-called 
Land Finance serves as a crucial source of local government revenue (Cao et al., 2008; Tan et al., 
2011; Tao et al., 2010). 
Based on the above analysis, we presume the following mechanisms: under the influences 
of Chinese-style fiscal decentralization system (administrative centralization and fiscal 
decentralization developed synchronously) and yardstick competition, higher (lower) promotion 
expectations of local officials make them adopt more aggressive (moderate) Land Finance 
method during their tenure; meanwhile, Land Finance may in turn affect the promotion 
expectation of local officials. In the end, the increased land prices induce the increment of house 
prices. 
Here follows by a chart of above mechanism:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
The empirical findings of this chapter confirm the influence of local officials’ promotion 
Promotion expectations 
of local officials 
Land Finance House prices 
Possible influence 
Chinese-style fiscal decentralization 
Yardstick competition Market mechanism 
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expectations on land prices as well as the influence of land prices on house prices; however the 
endogenous test applied in this chapter rejects the converse impact of land prices on local 
officials’ promotion expectations, probably caused by the price-control policy distorted 
performance appraisal criteria for local officials. The reason of not significant has been discussed 
in the section of endogenous test. 
Normally, aggressive Land Finance increases the land prices through following 
approaches: first, as discretionary funds of local governments, the money from land selling will 
be greatly spent on projects that benefit local officials’ political advancements; that is to say, 
instead of long-term public goods like sewers, buses and libraries etc., the growth-oriented 
projects such as urban infrastructures and amenities attract a great mass of local public funds; 
second, the developments of infrastructures and amenities improve the utilizability of lands; 
therefore, the land prices are increased; third, in order to generate land-sale revenue equal to the 
investment in construction, local government officials have the motivation to push up the land 
prices through controlling the land supply and even manipulating the land auction process. 
The main contributions of this chapter are: firstly, to the best of knowledge of the author, 
the literature on the promotion expectation is limited, while this chapter is one of the first 
attempts to introduce promotion expectations estimation into government departments, enriches 
the variables affecting the estimation of promotion expectations and enhances the estimation 
theory about promotion expectations; secondly, this chapter discusses from the special angle of 
the impact of promotion expectations of local officials on house prices, enriches the theory of 
house prices, and expands the boundary of study of impacts of subjective behavior on the 
housing market; thirdly, the yardstick competition model of local officials under Chinese-style 
fiscal decentralization system has general reference significance for countries to achieve certain 
economic and social development goals (such as improving environmental protection and 
promoting social equality, etc.). 
 
4.2 Literature review 
4.2.1 Yardstick competition 
Yardstick competition is a relative performance evaluation method between local 
governments as a discipline device for rent-seeking politicians in the context of a developed and 
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democratic country (Besley and Case, 1995), which is the stimulation methods of assessing of 
agent performance relative to a peer group.  
The original yardstick competition concept is developed by Shleifer (1985), which is a 
top-down process aim to address the problem of efficient cost reduction in a franchised monopoly. 
The idea that the performance of local governments can be evaluated by making comparisons 
between them was previously proposed by Salmon (1987) and formally developed by Besley and 
Case (1995). However, the premise that Besley and Case established for theory application is 
somewhat different from China’s reality (Caldeira, 2012). First, Besley and Case set the premise 
that local government is elected or discharged by voters, whereas China’s current fiscal system is 
largely decentralized while its governance ruling is rather a centralized system with strong 
top-down mandate. It means central government exerts great influence on local officials’ action. 
In particular, the powers of provincial governors, who are the observations in this study, is not 
based on a system of electoral representation, but are appointed by Beijing. Second, population 
mobility between provinces is still limited (from the point of job-seeking and social welfare) 
even with the relaxation of the Hukou system. 
Despite above-mentioned differences, Caldeira (2012) proposes a yardstick competition 
“from the top”, that is the central government (rather than local voters) creates competition 
among local officials by rewarding or punishing them on the basis of relative performance in 
providing public service. By estimating panel data from China’s 29 provinces, the author further 
argue that, in this context, the central government stimulates strategic interaction among local 
governments with similar results as voters do in a democratic regime. 
4.2.2 Promotion expectation 
Yardstick competition is a method of relative performance evaluation (Potter et al, 2004), 
and an important benefit of relative performance evaluation is that it can be used in promotion 
decisions within the organizational labor market (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). 
Performance-based promotion provides a powerful motivating force for individuals to exert effort 
(Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). From a theoretical standpoint, performance-based promotion 
systems create a tournament-like system within the organization, in which promotion is the prize 
awarded to the tournament winner. Promotions provide increased monetary rewards arising from 
advancement within the organization, as well as recognition, prestige, and increased power 
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(Demeré et al., 2015). 
There are theoretical reasons to expect that the ex-ante probability of a promotion will 
induce effort, thereby leading to improved performance (Demeré et al., 2015). A promotion 
provides a substantial, discontinuous, and persistent increase in compensation. While the increase 
in compensation may or may not reflect the marginal productivity of the employee who has been 
promoted, it still serves as a motivator for employees lower in the hierarchy seeking a future 
promotion (Lazear and Shaw, 2007). 
The two primary drivers of effort in tournament models are the size of the prize and the 
probability of winning the prize. If the prize is not sufficiently large, individuals are not likely to 
choose to supply higher effort because the value of the prize is not sufficient to offset the 
disutility from working harder (Rosen, 1986). Similarly, to motivate performance, it is critical 
that the probability of winning the prize increases with increased effort (Pinder, 1998). The key 
issue here is that the motivational effect of a promotion tournament is a function, not only of the 
size of the prize (i.e., the increase in salary, along with prestige and power), but also of the 
agent’s ex-ante assessment of the probability of winning the prize (i.e., being promoted) (Demeré 
et al., 2015). 
Empirical study on promotion-based incentive is limited, even in the private sector; and 
there is no such study in the public sector to the author’s knowledge. A field study by Campbell 
(2008) shows a positive association between individual absolute performance and market area 
characteristics (use as a proxy for the probability of promotion). Further on, by adopting 
proprietary archival and survey data from the internal audit department of a large organization, a 
latest research by Demeré et al. (2015) shows that while relative performance evaluation may 
benefit employees by reducing uncertainty in incentive compensation as predicted by theory, the 
incremental performance benefits derived from the use of relative performance evaluation as a 
promotion mechanism depend on the employee’s promotion expectations. Specifically, the 
greater (lower) performance benefits associated with the use of relative performance evaluation 
when an employee’s probability of promotion is greater (lower). These two empirical studies 
provide evidence on the effect of promotion incentives on performance as theorized in the earlier 
research (i.e., Lazear and Rosen 1981). 
It is worth noting that the variable setting of promotion expectations of the research is not 
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perfect although the research of Demeré et al. (2015) is frontier. Demeré et al. (2015) pointed out 
that the main variables affecting the promotion are from two aspects: one aspect is the historical 
performance of employees; the other aspect is the hierarchical level within an organization. 
Better historical performance improves promotion expectations, while a higher rank reduces 
promotion expectations; the reason is that jobs available for promotion for an official are fewer 
when the official’s rank is higher. We can foresee many other factors that will affect the 
subjective promotion expectations actually, for example: firstly. age and education level of 
individual officials, the older an official is, the less the promotion desire of the official is; the 
higher the level of education is, the easier the official is promoted; secondly, the age and service 
period of one’s superior, the reason is that there is no post available for promotion if one’s 
superior cannot be promoted or transferred; thirdly, the importance of one’s own post and post 
adaptive capacity, if one’s own post capacity is too simple or post adaptive capacity is too narrow, 
then the promotion possibility is reduced. In addition to these dominant factors, there are also 
more subtle factors, such as interpersonal relationships. The definition of historical performance 
of employee is also worth further exploration, Demeré et al. (2015) only used performance 
evaluation of the previous year as the historical performance variable; however, we usually 
consider the performance evaluation of more years. 
From what discussed above, it is obvious that even with the early emergence, the 
empirical study concerning the influences of promotion expectations on performance induced is 
still under development. The mechanism of promotion expectations on governing performance 
has not been applied to explaining the behavior of local officials, not mention its influence on 
housing market. 
4.2.3 Political-incentive-triggered economic development 
(1) Political incentive 
Based on Riker’s (1964) seminal book Federalism, Origins, Operation, Significance, 
Enikolopov and Zhuravskaya (2007) pointed out that “strong national political parties influence 
policies of local politicians by affecting their career expectations. The careers of politicians in 
local governments depend on their parties’ political and financial support at the time of their 
reelection and on the possibility of their promotion to the national government” (p2262). Further 
on, by comparing China with Russia, they argue that china’s economic miracle in 1980s and 
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1990s is forged by fiscal decentralization accompanied with tight control of the communist party, 
which means career concerns for advancement within CPC play an vital role in disciplining 
provincial governors in China. The communist party standing committee evaluates performance 
of provincial leaders and makes promotion (and dismissal) decisions on the basis of whether each 
of them followed growth-promoting policies (Huang, 2002; Blanchard and Shleifer, 2001). 
It is worth noting a particular career status among Chinese provincial leaders (Li and 
Zhou, 2005). Unlike corporate managers or politicians in western country, Chinese high rank 
government officials have few job options outside the administrative system. If a provincial 
leader leaves government, it is virtually no chance to find an equivalent job. It is called by Li and 
Zhou “lock-in effect”. The lock-in effect accompanied by the great differences in term of 
personal power, prestige and welfare, political advancement provides the provincial leaders with 
a strong incentive. 
(2) Political-incentive-triggered economic development 
A popular approach which emphasizes the political incentive of local officials behind 
China’s economic miracle, namely, the central government spurs local officials to maximize a 
well-specified target such as GDP growth or revenue remitted to the central government by 
creating or inducing what is known as “yardstick competition” among local officials (Xu 2011, 
Han and Kung 2015). 
With regard to the political turnover and economic performance, more explanation 
emphasizes the role of political incentives or career concerns on the part of local officials in 
China. According to the review, the readiness of the Chinese central government to reward and 
punish local officials on the basis of their economic performance motivates them to promote the 
local economy (Blanchard and Shleifer, 2001). The reward and punishment mechanisms are 
made possible within the multidivisional-form (M-form) structure of Chinese economic system, 
which allows yardstick competition among local officials (Qian and Xu, 1993; Maskin et al., 
2000). By employing the turnover data of top provincial leaders in China between 1979 (the start 
year of the open policy) and 1995, Li and Zhou (2005) find that the likelihood of promotion of 
provincial leaders increases with as well as likelihood of termination decreases with their 
economic performance rise. And the study also revealed that the turnover of provincial 
government leaders is more sensitive to the average GDP growth rate over their tenure than to 
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their annual performance. One step further, using a more recent dataset, Chen, Li and Zhou (2005) 
reveal that the turnover of Chinese top provincial leaders is not only related to their own 
economic performance, but also related tightly with the performance of their immediate 
predecessors. 
Li and Zhou’s argument is modified by Chen et al. (2016), who use a longer data period 
from 1978-2012. There are several findings in the study. Firstly, the regression covers entire 
sample period suggests that average GDP growth rates have a significant impact on political 
promotions of provincial governors, which echoes Li and Zhou’s result; Secondly, after the 
author chose 1990 (roughly the year that the central government determined to shift the economic 
development mode from resource-driven to energy efficient) as the cut-off point and divided the 
entire research period into two study samples, the impact of average GDP growth rate on 
promotion of provincial governors is significant in the first half period, but not in the second half 
period; thirdly, by contrast to the segmented effect of the average GDP growth rate, the effect of 
energy productivity on promotions of provincial governors getting stronger in the second phase. 
The findings, on the one hand, demonstrate that, with the shift of economic aim, the traditional 
yardstick—GDP has weakened its weight on the local official evaluation system; on the other 
hand, this change illuminates that China’s top-down yardstick competition on local government 
officials is flexible to achieve different governing goals. 
4.2.4 Fiscal decentralization and Land Finance 
From behavioral perspective, some recent studies have extended the influences of 
political incentive on fiscal decentralization to China’s land market, and then housing market.  
China has become a highly decentralized economy since its fiscal reform in 1980s and 
1990s (Chen et al., 2016). Many studies focus on the relation of China’s fiscal decentralization 
and economic growth (for a review, see Xu, 2011).The major finding is that the fiscal 
decentralization provides local government with the power to invest in public infrastructure to 
cultivate their tax bases, thereby promoting economic growth (Jin, Qian and Weingast, 2005; lin 
and Liu, 2000; Qiao, Martinez-Vazquez and Xu, 2008). 
China’s fiscal decentralization system, or named as the fiscal revenue-sharing system 
works in the way that for each and every source of the fiscal revenue the central government 
stipulates a sharing rule with the provincial government (Han and Kung, 2015). After the fiscal 
103 
 
reform in 1994, the central government raised its tax sharing for strengthening centralization. 
Specially, it reassigned to itself 75% of the transaction or value-added tax, which is generated 
mainly from Township and Village Enterprises (TVEs) and other industrial enterprises. The tax 
reassignment is deemed had greatly weakened the incentive of local government in fostering of 
enterprises ever since (Kung and Lin, 2007; Li and Rozelle, 2003, 2004). 
For the purpose of not stifle the incentive of local governments to continue with their 
economic development, a major statutory legislation enacted in 1998, whereby the local 
governments were assigned the exclusive rights over revenue generated from selling the usufruct 
rights of formerly arable land, also known as land conveyance (Han and Kung, 2015). Therefore, 
Land Finance came into being.  
A standard Land Finance operating is that land can be leased out (40, 50 or 70 years based 
on land uses) by local government in the urban land market to the real estate sector and other 
tertiary-sector business for price that far exceed those paid to farmer for expropriated land (Wu 
and Heerink, 2016). Land Finance serve as a vital source of revenue for local governments since 
it has been brought into the fiscal system. Because there is normally no rigorous fiscal scrutiny 
on the spending of land conveyance fees as budgetary revenue are subject to (Ding, Niu and 
Lichtenberg, 2014), the revenues from land transfer are routinely defined as off-budget revenue. 
Perhaps there is no other country like China that has such an extreme size of off-budget 
revenues (Ding, 2007; Eckaus, 2003). Although accurate data on off-budget incomes are not 
available in China, as it is true in many other countries too, anecdotal evidence suggests that the 
size of off-budget revenues is outstanding (Ding, 2007; Eckaus, 2003). Land revenues, which are 
predominately land conveyance fees generated from public land leasing in China, are the most 
important source for off-budget incomes in sub-national governments in China. They were 
equivalent to 38.9% of total fiscal revenues in sub-national governments in 2006. As 
intergovernmental transfers contribute 45% to total fiscal revenue on average, the ratio of land 
revenues to tax revenues in sub-national governments can be as high as 0.7. There are no other 
types of off-budget revenues that can match land revenues in terms of magnitude and significance 
to local governments (Ding, Niu and Lichtenberg, 2014). 
Because China’s land revenue is actually deemed as discretionary funds of local 
governments, the money will be spent on projects that benefit local officials’ political 
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advancements. It is been argued that Chinese local officials intend to channel land revenues more 
toward growth-oriented infrastructure such as urban roads, more toward “image projects” such as 
public squares and open space, and more toward projects that help to boost public impression of 
local economic success on which cadre evaluation weighs heavily, instead of sewers, buses and 
library books which have more subtle impact on local economy (Ding, Niu and Lichtenberg, 
2014). The preference of fiscal share will influence the land and house prices. The similar 
outcome is erected by Han and Kung (2015), who argue that through shifting bulk of the 
budgetary tax revenue from the local to central government, the local governments maneuver 
their efforts in fostering industrial growth to “urbanizing” their localities. Therefore, the authors 
concluded that the rocketing house prices and rapid real estate development can be partly 
explained by the craze for urbanization of the revenue-hungry local governments. 
4.2.5 Hypothesis and empirical strategy 
Under the premise of Chinese-style fiscal decentralization and the yardstick competition 
stimulated motivation, it is hypothesized that higher (lower) promotion expectations will induce 
local officials to adopt aggressive (moderate) Land Finance strategy. The aggressive Land 
Finance will increase the land prices, and then increase the house prices. The following parts are 
the demonstrations of empirical tests. 
The empirical tests of this chapter includes the following main sections: firstly, modify 
the estimated variables based on the estimation of the promotion expectations in the private 
sector, and estimate the promotion expectations of governors in China by using probit model; 
secondly, estimate the relationship between promotion expectations, land selling prices and the 
prices of houses property through panel data model; finally, carry out an endogenous test based 
on the possible existence of common factors affecting the promotion expectations and land 
prices. 
This chapter selects 2003-2011 annual provincial panel data of China as main focus of 
this research for two reasons. Firstly, in general, the economic growth policies of China to this 
day can be divided into three stages: the first stage is the period of 1978-1990, when the 
economic growth target is the pursuit of quantitative growth (Chen et al., 2016); the second stage 
is the period of 1991-2011, when the central government shifted its economic growth target from 
pursuing quantitative growth to pursuing economic efficiency, mainly manifested in energy use 
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efficiency and environmental protection (Chen et al., 2016); the third stage is the period from 
2012 to the present, since the stimulus policy introduced in response to the international financial 
crisis in 2008 resulted in obvious consequences, such as severe overcapacity, asset bubbles and 
weak sustained economic growth, the central government expressed clearly in the economic work 
conference at the end of 2011 that economic growth promotion was shifted to autonomous 
growth orderly from policy stimulus. Secondly, the economic growth orientation is closely 
correlated with the governing idea of the main officials in power; for example, during their time 
in office (March 2003 - March 2013), General Secretary Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao 
emphasized the development of the central and western areas, and the eastern area should give 
away resources to support the development of the central and western areas, which is obviously 
different from the governing idea of the leading development of the eastern coastal areas put 
forward by Deng Xiaoping. The selection of panel data for 2003 - 2011 is the result of the 
combined effects of these two factors. In other words, the panel data were for the later period 
influenced by China’s second-stage economic policy and in the continued term of office of Hu 
Jintao and Wen Jiabao, during which, the economic and political environment is relatively stable. 
 
4.3 Estimation of promotion expectations of provincial governors 
4.3.1 Bureaucratic system of China 
China is a state with centralization of authority, and its political system roughly consists 
of five administration levels: the center, provinces, prefectures, counties and townships. As the 
center of the national politics, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China ultimately 
controls the flow of government officials within the system. This highly centralized personnel 
control structure remains intact till today. 
Provinces are the second level of the political system of China. As of today, China 
consists of 31 provincial administrative units including Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao: 4 
municipalities (Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin and Chongqing), 22 provinces and 5 autonomous 
regions. Provincial level equals to central ministerial administrative level. Provincial party 
secretary is the highest provincial post, followed by the post of governors. This phenomenon of 
party and government dual setting exists in the political structure of every political level in China 
without exception. Governor, as the second commander in the party and government dual setting, 
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can be promoted to the post of provincial party secretary of the original province or other 
province or take office in the central or central ministries. The promotion referred to in this 
chapter means one of these positions transferred to from the post of governor. 
China began its far-reaching economic reforms in 1978. Compared with the key role of 
the central ministries in the development planning and coordination before the reform, the role of 
the provinces in economic administration had been improved significantly after the reform, 
which had also led to a significant increase in the strategic importance of provincial leaders in the 
political structure (Qian and Xu, 1993; Huang, 1996). In addition, reform also vested provincial 
leaders with the ultimate power to allocate economic resources in each province. Their political 
and economic decisions influenced the economic performance of these provinces greatly. For this 
reason, they were also responsible for the corresponding consequences generated by their 
decisions. To a certain extent, provincial leaders equal to middle level management personnel of 
a multidivisional corporation, who are responsible for the performance of their own division. 
The reform of China’s personnel management system was synchronized with its 
economic reform in general. A key shift in personnel management was the general change in the 
assessment criteria of government officials. Political conformity, being the only important 
promotion criteria before the reform, gave its way to economic development achievements and 
other competence-related indicators during the term of office of an official. While political 
loyalty remained important, three new factors had also been introduced into the assessment 
process. Officials must be comparatively young, well educated, and have specialized knowledge 
in public administration. Besides, local economic performance had become the most important 
criterion for higher-level officials to assess subordinate officials (Li and Zhou, 2005). For local 
officials, a clear sign of the importance of economic growth indicators was their “obsession” of 
economic rankings of the same level of administrative regions. Government reports or provincial 
yearbooks usually contain detailed information on the relative ranking of the economic growth of 
each province about GDP growth, steel yield, newly increased miles of highways and so on. 
In 1980, the Communist Party of China formally put forward the abolition of the lifelong 
tenure system of the party and government officials for the first time in the history, and set up the 
mandatory retirement system. Under this new system, a provincial leader must retire at the age of 
65 if he is not promoted to a senior position in the central government. According to the new 
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policy, many senior provincial leaders were requested to leave their office and gave way to young 
people. The implementation of this reform in 1982 gave rise to two major retirement waves in 
1983 and 1985. 
The economic and political reforms have made the governors (including other leaders at 
all levels) have clear career advancement expectations and have a clear understanding of the 
conditions under which the expectations can be realized. However, in addition to promotion, 
termination, including retirement and demotions, also affects the behaviors of officials as an 
incentive mechanism. 
Under normal conditions, provincial leaders (including other leaders at all levels) will not 
leave the power system completely after their retirement except for special circumstances, such 
as poor health. Before the formal retirement, they are often transferred to the provincial People’s 
Congress or the provincial People’s Political Consultative Conference as a transition, holding a 
post with honor but without actual administrative power. Although the loss of power is a sign of 
the end of the political career (regardless of what kind of honorary positions he holds), senior 
officials who resign from leading posts still have extensive social influence and a large number of 
welfare benefits related to their positions; therefore, local officials have a tendency of 
conservative administration. 
For officials who pursue promotion, radical development policies and tough 
administrative tools must be adopted to realize relatively excellent economic growth in China’s 
gradual model reform environment; however, these policies and tools may bring risks to 
executors in two aspects: on the one hand, radical local development policies require policy 
innovation, while new policy is likely to be in the policy grey zone, which may bring about 
unpredictable political risks; on the other hand, tough administrative tools may lead to fierce 
fighting of subordinates, and executors shall shoulder responsibility for potential failures. 
Therefore, it is foreseeable that the avidity of local officials’ pursuit of promotion is closely 
related to the possibility of promotion in advance. The higher estimated promotion possibility is, 
the more radically the local officials will pursue the promotion and the more radical economic 
development means will be adopted consequently. 
In a word, the following organizational characteristics of China’s administrative personnel 
management system have great significance to this research. Firstly, the personnel power over the 
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governors (including other officials at all levels) is firmly held by their superiors, and the 
economic performance (or the “impression” of economic success) during their term of office is a 
key indicator of the personnel assessment of them. Secondly, the relative official assessment 
system based on the yardstick competition and a clear target allow for a sensible link between 
performance and turnover. Thirdly, the lock-in effect (Li and Zhou, 2005) accompanied by the 
great differences in terms of personal power, prestige and welfare, political benefits provide the 
provincial leaders (including other leaders at all levels) with a strong incentive to pursuit 
promotion. Fourthly, because of potential risks brought by the pursuit of promotion, the intensity 
of local officials’ pursuit of promotion is closely positively correlated with the estimated 
possibility of promotion in advance, and the intensity of the pursuit of promotion is closely 
positively correlated with the degree of radicalization of economic development means adopted 
by these officials. 
4.3.2 Data about the turnover of the provincial governors 
This chapter aims to structure the promotion incentives of the responsible persons, the 
governors of each province of which the officials are assessed. The promotion of governors has a 
strong regularity to follow, part of which is even manifested in the form of regulations and laws. 
For example, Decision of the CPC Central Committee on the Establishment of the Retirement 
System of Veteran Cadres promulgated in 1982 explicitly stipulates that the retirement age of 
provincial officials (secretary of a provincial party committee and provincial governor) is 65 
years old. After a governor is promoted, the governor would become: (1) the secretary of the 
party committee of the province, (2) the secretary of the party committee of another province, (3) 
or be promoted to a higher rank in a higher level central government department, such as deputy 
leader of the National People’s Congress (NPC) or the Chinese People’s Political Consultative 
Conference (CPPCC), or member of political bureau. During the period between 2003 and 2011, 
60 governors’ positions were changed, of which a total of 29 were promoted (20 were promoted 
to the secretary of the party committee of the province, 7 were promoted to the secretary of the 
party committee of the other provinces, and 2 were promoted to a higher rank in a central 
government department); 15 were transferred to a position of same level, 1 was removed from 
office, and 15 came to the age of retirement. This shows that more than two thirds of the 
governors were promoted after job transfer, and most of them were promoted to the secretary of 
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the party committee of the province. 
By sorting the data from the database of important members of the government and 
China’s leading cadres of people.cn7, Figure 4.1 shows the promotion distribution diagram of 
governors of various regions; during year 2003-2011, the promotion frequency of officials of 
Hainan provinces is the highest, a total of 3 officials were promoted from the governor to the 
provincial party secretary; Anhui, Hebei, Heilongjiang, Hubei, Jiangsu, Qinghai, Xinjiang and 
other provinces are in the second place, a total of 2 governors were promoted during 9 years; 
Guizhou, Henan, Jiangxi, Ningxia, Shandong, Sichuan, Tianjin, Tibet, Zhejiang, Chongqing 
totaling 10 provinces are in the last place, and no governor is promoted to the provincial party 
secretary. In addition, from the perspective of annual official promotion distribution shown in 
Figure 4.2, the times of promotion of officials in 2003 and 2007 are the highest with 6 officials 
promoted every year; moreover, the promotion of officials shows strong political periodic 
characteristics, year 2003 is the first year that the new leaders took their office, and the 17th 
National Congress of the Communist Party of China was held in 2007. Comparatively speaking, 
the promotion of officials in 2004 and 2008 is more moderate. 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Official promotion distribution diagram by region 
                                                        
7 http://renshi.people.com.cn/ 
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Figure 4.2: Official promotion distribution diagram by year 
 
4.3.3 Variable set 
In accordance with the findings relating to the promotion and the research of Li and Zhou 
(2005), Chen et al. (2005), Demeré et al. (2015) and Chen et al. (2016), this chapter holds that the 
factors influencing the promotion expectations of governors are as follows: (1) the age of 
governors. As mentioned above, the retirement age of provincial officials is 65 years old, so the 
age of a governor is an important condition to determine whether he will be promoted, so the 
closer to the retirement age, the more difficult the promotion is; (2) the length of tenure of 
governor. The longer a governor has served in his office, the more likely he will leave the post. 
Even if the governor wishes to serve for another term of office consecutively, he has to leave the 
post in accordance with the Interim Provisions on the Tenure of Party and Government Leading 
Cadres. Therefore, the longer the tenure is, the greater the possibility of redeployment is, and the 
greater the possibility of promotion is; (3) the age and tenure of the secretary of the party 
committee of the province. The older the secretary is, the greater the possibility of the secretary 
to leave the office is, and the job vacancy is likely to be filled by the governor of the province; in 
addition, the province of which the secretary of a provincial party committee is a member of the 
Political Bureau is usually a comparatively important province, and the governor of such 
province may also obtain the opportunity of promotion easily; (4) Provincial historical average 
growth rate of GDP during tenure. Demeré et al. (2015) pointed out that in the private sector, the 
111 
 
historical performance of employees and hierarchical level within an organization affect their 
promotion expectations. Taking into account the actual performance appraisal of government 
departments as well as the conclusion of literature, the chapter uses historical average growth rate 
of GDP during tenure as a proxy variable to replace historical performance. As for the post level 
within the organization, since this chapter examines only one level of governor, no variable is set 
in this chapter. 
There are some other variables that may affect the promotion expectations of provincial 
governors. These variable are, whether the province where an official works is a national 
autonomous region (national policy and ethnic policy may affect promotion expectations); 
whether the year in which an official takes his office is the year for holding the National Party 
Congress or the new National People’s Congress(the year of personnel change may increase the 
probability of promotion); population size of a province (the complexity of governance may 
affect the promotion expectations); change in GDP ranking nationwide (the result of relative 
economic development competition amongst provinces may affect the promotion expectations). 
Part of variables has been verified to have non-significant correlation with promotion of 
provincial officials in other literatures; therefore, they are not included in the estimates of this 
chapter, including level of education (Li and Zhou, 2005; Chen, Li and Zhou, 2005) and 
relationship with the central government (Chen, Li and Zhou, 2005). 
4.3.4 Estimation method of the promotion expectations of governors: probit model 
It assumes that individuals have only two options, namely y=1 (promotion) or y=0 (no 
promotion); promotion depends on the age, tenure, economic performance and other factors of 
officials; it is supposed that all these explanatory variables are included in the vector x. 
The simplest model is linear probability model as follows: 
yi = xi
′β + εi                                                         (4.1) 
Since εi = yi − xi
′ , so εi = 1 − xi
′β or εi = −xi
′β ; therefore, the disturbance 
termεicomplies with two-point distribution rather than normal distribution. Another difficulty is 
that although we know the value of the explained variable y is either 0 or 1, the estimated value 
of ŷ made according to the linear probability model may be greater than 1 or less than 0, which 
is impractical. 
To make the predicted value of y always fall into the range of [0,1], under the condition 
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that x is given, the two-point distribution probability of y is considered: 
{
P(y = 1|x) = F(x, β)
P(y = 0|x) = 1 − F(x, β)
                                         (4.2) 
It can be assured that the predictive value 0 ≤ ŷ ≤ 1 by selecting appropriate functional 
formF(x, β) ; it is understood as probability generated when “y=1”, namely E(y|x) = 1 ∗
P(y = 1|x) + 0 ∗ P(y = 0|x) = P(y = 1|x). If F(x, β) is the cumulative distribution function of 
the standard normal distribution, then P(y = 1|x) = F(x, β) = Φ(x′β) = ∫ φ(t)
x′β
−∞
dt, the model 
is called Probit model. If F(x, β) is the cumulative distribution function of Logit distribution, 
then P(y = 1|x) = F(x, β) = Λ(x′β) =
exp (x′β)
1+exp (x′β)
, the model is called Logit model. The image 
of cumulative distribution function of Logit distribution is similar to that of the standard normal 
distribution, and its density function is symmetric to the origin. 
As for binary choice behavior, a “latent variable” can usually be used to summarize the 
net income of the behavior; if the net income is greater than 0, then “do” is selected, otherwise, 
“not do” is selected. It is assumed that the net income is 
y∗ = x′β + ε                                                         (4.3) 
Wherein, the net income y∗is unobservable latent variable, the above formula is also 
usually referred to as “index function”. The selection rule of individuals is as follows  
y = {
1, if y∗ > 0
0, if y∗ ≤ 0
                                                      (4.4) 
Therefore, the following can be obtained: 
P(y = 1|x) = P(y∗ > 0|x) = P(x′β + ε > 0|x) = P(ε > −x′β|x)              (4.5) 
Assume ε~N(0, σ2) is a normal distribution, there isP(y = 1|x) = P(ε > −x′β|x) =
P(ε < x′β) = Fε(x
′β). Wherein, Fε(. ) is the cumulative distribution function of ε. The second 
equal sign of the above equation uses the nature of density function that it is symmetric to the 
origin. If ε follows normal distribution, then it is called probit; if ε follows logit distribution, 
then it is called logit. It should be noted that for any constant k>0, P(x′β + ε > 0) = 𝑃(𝑘x′β +
kε > 0). If disturbance term variance 𝜎2 = 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝜀), then 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑘𝜀) = 𝑘2𝜎2, the fitting of model 
for (  𝑘β, 𝑘2𝜎2 ) is exactly the same as  (  β, 𝜎2 ) , β  and 𝜎2  cannot be simultaneously 
recognized at the same time. Therefore, for the probit model, make the variance 𝜎2 of the 
disturbance term 1, namely ε~N(0,1), while for the logit model, make the variance of the 
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disturbance term 𝜋2 3⁄ . 
4.3.5 Model specification and estimation results 
This chapter takes the promotion expectation of a governor as the proxy variable for his 
promotion incentives, and probit model is constructed as follows based on 2003 - 2011 data about 
the turnover of governors: 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑚𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 1{𝛤𝑊𝑖𝑡 + 𝐷𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡}                                        (4.6) 
Wherein, promote is the dummy variable denoting whether a governor of i province is 
promoted in the t-th year; if the governor is promoted, the value of promote is 1; otherwise, it is 0; 
W is a control variable, including the age and tenure of the governor, the age of the secretary of a 
provincial party committee and whether he is a member of Political Bureau, whether the National 
Party Congress or the new National People’s Congress will be held in the current year, whether it 
is a national autonomous area, the proportion of GDP of the province where the governor works 
to the GDP of the country, etc. D is the provincial fixed effect used to control other unobservable 
heterogeneity of provinces. As for the value of the number of years in governor’s office, if the 
governor takes up his post in the first half of the year, the number of years in governor’s office 
will include the current year; if the governor takes up his post in the second half of the year, the 
number of years in governor’s office will be calculated from the next year; as for the value of the 
age of provincial secretary, if replacement has occurred to the secretary of a provincial party 
committee, the value will be the age of the provincial secretary who have served for a longer 
period; if changes have occurred to both the provincial governor and the secretary of the party 
committee, the age of the provincial secretary in the observation value of original governors will 
be the age of the original provincial party secretary, the age of the provincial secretary in the 
observation value of new provincial governors will be the age of the new provincial party 
secretary. Historical average growth rate of GDP during the tenure is the moving average growth 
rate of GDP during the tenure. The age, tenure, promotion, and other variable data of the 
governors and provincial party secretaries are from the database of important members of the 
government and China’s leading cadres of people.cn8; population size, GDP average growth rate 
and other control variables are calculated according to the data of 2003-2011 China Statistical 
Yearbook, and descriptive statistics of each variable are shown in the following table. 
                                                        
8 http://renshi.people.com.cn/ 
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Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics of variable 
Variable definition Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Promotion dummy variable Governor promoted as 1; otherwise 0 0.11  0.31  0 1 
Age of provincial governors Calculated based on the date of birth 57.35  3.95  45 65 
Tenure of provincial governors 
Tenure of provincial governors from the 
year on board to the year promoted, 
dismissed or retired 
2.76  1.93  0 10 
Age of provincial party 
secretaries 
Calculated based on the date of birth 58.77  4.29  45 68 
Tenure of provincial party 
secretaries 
Tenure of provincial party secretaries from 
the year on board to the year promoted, 
dismissed or retired 
3.51  2.52  0 15 
Whether the provincial party 
secretary is a member of 
Political Bureau 
Being a member of Political Bureau as 1; 
otherwise 0 
0.19  0.40  0 1 
Whether the National Congress 
of the CPC will be held in the 
year 
The year of the National Congress will be 
held as 1; otherwise 0 
0.33  0.47  0 1 
Whether it is a minority area Minority area as 1; otherwise 0 0.13  0.34  0 1 
Population size (logarithm) Logarithm of provincial population 8.14  0.76  6.28  9.26  
Historical average growth rate 
of GDP during the tenure 
The moving average growth rate of GDP 
during the tenure 
-0.14  4.06  -16.87  19.62  
Change in GDP Ranking 
Position difference in GDP ranking 
between year t and t-1 
-0.09  6.93  -25 20 
Note: the sample quantity is 270. 
 
The estimated results of Table 4.2 show that: first, the younger the governor is, the longer 
the tenure is, the greater the probability of promotion is; while if the provincial secretary is a 
member of Political Bureau, the probability of promotion of provincial governor becomes greater; 
comparatively speaking, the probability of promotion of responsible person in the government of 
national autonomous region is lower. These conclusions are consistent with that of Li and Zhou 
(2005), Chen et al. (2005) and Chen et al. (2016). According to the dprobit9 estimation result, 
under the condition that the sample mean of all the variables is taken, one additional year is 
added to the age of governors, the probability of promotion is reduced by 0.012; the term of 
office is extended by one year, the probability of promotion is increased by 0.03; the probability 
of promotion of governors in minority areas is 0.091 lower than that of governors in 
                                                        
9 Dprobit denotes the estimated marginal effect of probit model. 
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non-minority ethnic areas.  
 
Table 4.2: Probit estimate of promotion expectations of governors 
  (1) (2) 
Equation Variables Probit estimation Dprobit estimation 
Promote Age of provincial governors -0.1078*** -0.0124*** 
  (0.0366) (0.0043) 
 Tenure of provincial governors 0.2586*** 0.0298*** 
  (0.0847) (0.0098) 
 Age of provincial party secretaries -0.0186 -0.0021 
  (0.0333) (0.0039) 
 Tenure of provincial party secretaries -0.5599 -0.0498* 
  (0.3744) (0.0262) 
 
Whether the provincial party secretary is a member 
of Political Bureau 
0.2247*** 0.0259*** 
  (0.0635) (0.0071) 
 
Whether the National Congress of the CPC will be 
held in the year 
0.1986 0.0248 
  (0.2880) (0.0383) 
 Whether it is a minority area -1.8242*** -0.0906*** 
  (0.6542) (0.0224) 
 Population size -0.0002 -0.0000 
  (0.1730) (0.0199) 
 
Historical average growth rate of GDP during the 
tenure 
0.0401 0.0046 
  (0.0317) (0.0037) 
 Change in GDP Ranking -0.0070 -0.0008 
  (0.0187) (0.0022) 
 Constant 4.4819*  
  (2.7059)  
 Observations 270 270 
Note: *significance level is 10%; **significance level is 5%; ***significance level is 1%; take the 
logarithm of all the variables in the estimation; model (1) denotes the estimated coefficient of probit model, and 
model (2) denotes the estimated marginal effect of probit model. Standard errors are displayed in the parenthesis. 
 
Second, during the tenure, the estimated coefficient of the historical average growth rate 
of GDP is positive, but not significant, such conclusion is inconsistent with that of Li and Zhou 
(2005); however, it can be explained by using the research results of Chen et al. (2016). Chen et 
al. (2016) divided the data of 1978-2012 of China into two stages, namely 1978-1990,1990-2012 
(1990 can be regarded as a year of transition during which China’s economic policy shifted from 
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extensive to intensive mode of economic development), and the influence of GDP and energy 
productivity on the promotion of provincial officials is estimated respectively. The results show 
that the average growth rate of GDP can significantly affect the promotion of governors before 
1990, while the impact is not significant after 1990; however, the impact of energy productivity 
on the promotion of a governor is just the reverse. Our sample stage falls right in the second stage 
defined by Chen et al. (2016). The estimation result of changes in the GDP ranking is negative, 
which is because the distribution mean value of changes in the GDP ranking during this sample 
stage is -0.089.  
Third, the impact of other variables (such as the age and tenure of provincial party 
secretaries, whether to convene a meeting of the National Congress of Chinese Communist Party 
and population size) on the promotion of governors is not significant.  
Furthermore, the fitted value of the probability of promotion of a governor can be 
obtained based on the probit model, and such fitted value is the promotion expectation of a 
governor. In addition to the above-mentioned age and tenure of governors, factors affecting the 
probability of promotion are also public information, which governors can easily obtain and 
understand clearly; therefore, they can form their own promotion expectations. 
 
4.4 Interaction mechanism between provincial governors’ promotion expectations, Land 
Finance and house prices 
4.4.1 Model Specification  
This chapter adopts the panel data model to analyze the mechanism of interaction 
between provincial governors’ promotion expectations, Land Finance and house prices. Based on 
the argument above, this section adopts the fitted value of probit estimation as the promotion 
expectations of Chinese provincial governors. The specification of model is as follows: 
0 1 2
0 1 2
_ cos 2008
_ cos 2008
it it it it
it it it it
land t promote X year
hprice land t Z year u
   
  
= + + + +
= + + + +
 
Wherein, i and t denote the province and year, land_cost denotes Land Finance indicator 
measured by the land price, calculated by the ratio of land acquisition cost to area of acquired 
land, promote denotes the probability of promotion of governors, hprice denotes house prices, X 
denotes the control variables affecting land prices, such as the level of urbanization, GDP per 
      (4.7) 
      (4.8) 
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capita, population density; Z denotes the control variables affecting the house prices, including 
construction costs, proportion of unmarried population, foreign investment proportion and loan 
rate, meanwhile, dummy variables of year 2008 are added in the model, controlling 2008 
financial crisis and the policy effect of government policies. 
4.4.2 Variable set 
Based on above model specification, the dependent variable, independent variable and 
control variables are defined as follow.  
Land price (land cost): Land acquisition cost per square meter, as a proxy for Land 
Finance, refers to the expenses that housing development enterprises have to pay in order to 
obtain the use right of land by different means. The land acquisition cost falls into three types. 
Firstly, it is composed of the compensation for the land, the compensation for the attachments to 
or green crops on the land, settlement allowances, the management fee for land acquisition and 
many others that shall be paid if the land use right is obtained by way of land allocation; secondly, 
it is composed of the fees for assignment that are paid in case that the land use right is obtained 
through land transfer; thirdly, it consists of the funds that are paid in order to get the land use 
right through “land auction”. The land acquisition area of the year refers to the land area of which 
the use right is obtained by different means (excluding land appropriation) in the current year. 
The variable will be adjusted according to Consumer Price Index (CPI) of different regions and 
converted into the value of the year 2003. 
House prices (hprice): Since no statistical indicators about house prices of China’s 
provinces, this chapter estimated the house prices of provinces according to the relevant 
statistical indicators in China Statistical Yearbook (2003-2011). Specifically speaking, the prices 
of residential commodity houses of the current year equals to the sales of residential commodity 
houses divided by the sale area. The residential commodity houses refer to those exclusively for 
residence, including villas, apartments, family dormitories and common dormitories of 
employees (including bachelor employees and students dormitories), etc. 
From the above method of house prices calculation, it is known that the price used in this 
chapter is the average price, instead of hedonic house price, which may result in the difference in 
price structure and quality of the houses cannot be captured. Considering that the high-price 
houses and affordable houses only account for a low proportion in China’s house prices structure 
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in the sample period, the deviation caused by the price structure may be ignored (Li and Chand, 
2013). For example, in 2009, the high-price houses accounted for 5% of total sales, affordable 
houses accounted for 4%, and the remaining 91% were sold at conventional prices. In view of 
that the housing sales involve new houses, the difference in quality of sample houses may result 
in overestimation of the overall house prices. 
Other control variables are: (1) House construction cost (construct): The construction 
cost is measured by the construction cost of commercial building upon completion. The variable 
is also adjusted according to CPI of different regions and the year of 2003 is taken as the 
benchmark. (2) GDP per capita (gdp_pop): This chapter will use GDP per capital of each 
province to control the economic development level of the region. The GDP per capita will be 
deflated according to GNP index of each province and converted to the value of the year 2003. (3) 
Foreign investment proportion (fi): It refers to the proportion of the foreign investments in 
capital source of the housing enterprises in each province for the current year. Chen et al. (2016) 
implied that because of eager for foreign investments, local government may attract investors via 
reducing land transfer price. (4) Loan rate (interest): The more-than five-year loan rate released 
by the People’s Bank of China will be adopted as the loan rate for the housing market in this 
chapter. (5) Urbanization level (urban): the urbanization level of a region is measured by the 
proportion of urban population in the total population of the region and this indicator could 
reflect the change of urban-rural dual economic structure (Gong, 2010). (6) Proportion of 
unmarried population (unmarried): It refers to Ratio of unmarried female to unmarried male. (7) 
Population density (pop_area): it is measured by provincial population divided by built urban 
area. 
The data of this chapter comes from China Housing Statistics Yearbook 2003-2011, China 
Statistics Yearbook 2004-2012 and the website of the People’s Bank of China. The samples 
contain the data of 30 provinces other than Tibet Autonomous Region during 2003 to 2011 and 
the descriptive statistics of all variables are shown in Table 4.3. 
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Table 4.3: Descriptive statistics of variables 
Variables Definition 
Mean 
value 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
promote promotion expectations 0.11 0.11 0.01 0.65 
price 
logarithm of housing sales price 
(yuan/m2) 
2970.70 2139.87 964.00 15274.68 
land_cost logarithm of land price (yuan/m2) 1330.51 2107.39 163.58 21643.43 
construct 
logarithm of house construction 
cost (yuan/m2) 
1441.54 515.41 740.10 3892.49 
gdp_pop 
logarithm of GDP per capita 
(yuan/person) 
13589.6 8494.75 3603 48429.95 
fi （%） proportion of foreign investment 0.83 1.43 0.00 18.45 
interest（%） loan interest rate 6.14 0.62 5.40 7.26 
urban （%） urbanization level 47.75 14.86 20.48 89.30 
unmarried 
Ratio of unmarried female to 
unmarried male 
0.72 0.09 0.53 1.20 
pop_area population density 415.34 563.85 7.39 3778.46 
first difference 
promote_fd  0.006 0.107 -0.572 0.310 
price_fd  298.51 504.27 -2187.25 3768.90 
land_cost_fd  198.16 1161.73 -9450.59 8237.23 
construct_fd  85.87 175.69 -845.34 882.41 
gdp_pop_fd  406.76 914.50 -7968.95 6792.66 
fi_fd （%）  -0.03 1.83 -17.95 17.20 
interest_fd（%）  0.18 0.64 -1.32 0.90 
urban_fd （%）  1.53 2.58 -15.80 16.85 
unmarried_fd  0.0036 0.09 -0.35 0.49 
pop_area_fd  8.81 46.96 -39.37 676.92 
Note: the sample quantity is 270. 
 
4.4.3 Estimation results 
This chapter carries out empirical analysis of the mechanism of action between promotion 
incentive, Land Finance and house price based on econometric model formula (4.7) and (4.8). 
Under normal circumstances, ordinary OLS will take 𝛼𝑖 are 𝜀𝑖𝑡  as disturbance term together; 
we cannot control all the variables influencing the land price and house price because of the 
limitations of data; there are differences in the geographic features, institutional environment and 
other aspects of various provinces in China, there may exist omitted variables which are not 
time-varying; therefore, the regression results of OLS may be inconsistent. The econometric 
model adopting panel data can control individual heterogeneity between different provinces, 
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which can solve the endogenous problems caused by omitted variables. Based on whether 𝛼𝑖  is 
associated with explanatory variables, the estimation methods of fixed effect model (FE) and 
random effect model (RE) can be adopted respectively.  If 𝛼𝑖 is not associated with other 
explanatory variables, random effect model is more efficient compared with fixed effect model; 
no matter 𝛼𝑖 is not associated with other explanatory variables or not, the estimation results of 
fixed effect model are always consistent. 
Firstly, the fitted value in promotion expectation estimated in section 4.3 of this chapter is 
used as the proxy variable for promotion expectation, and is used as key explanatory variables of 
Land Finance equation (Equation 4.7) so as to verify its impact on land prices. Secondly, Land 
Finance equation is regressed and then added to housing equation (Equation 4.8) as an 
explanatory variable so as to analyze the influencing mechanism between the land prices and 
house prices. 
As shown in Table 4.4, the Land Finance equation shows the regression results of the 
governor promotion expectations on land prices, the governor promotion expectations and land 
prices are significantly positively correlated, namely the greater a governor considers his 
promotion probability is, the higher the land price of the region is. The estimation coefficient 
indicates that one percentage point increase of the promotion expectations of the governors will 
increase the land prices by 0.043%. The house price equation indicates the regression results of 
land prices and house prices, which have significant positive correlation (Table 4.5); for China’s 
housing market, the same conclusion had been reached by Zhang, Cheng and Ng (2013), Li and 
Chand (2013), Wu, Gyourko and Deng (2012), Du, Ma and An (2011), and in Chapter 3. The 
estimation coefficient of land cost indicates that one percentage point increase of the land prices 
will increase the house prices by 0.124%. The mechanism about promotion expectations of 
governors and fluctuations of house prices lies in that, under the condition of fiscal 
decentralization, governors indirectly affect the house prices by intervening the Land Finance of 
the region, the underlying cause is the official appraisal mechanism with local economic 
development as target. The greater a governor considers his promotion probability is, the greater 
his motivation is to achieve economic growth targets through Land Finance, while land prices are 
the main factor influencing house prices. 
Results about control variables are discussed below. Except for the population density as 
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a newly added control variable in the land finance regression equation, Chapter 3 adopts control 
variables and data periods consistent with that used in this chapter. The difference lies in the 
estimation method, where Chapter 3 adopts overall panel estimate, while this chapter adopts 
two-stage equation estimate. In general, the two chapters are basically the same in aspects of the 
estimated results of control variables: per capita GDP, urbanization rate, construction costs and 
economic stimulus in 2008 significantly affected the house prices, while the effect of the 
proportion of unmarried female to male and the proportion of foreign investment on the house 
prices is not significant, the reason for which has been explained in Chapter 3. The main 
difference between the estimate results of control variables of the two chapters lies in the effect 
of the five-year interest rate on house prices. The effect is not significant in Chapter 3, but 
significant in this chapter, but the signs of estimated coefficients are consistent. The conclusion of 
non-consistency of interest rate on China’s house prices can be manifested by other documents; 
for example, when Li and Chand (2013) used provincial panel data to estimate the market 
fundamentals of China’s house prices, they pointed out that the significance of the influence of 
interest rates on the house price is slightly lower than 10% (0.0998), and the estimated coefficient 
is very small (-0.001). 
In the regression results of promotion expectations and land finance of this chapter, the 
per capita GDP, population density and urbanization rate are positively correlated with land 
prices at least at a significance level of 10%. The per capita GDP controls the economic scale of 
the region, while population density controls the demand for land; with the development of the 
industrialization and urbanization, large population gather in cities, and land has gradually 
become the main source of revenue of local governments. The increase in per capita GDP, 
population density and urbanization rate have led to the scarcity of land, which has led to the rise 
of land prices and encouraged local officials to implement Land Finance so as to create personal 
political capital. In the regression results of Land Finance and house prices, the construction cost 
is the main factor affecting the real house prices, where one percentage point increase in 
construction cost will make house prices increase by about 0.5%. 
We also reported on the test statistics to find out whether there exists multicollinearity or 
individual heterogeneity. The figure of variance inflation factor (VIF) in table 4.4 and 4.5 is 
clearly below 10, indicates there is no multicollinearity between explanatory variables. As for 
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individual heterogeneity, no matter F test of fixed effect model or the Breusch-Pagan LM test of 
random effect model (Breusch and Pagan, 1979) all rejected the original hypothesis without 
individual effects at the significance level of 1%, which also indicates that the usual OLS 
estimation results are inconsistent. The results of Hausman test of Land Finance equation and 
house price equation are 12.42 and 17.23 respectively, rejecting the original hypothesis of “𝛼𝑖  is 
not associated with other explanatory variables of the model” at the significance level of 5%, the 
estimation results of random effect model are inconsistent, so the fixed effect model should be 
adopted. 
 
Table 4.4: Promotion expectations and Land Finance (explained variable: land_cost) 
 (1) (2) 
Variables FE RE 
promote 0.0433* 0.0486* 
 (0.0254) (0.0253) 
gdp_pop 1.1676*** 0.5056** 
 (0.3292) (0.2084) 
urban 0.4897* 0.4734* 
 (0.2840) (0.2693) 
pop_area 0.0015*** 0.0005*** 
 (0.0003) (0.0002) 
year2008 0.4415*** 0.5939*** 
 (0.0741) (0.0560) 
constant -6.9853** -0.3930 
 (2.8101) (1.5245) 
F test 13.44***  
Breusch and Pagan LM test  317.62*** 
Hausman test 12.42** 
Observations 270 270 
R-squared 0.5757  
Variance inflation factor 2.3  
Note：*significance level is 10%; **significance level is 5%; ***significance level is 1%; FE: fixed effect 
panel data model, RE: random effect panel data model. 
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Table 4.5: Land Finance and house price (explained variable：hprice) 
 (1) (2) 
Variables FE RE 
land_cost 0.1244*** 0.1612*** 
 (0.0213) (0.0212) 
construct 0.4992*** 0.6453*** 
 (0.0645) (0.0620) 
fi -0.0049 0.0001 
 (0.0067) (0.0071) 
unmarried 0.0964 0.1261 
 (0.0899) (0.0934) 
interest -0.2959** -0.2080 
 (0.1202) (0.1273) 
year2008 0.1545*** 0.0865*** 
 (0.0299) (0.0298) 
constant 3.2811*** 1.7568*** 
 (0.6414) (0.6227) 
F test 13.29***  
Breusch and Pagan LM test  262.08*** 
Hausman test 17.23*** 
Observations 270 270 
R-squared 0.8523  
Variance inflation factor 1.26  
Note：*significance level is 10%; **significance level is 5%; ***significance level is 1%; FE: fixed effect 
panel data model, RE: random effect panel data model. 
 
4.5 Endogenous test 
Endogenous problem usually comes from three aspects: the omitted variable, 
measurement error and simultaneity bias. We adopted fixed effect estimation and random effect 
estimation in the above panel ordinary least square regression. Fixed effect estimation and 
random effect estimation may effectively eliminate unobservable province difference effect; 
therefore, the endogenous problem of omitted variables generated by the correlation between 
province difference effect and disturbance term of the models is solved.  Promotion 
expectations variable estimated by using a binary choice model can solve endogenous problems 
generated by measurement error. However, there may exist endogenous problem of simultaneity 
bias between the promotion expectations of the officials and the explained variable Land Finance, 
the higher the promotion expectations of officials is, the greater the impetus to drive Land 
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Finance is, which in turn increase the level of economic growth and further increase the 
promotion expectations of officials. Serious endogenous problems can cause inconsistency of 
model coefficient estimate. The panel two-stage least square regression method (2SLS) is 
adopted in the ensuing paragraphs to carry out endogenous test of promotion expectations and 
econometric model of Land Finance. 
The premise of using instrumental variable estimation is the existence of valid 
instrumental variable; therefore, how to find instrumental variables is very important. However, 
the main aspects to be considered for selecting instrumental variables are: On the one hand, the 
instrumental variable is strictly exogenous, and the instrumental variable is correlated with 
endogenous variable. The two requirements of the instrumental variables (correlation and 
exogeneity) are often contradictory, that is to say, variables correlated with the endogenous 
explanatory variables are often associated with the disturbance term of the explanatory variables. 
For panel data models, the lagged variable of endogenous explanatory variable is often used as 
instrumental variable. It is obvious that the endogenous explanatory variable is associated with its 
lagged variable, meeting the requirement of correlation. On the other hand, since the lagged 
variable has already occurred, its value has been fixed from the current perspective, and it may 
possibly be uncorrelated with the current disturbance term. Therefore, for the endogenous test of 
promotion expectations of officials, this chapter takes the lagged term of promotion expectations 
(promote) as instrumental variables, carries out Durbin-Wu-Hausman endogenous test, and 
adopts two-stage least square estimation (2sls). 
The estimation results of instrumental variables are shown in Table 4.6. We should first 
verify the reasonableness of instrumental variables selected, and this chapter takes the lagged 
term of promotion expectations (promote) as instrumental variable. Staiger and Stock (1997) 
pointed out that F statistical value of the first stage should be reported when applying two-stage 
least square method. Judging the correlation between instrumental variables and endogenous 
variables may guarantee the reasonable performance of two-stage least square method, and the 
statistical value should be greater than 10 usually. Therefore, before reporting the results of the 
two-stage least square regression results, we first report the regression results of the first stage, as 
shown in column (1) of Table 4.6; the F statistical value of the first stage regression of 2SLS is 
22.58, indicating that the selection of instrumental variable is reasonable. The column (2) of 
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Table 4.6 shows the estimation results of the second stage regression of 2SLS, the robust 
F-statistical value of Durbin-Wu-Hausman endogenous test is 0.7892, which corresponds to the 
p-value of 0.375, and the original hypothesis of exogenous explanatory variables cannot be 
rejected. In addition, the estimation results of 2SLS instrumental variable show positive but not 
significant correlation between promotion expectations and land prices, the reason is that 
although 2SLS estimation is always consistent, it is not the most effective; using 2SLS estimate 
can lead to a significance level of twist, that is to say, in the case of absence of endogenous 
explanatory variables, the fixed effect estimation of panel data model is the most effective. In 
other words, the estimated results of the effect of promotion expectations on land prices should 
be subject to the FE estimate in Table 4.4, and the 2SLS estimate is only used to verify the 
endogeneity of the core explanatory variables. 
In fact, for Chinese governors, under the background of long-term regulation of the 
housing market (from the day on which the first housing macro control policy State Eight is 
promulgated in 2005), the excessive growth of land prices is not entirely favorable for the 
promotions. The objective of the regulations and controls of the central government on the land 
market has always been maintaining moderate and steady growth. If local governments have not 
taken measures which are expected to cool down the housing market under the circumstance that 
the house price increases rapidly in the short term, then it will be considered politically incorrect 
to some extent. However, compared with economic growth, maintaining house price at a 
reasonable level is not the core pursuit of local officials. Except price fall caused by market 
reasons, maintaining the stable house price periodically during the rapid growth is already bottom 
line that the local officials can accept in their mind. 
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Table 4.6: 2SLS estimation of promotion expectations and Land Finance 
 (1)  (2) 
Variables promote 
2SLS_1st 
 land_cost 
2SLS_2nd 
promote_iv 0.4854***   
 (0.0603)   
promote   0.0360 
   (0.0672) 
gdp_pop 0.1421  0.6972*** 
 (0.2548)  (0.1651) 
urban -0.4269  0.1039 
 (0.4049)  (0.2847) 
pop_area 0.0002**  0.0004*** 
 (0.0001)  (0.0001) 
year2008 -0.0713  0.5763*** 
 (0.1251)  (0.0720) 
constant 1.2630   -0.5346 
 （1.4944）  (0.9059) 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test     0.7892 
F statistical magnitude 22.58   
Observations 240  240 
R-squared 0.2643  0.5864 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, take the logarithm of all the variables in the estimation; 2SLS: 
two-stage least squares of instrumental-variables regression, 2SLS-1st is to regress the endogenous variable of 
promote expectations, while 2SLS-2nd is to use the estimated promote expectations (with endogeneity having 
been removed) as an explanatory variable for regression with land price. 
 
4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter places the promotion expectations, Land Finance and house prices in the 
same frame so as to analyze the mechanism between the three based on the fact of continuous 
rising of the house prices in China. Firstly, this chapter collects data related to the relocation of 
provincial governors, selects probit model to describe the promotion expectations of governors 
by using the championship mode of promotion of Chinese local officials and evaluation 
mechanism with economic development as the target. Secondly, this chapter separately sets up 
measurement model between the promotion expectations and Land Finance, Land Finance and 
house prices, and recognizes the influencing mechanism between the three through panel data 
model. Finally, the regression results of 2003 - 2011 provincial level data show that for samples 
in general, the higher the promotion expectations probability of the governor is, the larger the 
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impact on the local Land Finance is, and the higher land price of the region is, meanwhile, the 
land price level and house price are significantly positive correlated. 
The conclusions of this chapter show that the underlying cause that local officials prefer 
the Land Finance of land transfer is the official assessment and promotion mechanism with 
economic development as the target. The fiscal revenue of the area is assured by Land Finance; 
the targets of economic growth and employment and others are further realized through the 
continuous rising of house prices and the development of housing market driven by land price. 
Under the Chinese-style fiscal decentralization system (administrative centralization and fiscal 
decentralization develop simultaneously), higher (lower) promotion expectations of local officials 
(it refers to governors in this chapter) make them adopt more aggressive (moderate) Land 
Finance method during their tenure, and aggressive Land Finance will increase the house prices 
through two approaches: 1. The development of infrastructure and amenity improve the 
utilizability of land; therefore, the house price is increased; 2.To generate land-sale revenue equal 
to the investment in construction, local government officials have the motivation to maintain 
house prices that they consider reasonable and they even adopt administrative means. 
In order to increase their promotion probability, the local officials continue to strengthen 
the demand for “image” projects, which leads to high dependence on Land Finance, while 
sustained high-intensity Land Finance generates broad and in-depth influences on the economy, 
politics and livelihood of China. Large scale land acquisition from farmers has been found to 
contribute to regional protectionism, inflation, jurisdictional disparity and other problem 
(Feltenstein and Iwata, 2005; Zhang, 2006; Wu and Heerink, 2016). There are also some 
examples of confronting land acquisition by adopting extreme means (such as self-burning, 
killing government workers, etc.) released in the newspapers. We can say that the development of 
China from the late 1990s till today is at the cost of sacrificing the interests of farmers to a large 
extent. 
The contributions of this chapter mainly are: firstly. as far as the author knows, the 
literature on the promotion expectation is not much, while this chapter may be the first attempt to 
introduces the promotion expectation estimation into public administration study, this chapter 
also greatly enriches the variables that can affect the estimation of promotion expectations and 
enhances estimation theories on promotion expectations; secondly, this chapter discusses from 
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the special angle of the impact of promotion expectations of local officials on house prices, 
enriches the theory of house prices, and expands the boundary of study of impacts of subjective 
behavior on the housing market; thirdly, the yardstick competition model of local officials under 
Chinese-style fiscal decentralization system has general reference significance for countries to 
achieve certain economic and social development goals (such as improving environmental 
protection and promoting social equality, etc.). 
Subsequent studies may include: firstly, further define the economic development 
assessment factors affecting the promotion expectations of local officials. This chapter adopts the 
historical average growth rate of GDP during the term of office, which is not the best explanatory 
variable; secondly, extend the impact of promotion expectations on economy to the prefectures 
(diqu) level; such impact may be enhanced on this level; thirdly, Investigate the impact of 
promotion expectations of local officials on other industries, such as the impact on the industries 
causing environmental pollution. 
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Chapter 5 
Conclusion 
 
 
5.1 Overview of the thesis  
Including the conclusion chapter, this thesis consists of five chapters. Chapter 1 is an 
introduction which firstly presented the theoretical backgrounds of and debates on psychological 
factors, expectation, and sentimental variables. What come next was the development and current 
status of China's real estate industry to be studied in this thesis, as well as its key features. The 
three main research subjects to be investigated in this thesis were presented at the end, together 
with a brief discussion. 
As the first subject, the investigation on the bidirectional interaction between Consumer 
Expectation Index in China (as the selected proxy variable for general consumer sentiment) and 
real estate prices has been conducted in Chapter 2. The analysis began with a cointegration 
analysis of macro-variables based on time series data to evaluate the cointegration relationship 
between Consumer Expectation Index and real estate prices at the national level. After a positive 
result was obtained, M2 and quarterly GDP had been added into the time series, so as to test the 
robustness of the cointegration relationship between Consumer Expectation Index and real estate 
prices respectively. 
Based on findings of Chapter 2, the study on the influence of Entrepreneur Confidence 
Index (as the selected proxy variable for investor sentiment) on the house prices across provinces 
has been conducted in Chapter 3, to further clarify the influence of psychological factors on real 
estate prices based on data at a more specific level. The analysis began with the evaluation on the 
overall influence of Entrepreneur Confidence Index on house prices via the panel data model. 
Subsequently, a test of endogeneity on the evaluation model was conducted to avoid omitting 
relevant variables. In light of the level of economic development and geographical location, 
provinces were then divided into three groups: eastern, middle and western regions. The 
influences of the entrepreneurs’ confidence on house prices were estimated via the panel data 
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model respectively. Finally, given the lagged impact exerted by sentimental factors on economy, 
an additional analysis of the influence of lagged entrepreneurs’ confidence on house prices was 
provided. 
China's distinct promotion system for local officials based on quasi-yardstick competition 
has a far-reaching and profound impact on the real estate market. An examination on the 
influence of local officials' promotion expectations on land prices in China, and further on house 
prices, was carried out in Chapter 4. After a systematic introduction on China's bureaucracy 
system, variables were selected out to estimate the local officials' promotion expectations via the 
probit model. Then, the estimated promotion expectations were applied to the panel data model to 
evaluate its influence on land prices and house prices. At last, a test of endogeneity was added on 
the evaluation system about the influence of promotion expectations on land prices, in 
consideration of the concerns on possibly simultaneity bias.  
The thesis has the following characteristics: firstly, discussions all focus on psychological 
factors, expectations, and sentimental variables which are closely interrelated theoretically; 
secondly, all three research topics are concerned with the formation mechanism and influential 
factors of real estate prices at the macro level; thirdly, the research methods and models selected 
in this thesis become increasingly sophisticated as the research proceeds, and comprehensive and 
multiple perspectives have been adopted to perform this research.  
 
5.2 Summary of the empirical findings  
(1) Consumer Expectation Index and real estate prices 
Customer expectations significantly affect assets prices. Recent literatures have indicated 
that the agents' subjective expectations on investment returns are formed varyingly. In other 
words, individual investment decision making is heterogeneous. Some people develop their 
expectations rationally, while other follows a completely irrational path (such as rule of thumbs) 
(Drerup et al., 2017). Consequently, subjective beliefs and stockholding decisions tend to be 
statistically significant, but usually rather small in magnitude (Hurd, 2009; Ameriks et al., 2016). 
Meanwhile, these two mechanisms of investment decision making also reflect two different 
interpretations by current theorists on influence of sentiment (confidence) index on macro 
economy. The former supposes that the influence result from agents’ rational and intelligent 
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processing of current or future fundamental news (Barsky and Sims, 2012). The latter holds that 
the influence originates from the psychologically based animal spirits (Keynes, 1936; Akerlof 
and Shiller, 2009). Therefore, compared with other variables for economic analysis, Consumer 
Expectation Index, as a direct measurement of consumers' subjective expectations, is 
straightforward to facilitate analysis of variation in asset prices. In addition, Consumer 
Expectation Index, as a sub-index of Consumer Confidence Index, is a common index published 
timely and without the needs for following revision, it is more suitable compared with other 
important economic indicators (Koenig, 2002). However, this index has rarely been adopted in 
the real estate sector to study price variations.     
This academic gap is filled by the study in Chapter 2. The study started with literature 
view on the impact of psychological factors and sentimental variables on real estate prices. Then, 
Consumer Expectation Index was used to indicate the agent’s subjective expectation on 
macro-economic climate, and the cointegration analysis based on time series data was deployed 
to evaluate the long-term equilibrium relationship between consumer expectations and real estate 
prices. The empirical result confirmed the relationship at the 1% significance level. If Consumer 
Expectation Index rises by 1%, the real estate price will increase by 4.345%. Then, in order to 
verify the robustness of the empirical conclusions, M2 and the quarterly GDP data were applied 
to the cointegration test one by one. The test result confirmed the robustness of this cointegration 
relationship between consumer expectations and real estate prices. Moreover, the test results with 
the two added factors -- M2 and the quarterly GDP data, indicated an exclusive cointegration 
relationship between real estate prices and Consumer Expectation Index, which suggests 
consumer expectations are more effective to explain and more closely related to the real estate 
prices than the conventional economic fundamentals. 
(2) The entrepreneurs’ confidence and house prices 
Based on the positive findings from the empirical study in Chapter 2, the analysis on the 
influence of the entrepreneurs’ confidence on house prices was conducted in Chapter 3. 
Entrepreneurs are usually regarded as opinion leaders. An opinion leader is an individual having 
prominent influence on the decision-making of other individuals in the opinion communication 
process (Valente and Pumpuang, 2007). Entrepreneur Confidence Index is a component of 
China's economic climate indices, which comprehensively reflects entrepreneurs' optimistic level 
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on the current macroeconomic situation and the development trend, according to their judgment 
on the industrial situation in the enterprise prosperity survey. 
Data on house price and Entrepreneur Confidence Index for different provinces between 
2003 and 2011 were adopted in Chapter 3. After all control variables identified in the literature 
had been input into the estimate model, Entrepreneur Confidence Index was treated as the 
explanatory variable to fulfill the empirical analysis of its overall influence on house prices via a 
fixed effect panel data model. The result indicated that house prices were positively influenced 
by Entrepreneur Confidence Index. When Entrepreneur Confidence Index is increased by one 
percentage point, the house prices rise by 0.27% to 0.38%. The following test of endogeneity 
verified the independent influence of the entrepreneurs’ confidence on house prices. The 
inclusion of this variable into the panel model tends to improve the model's explanatory power. 
Then, the test via the fixed effect panel data model was conducted after dividing the provinces 
into three groups: eastern, middle and western regions, in light of the level of economic 
development and geographical location. The results showed that the intensity of the influence 
imposed by the entrepreneurs’ confidence was positively related to the level of economic 
development. House prices in economically developed provinces were more susceptible to the 
influence of the entrepreneurs’ confidence. Given the lagged effect of the confidence index, an 
empirical test was added on the influence of Entrepreneur Confidence Index at different lag 
phases on house prices. The results showed that the entrepreneurs’ confidence at the first and 
second lag had the greatest influence on the house prices. 
The empirical results from the panel data also confirmed the significant influence of 
control variables including land prices, construction costs, and the urbanization level, on house 
prices. House prices have risen sharply since the 2008 financial crisis, which may be attributed to 
the state government's four trillion investment program. Tremendous government investment 
flew into the real estate market, which had greatly pushed up the price of land and properties. In 
general, the empirical findings on control variables are consistent with that from the literature 
(e.g., Li and Chand, 2013; Wang et al., 2014). 
It is worth noting that the interpretation on whether the influencing potential of market 
sentiment (confidence) on the economy derives from the debate on rational expectations or 
animal spirits. Since the cointegration analysis based on time series data was selected in Chapter 
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2, it became difficult to set control variables to simulate the influence of news on sentiment, 
when investigating the impact by consumer expectations on house prices. Yet, given the attributes 
of panel data model selected for the research in Chapter 3, diverse control variables can be set to 
better control for the influence by objective information (news) on expectations. Therefore, if 
control variables are set, the sentimental index is still able to generate significant influence, and 
thus the view may held that influence primarily derive from the psychological factors in 
subjective expectations. 
(3) The local officials' promotion expectations and house prices 
Based on the following facts: firstly, the promotion and selection system based on relative 
performance appraisal is effective to stimulate individuals' hard work (Milgrom and Roberts, 
1992); secondly, the ex-ante probability of a promotion will induce effort, thereby leading to 
improved performance (Demeré et al., 2015); thirdly, China's distinct regime which combines 
fiscal decentralization and administrative centralization gives birth to Land Finance (Han and 
Kung, 2015; Ding, Niu and Lichtenberg, 2014; Wu and Heerink, 2016). It is inferred that there is 
a competition between China's local officials on “images” (mainly in the form of urban 
infrastructure and amenity) which reflect economic growth rate or local economic achievements 
and are used in performance assessment. It is likely to greatly affect China’s land market and real 
estate market. Then, local officials’ ex-ante promotion expectation determines their commitment 
to this competition. The empirical test in Chapter 4 was conducted in three steps: firstly, variables 
that affect the promotion expectations of these provincial governors were revised in accordance 
with the literatures, and the probit model was developed to estimate the governors' promotion 
expectations. The results showed that age, the serving years at that post, membership of the 
Politburo, and the status of the jurisdiction area (where or not it is a minority area) all 
significantly shaped the promotion expectations. The independent influence by GDP was not 
significant during the sample period. Secondly, the fixed effect panel model was used to work out 
the measurement models on the correlation between the promotion expectation and Land Finance, 
and that between Land Finance and the house prices respectively. The results showed that the 
promotion expectations had a significant impact on land prices, and land prices had a significant 
impact on house prices. At last, a test of endogeneity was conducted, showing that although the 
promotion expectations of governors significantly affected the land prices, but land prices had no 
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significant effect on the promotion expectations. 
 
5.3 Implications  
(1) Consumer Expectation Index and real estate prices 
The conclusion in the thesis on the influence of consumer expectations on real estate 
prices is saliently important to design real estate policies. The research conclusions, on either the 
national or the urban level, are able to guide the control over property-market. The continuous 
rapid growth of real estate prices goes along with the consistent tightening measures, especially 
in first-tier cities like Beijing and Shanghai. The tightening measures range from the escalating 
land, credit and loan, taxation, foreign exchange and security housing policies since 2004, 
through property-purchase restrictions since 2010, to the recent transfer restrictions and pricing 
regulation. Measures become increasingly severe, gradually shifting away from market 
instruments to administrative control. However, the various tightening measures failed to 
generate the effect as expected by the government (Hui and Wang, 2014). The main reason lies in 
the lack of focus on regulating market expectations. Administrative instruments in particular, 
such as purchase restrictions and price control, are easy to stimulate expectations among 
investors that tremendous needs cannot be satisfied, so the price would inevitably rise fiercely 
after the removal of restrictions. As a result, buyers without actual housing demand flock into the 
market, creating extra demand. Besides, regarding market instruments, enough attention should 
be paid to their influence on group psychology and subjective expectations as well. 
Shiller (2005) believed that waves of optimistic, pessimistic or neutral investment 
sentiment and overconfidence prevail in the assets market, which gives rise to spiraling positive 
feedback loops in prices. This is obviously applicable to China's real estate market as well. For 
example, investors in Shanghai, Beijing, Shenzhen, etc. are inclined to overlook market 
information which evidently goes against investment common sense, such as a price-to-rent ratio 
lower than 1%, or a house price-to-household income ratio above 40. Instead, they believe in 
“super cities” and maintain an expectation of continuous rapid increase in house prices. Therefore, 
in order to manage consumers’ expectations on investment returns, new channels and methods 
should be introduced to influence public psychology, in addition to the traditional economic 
variables. What kinds of channels and methods are worth studying. 
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(2) The entrepreneurs’ confidence and house prices 
It has become a common sense to leverage the influence of opinion leaders to implement 
marketing strategies in the marketing world. The real estate sector is of no exception in this 
regard. Although results from recent economic experiments unveil that “players fail to predict 
the fundamental value and that agents have adaptive expectations rather than rational ones" 
(Colasante et al., 2017, p1001), but collective rationality emerges when they have to make 
decisions independently (Colasante et al., 2017). Yet, the preconditions for such independent 
decision making are destroyed by opinion leaders. Shiller (2005) summarized the effects of group 
psychology on market fluctuations into the influence of authority (Asch, 1952, Milgram, 1974), 
herd behavior, information cascade (Bikhchandani et al., 1992) and tale spreading surpassed 
theoretical analysis, etc. All of them can be founded in the influence by entrepreneurs on market 
sentiment related to property investment.  
Deviant behaviors may emerge due to the influence of investment psychology and 
subjective expectations. Consequently, research with mere focus on the influence of traditional 
macroeconomic variables on house prices always end with a finding that economic fundamentals 
cannot sufficiently explain the change of house prices. For instance, Wang et al. (2014) pointed 
out that the actual rise in house prices in China’s several coastal cities differs greatly from the 
expected value based on economic fundamentals. Yet, a reliable explanation can be derived from 
the conclusion on the eastern, middle and western regions in Chapter 3. The results from 
comparative empirical study in Chapter 3 unveil a positive correlation between the intensity of 
the influence by the entrepreneurs’ confidence on house prices and the degree of marketization in 
a given region. The entrepreneurs’ confidence may generate greater far-reaching influence in a 
freer market with a higher level of economic development. Possible reasons are: firstly, a more 
liberal market environment means less government control, so investors and customers can make 
decision more freely based on the market information, and thus are more susceptible to the 
influence of psychological factors. Secondly, a more developed property market means that 
making money through investment (compare to rigid needs) weighs more in terms of the purpose 
to perform a transaction. A real estate market where investment transactions accounted for a large 
proportion is more easily influenced by psychological factors. Thirdly, a more developed and 
more liberal market means richer market information and more complex trade products, so the 
136 
 
effects incurred by imperfect foresight and human inability to solve complex problems with a 
host of variables will come into force (Alchian, 1950). 
(3) The local officials’ promotion expectations and house prices 
Zhuravskaya (2000) maintained that China's rapid economic growth in 1980s and 1990s 
resulted from fiscal decentralization and the great incentives for local officials via promotion. 
Findings from Chapter 4 suggest the root cause behind local officials’ preference to Land Finance 
lies in the promotion system based on relative performance appraisal under this fiscal 
decentralization system. The superior’s power of appointment and removal of his subordinates 
directly and an appraisal system which emphasizes economic development implemented by the 
state government after the reform and opening-up foster local officials’ pursuit for short-term 
economic development. Compared with long-term measures for economic development to 
improve comprehensive economic efficiency, the construction of amenity and infrastructure 
mainly driven by government investment is undoubtedly easier to yield visible outcome within 
the tenure. Land Finance secures local fiscal revenues, and boosts regional economic growth. 
However, it also results in local governments’ high reliance upon Land Finance. The continuous, 
intensive Land Finance has exerted far-reaching and deep-going impacts on China’s economy, 
politics and people’s livelihood. 
An important feature of the study in Chapter 4 is to link the promotion expectations of 
officials with their behavioral consequences from a behavioral perspective. Actions may incur 
either positive or negative consequences. When it comes to local officials, they may attain the 
opportunity of promotion eventually after working hard to win the competition, or may be 
dismissed, squeeze out, or even sentenced to imprisonment for deploying unauthorized policies 
or administrative measures. Negative consequences are worse than stably whiling away the 
tenure. The ex-ante probability of a promotion will induce effort (Demeré, 2015), so the 
commitment to hard work is closely related to the ex-ante probability of a promotion. This 
relationship has been introduced into the research on public management behaviors and used to 
explain specific industry phenomenon in this thesis. 
Sound policies produce positive behavior and results. China’s promotion mechanism for 
local officials based on relative performance appraisal facilitates the fulfillment of many policy 
objectives like environmental governance, social stability, population management and so on, 
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which is also a reference for institutional improvement in other countries. Nevertheless, it should 
be noted that excessive emphasis on one single governance target also incurs other social costs 
under this system. For example, excessive emphasis on population management causes plenty of 
extremely ruthless forced abortions and displaced people for having extra children, which is even 
widely criticized nowadays.  
 
5.4 Future research 
Future research can be conducted in the following aspects. Firstly, price is used as the 
explained variables throughout this thesis. Future research may center on other explained 
variables. For instance, research can be conducted on the correlation between house retention rate 
and social psychological factors. Qualitative and quantitative methods can be adopted to study 
the social psychological factors that determine the house ownership rate. Secondly, based on 
findings from Chapter 2, studies can be furthered on the influence of sentimental variables on the 
fluctuation of house prices. Thirdly, based on results from Chapters 2 and 3, researchers may 
further explore the sentimental indicator in the real estate market, so as to identify more suitable 
barometers to regulate the market and guide investment decision making. Fourthly, based on the 
estimate of promotion expectation in Chapter 4, research can be carried out to further determine 
the assessment criteria related to economic development that affect local officials’ promotion 
expectations. Finally, the study on the influence of promotion expectations on the real estate 
market can be extended to the prefectural level where the influence may be enhanced. Moreover, 
researchers may work on the influence of local officials’ promotion expectations in other fields, 
such as environment pollution.  
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